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100 YEARS OF THE REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN'S DIPLOMACY: UPHOLDING NATIONAL INTERESTS AT THE CROSSROADS OF EPOCHS AND REGIONS

On 9 July 1919, the Government of the Azerbaijani People's (Democratic) Republic (ADR) adopted a temporary instruction on the secretariat of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. According to a Decree of President of the Republic of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev dated 24 August 2007, this date was taken as the basis for the establishment of the Day of employees of the Diplomatic Service of Azerbaijan. One century separates us from a time when the ADR was taking its first steps in the international arena. It was an incredibly hectic century which encompassed the collapse of former empires which perished in the fire of World War One, Azerbaijan's state independence in the form of the first republic in the Muslim East, the loss of this independence, seven decades within the USSR, and the new historic achievement – the proclamation in 1991 of the Republic of Azerbaijan which, for almost three decades, has consistently strengthened its positions in the region and the world as a whole.

Despite living at a junction where the interests of global superpowers converged and often overtly collided, the Azerbaijani people always showed a strong determination and steadfast will to uphold its freedom. This demonstrates a continuity of the traditions of statehood and the fact that it is embedded in national consciousness. Emphasizing this, the Founding Father of the modern Azerbaijani State Heydar Aliyev said in an address to young people in 2001, "Our greatest historic achievement is the acquisition of state independence."

In essence, the past hundred years have become the annals of the formation and development of modern Azerbaijani statehood. It should be noted that the Republic period of our history did not arise in a vacuum – it was organically prepared by all of its predecessors. Located at a crossroads of the Great Silk Road, Azerbaijan confirmed with its own example the accuracy of Napoleon's saying that "Geography is a destiny". Foreign policy mechanisms of promoting their own inter-

ests in such a difficult environment, their alignment with the aspirations of close and distant states were not at all alien to the old generations of our ancestors. There are quite a few documents in the archives of various countries regarding an exchange of embassies between medieval Azerbaijani states and those of Europe, Russia and Asia. One of the most remarkable figures of that time was Sarah Khatun, the mother of Uzun Hasan – the ruler of the Aghgoyunlu dynasty. She was so insightful in state affairs that she would conduct important negotiations and even succeeded in reaching an agreement with Ottoman Sultan Mehmet II, thus writing her name in history as the first female diplomat in the Muslim world.

Such was the rich historical foundation on which the people of Azerbaijan began to transform into a new social and political community, a nation, in the 19th century. This process proceeded synchronously with many countries of Eastern Europe and led to the subsequent proclamation of a state that embodied the model of a parliamentary republic. The Act of Independence of Azerbaijan adopted by the National Council on 28 May 1918 already stated: "The Azerbaijani Democratic Republic guarantees within its borders civil and political rights to all its citizens irrespective of ethnic origin, religion, social status and gender". The document also emphasized the desire to "establish good-neighboring relations with all members of the international community".

Of course, the very existence of the ADR in the aftermath of World War One, the Bolsheviks' expansion and the aggression on the part of neighboring Armenia was as difficult and turbulent as it was crucial in terms of the development of Azerbaijan's foreign relations. At that time, there were diplomatic missions of 16 states operating in Baku, including, for example, those of the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland, Belgium, Persia, Poland, Ukraine, etc. In its turn, the ADR Government had diplomatic and consular missions in Georgia, Armenia, Turkey, Ukraine and other countries, not to mention the delegation at the Paris Peace Conference. Thanks to the ADR Government, its explanatory work and interaction with foreign countries, the ADR on 11 January 1920 was de facto recognized by the Supreme Council of the Paris Peace Conference. Unfortunately, the fall of the ADR under the onslaught of the 11th Red Army on 28 April 1920 interrupted the process of international recognition of Azerbaijan's independence and prevented its logical conclusion – admission to the League of Nations.



Nevertheless, the 23 months of the ADR's tumultuous history with five different Cabinets of Ministers and international situation changing with a kaleidoscopic speed demonstrated Azerbaijan's ability to build diplomatic contacts with foreign countries and the focus on the development of such interaction.

This circumstance could not be ignored even by the new Bolshevik leaders who came to power in April 1920. In particular, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Azerbaijan SSR operated until the end of 1921, while missions



of a number of foreign states stayed in Baku until 1923. Also, the Embassy of Soviet Azerbaijan operated in Ankara. However, after the establishment of the Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic (TSFSR) and its entry into the USSR, the decision was made to limit foreign policy activities of Azerbaijan and its relations with the outside world. Up until 1944, Azerbaijan, like other Soviet republics, was deprived even of formal rights to maintain foreign political contacts. However, awaiting a victorious completion of World War Two, Moscow decided in 1944 to revitalize, albeit at a purely symbolic level, the People's Commissariats of Foreign Affairs in USSR republics. These were transformed into ministries in 1946. However, up until 1968 the activities of these departments were so dependent on the central Soviet government that the person holding the post of minister in most of the Union republics except for Ukraine and Belarus, which had representative offices in the UN, performed these duties in combination with another position. In 1968, Baku became the first capital where the foreign minister focused on diplomatic work only.

Overall, as was the case in many other areas, the period when Heydar Aliyev led Soviet Azerbaijan was marked by the emergence of qualified Foreign Ministry professionals who subsequently formed the backbone of the diplomatic corps for the young Azerbaijan Republic.

Having restored its state independence in 1991 and become a fully-fledged member of the UN on 2 March 1992, just like at the beginning of the 20th century Azerbaijan was faced with aggression on the part of the Republic of Armenia. The unlawful use of force with the aim of seizing the territories of the Republic of Azerbaijan was accompanied by large-scale ethnic cleansing and flagrant violations of international humanitarian law, including the Khojaly act of genocide. For more than a quarter of a century now, Azerbaijan has been fighting for the restoration of its territorial integrity and the right of its internally displaced persons to return to their places of origin in the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan and adjacent administrative districts that are still under occupation.

In the current circumstances, it is quite clear that the elimination of the consequences of the military aggression by the Republic of Armenia is the primary and most significant problem which the Republic of Azerbaijan as a responsible member of the international community is trying to peacefully resolve through substantive and result-focused negotiations. As is known, the UN Security Council in 1993 adopted four resolutions – 822, 853, 874 and 884, which express explicit support for the sovereignty, territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and the fact that the Nagorno-Karabakh region is a part of Azerbai-

jan, condemn aggression and seizure of the country's territories, and demand an immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of occupying forces.

For many years, the Republic of Armenia has tried to torpedo the conflict resolution process in every possible way, evaded its international obligations not to use force or threats of using force, to resolve international disputes by peaceful means, to respect the inviolability of state borders and territorial integrity of states. This line of conduct has brought Armenia to a dead end which can only be removed by normalizing the relations with neighbors and abandoning annexationist intentions. The sooner the Armenian leadership understands this fundamental truth and displays political will to start withdrawing its armed forces from the territories of our country they are holding by force, the sooner it will be possible to start moving towards creating conditions for a sustainable peace, security, well-being and development in the region.

On the other hand, despite the presence of foreign aggression, a balanced and multi-vector foreign policy pursued by the Azerbaijani state ensures consistent strengthening of Azerbaijan's international authority and significance in the system of international relations. By developing mutually beneficial and equitable cooperation both in bilateral and multilateral formats, Azerbaijan follows the path of meeting the needs of national progress by promoting its external relations and partnership. In particular, diversified cooperation develops successfully with all neighboring states – except for Armenia, of course. Azerbaijan grants its transit opportunities for the implementation of logistical projects within the framework of the East-West, North-South and South-West corridors. The development of the country's rich energy potential continues. Along with the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan main export pipeline, which has been a source of major revenue for many years, work on the Southern Gas Corridor is also in its final stages. Azerbaijan takes the most active part in the dialog among Caspian littoral states, which led to the signing of the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea in 2018 and created the conditions for the transformation of the Sea into a zone of peace, good neighborliness, peace and cooperation. All this has allowed us the opportunity to minimize the adverse impacts of crises, which undermined global economic growth.

The internal potential accumulated in this way is consistently converted into the successes of Azerbaijan in various international organizations and initiatives. In

particular, after a nonpermanent membership in the UN Security Council in 2012-2013, Azerbaijan was elected by 176 votes as a member of the UN Economic and Social Council for 2017-2019. From 2019, Azerbaijan will assume presidency in the Non-Aligned Movement, the world's second biggest international platform Azerbaijan joined in 2011. The mere fact that a recent member of the Movement prepares to lead the organization is highly indicative. The significant progress made in advancing the cooperation with the European Union, as well as the consistent development of cooperation with NATO, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the League of Arab States, the African Union and the Organization of American States, also creates a favorable background for representing and defending our national interests. At the same time, Baku takes the most active part in the interaction within the framework of international organizations it is a member of. The OSCE, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the Cooperation Council of Turkic-speaking States, the CIS, GUAM, the Council of Europe and the BSEC are some of such multilateral formats.

Speaking about the place and role of Azerbaijan in the system of international relations, it should be noted that our country acts not only as an acceptor of signals transmitted from the main power centers, but also as an active producer making a tangible contribution to the definition of the global agenda. In recent years, Baku has established itself as one of the leading platforms for promoting the values of the dialogue of cultures, religions and civilizations. Launched at the initiative of President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev in 2008, the Baku process has become an effective factor in promoting the highest values of humanism at the global level.

It can be stated with full confidence that Azerbaijani diplomacy can be rightfully proud of the tumultuous century-old road it has covered. As President Ilham Aliyev said at the Global Baku Forum in 2018, "I think that if the founders of the first Democratic Republic had the chance to see how Azerbaijan develops today, they would have definitely been proud of us. We are proud of them. We demonstrate, first of all, to ourselves and also to the world that only during independence people can achieve success. Only when their density is in their hands, when they are masters of their fate they can be successful. Today's Azerbaijan is a good demonstration of that."

Ramiya ISMAYLOVA

EUROPEAN AND RUSSIAN DIPLOMATS' ACTIVITY IN AZERBAIJAN IN 13TH-17TH CENTURIES

Plano Carpini



Azerbaijan, a country with rich resources of raw materials, highly developed craftsmanship and a favorable geographical location, has always drawn the attention of other states. While establishing diplomatic and trade relations with Azerbaijani states, foreign countries focused on the description of cities, the ethnic composition and religious affiliation of the local population and the types of available crafts and goods. Therefore, the notes of ancient and medieval diplomats currently serve as an important source of information for studying the history of Azerbaijan.

Mongol invasions and the establishment of the Mongol Empire, the ensuing emergence of the state of Amir Timur, Ottoman military campaigns and the founding of the Ottoman Empire, the emergence of the Safavid state, as well as the transition of major trade routes, were the driving factors for the surge in the number of European and Russian ambassades being sent to the East. Most of those ambassades left behind documents and travel notes relating to Azerbaijan.

Plano (Palazio) Carpini (13th century), an Italian monk of the Franciscan Order, was delegated to the East in accordance with a decision of the Catholic Lyon Cathedral in 1245 "to convince the Mongols to accept the Christian faith and to turn their weapons against the Turks and Arabs." Six monks serving as ambassadors, including Plano Carpini, started a trip to meet with the Mongol khans. Carpini travelled through Russia, passing by the Caspian Sea and heading to Central Asia. Upon return to his home country, he published his travel notes, which also included information about Azerbaijan.

William of Rubruck (around 1215 to around 1270) was a French monk from Flanders, who hailed from the Rubruck village near Saint-Omer. In 1253-1255, he was delegated by the King of France Louis IX to meet with the Mongol Khan Mangu. Rubruck headed to Sudak in Crimea from Constantinople through the Black Sea and onward to Matriga near Azov, via the Don and Volga rivers, the steppe, southward from Lake Balkhash to Karakorum, the residence of the Mongolian "great khan", arriving there on December 27, 1253. On his way back,

Rubruck turned southward from Sarai on the Volga, crossing Derbent, Shamakhi, the Mughan steppe and Nakhchivan. Rubruck further reached Erzurum, Cilicia, Cyprus, Antioch, and Tripoli, arriving at this destination by August 15, 1255 whence he sent a message notifying King Louis IX that he had fulfilled his mission. Rubruck cited a number of facts regarding the parts of the Caucasus he traversed during his trip, providing descriptions of Derbent, Ganja, Shamakhi and Nakhchivan and information about the activities of the local population.

Marco Polo (born circa 1254 in Venice) is a world-famous explorer. His father and his uncle, Niccolo and Maffeo, who were engaged in mercantile trade in Constantinople, visited countries subject to the Mongol khans and were hosted by Kublai Khan in China circa 1255. On their way back, Niccolo and Maffeo were instructed by Kublai Khan to arrange sending missionaries to the Pope. Having completed this assignment, they went to see the khan again in 1271, taking the young Marco with them. Marco Polo became fluent in Mongolian and other Oriental languages, learned the local customs and went on to receive various administrative and financial assignments from Kublai Khan, which allowed him to visit many Asian countries. Marco Polo's journey, which was generated by the interests of the Venetian merchant capital and those pertaining to the feudal-Catholic policy, surpassed by far all the previous trips of Europeans to Asia. Marco Polo travelled from Asia Minor to Tabriz, Isfahan, Hormuz and Khorasan, through Pamir and the Gobi Desert. His return journey stretched from the shores of China, circumventing Asia by sea into Hormuz, and then back to Tabriz, Erzurum, Trabisond and onward. Polo headed back as late as in 1292 and returned to Venice by the end of 1295. In 1298, Polo took part in a naval battle with the Genoese as an officer of the Venetian fleet and was captured. While in captivity in Genoa, he talked about his travel experiences with Rusticiano, a fellow captive. The latter's notes, supplemented by Polo himself, were at the core of the description of his journey.

Ruy Gonzalez de Clavijo (died in 1412) was a nobleman from Madrid, who served as Ambassador of Castile to the court of Timur. The growing might of the state of Amir Timur and its rivalry with Turkey were of great interest in Western Europe and drew particular attention in the states that were involved in trading with the East. Castile, which embarked on a path of colonial policy from the end of the 14th century, was one of the first European countries to forge ties with Amir Timur.



Gilliom de Rubruck

An embassy mission that included Clavijo, Alfonso Paez de Santa Maria and Gomez de Salazar was active in the East in 1403-1406. Clavijo kept a travel diary for the embassy. The embassy mission traveled via Cadix, Constantinople, Sinop, Trabisond, Erzincan, Erzurum, Alashkert, Igdir, Bayazet, Khoy, Tabriz, Miane, Sultaniye, Tehran, Damgan, Nishapur, Mashhad, Ankhoy, Balkh and Samarkand, arriving there on September 8, 1404. The mission was hosted by Timur in Samarkand. During their return trip the diplomats traveled via Bukhara, Abiward, Jajerm and Damgan whence they took the previous path, subsequently reaching Khoy. Since it was unsafe to go through the Bayazet region, they had to head toward Ani and Kars and onward to Georgia, Tortum, Trabisond and then to Castile by sea.

Clavijo's diary does not contain medieval "fiction". The accurate information he provided in it has been confirmed by recent research. He managed to document a lot of important facts from the realities pertaining to Azerbaijan.

Afanasy Nikitin, a well-known Russian merchant from Tver, made a major trip to the Caucasus, Persia and India in 1466-1472, which was in line with international aspirations of the Russian traders. During his journey Nikitin was engaged in commercial transactions; he went bankrupt a few times and his business picked up several times again during that time period. His description of localities is rather inconsistent, but he mainly focused in his writings on all matters related to trade and domestic life.

Initially, Shamakhi was the final destination of Nikitin's trip. A convoy comprised of two ships, loaded by Nikitin and other Tver merchants with goods, joined Shirvan Ambassador Asanbeg (Hasan Bay), who was returning from Moscow at that time, and headed to Astrakhan through the Volga river. The convoy was plundered



there, but Nikitin and his fellow travelers continued their journey toward Derbent on board the two ships along with Asanbeg. The ship carrying Nikitin's fellow travelers crashed due to a storm near Tarkov, while Nikitin, himself, was captured by a Kaitag ruler. However, Nikitin managed to reach Derbent. Moscow Ambassador Vasily Papin, delegated to Shirvanshah Farrukh Yasar, was there at the time. The Russian merchants were released from captivity owing to the efforts of Farrukh Yasar and V. Papin. Nikitin further headed to Baku from Derbent and onward to Persia circa 1466. In the spring of 1469, he headed to Muscat from Hormuz whence he went to India, staying there until early 1472. On his way back Nikitin traveled via Muscat again to Bandar Abbas and onward to Shiraz. He further went to Yazd, Isfahan, Kashan, Tabriz, Erzurum, Trabisond and Kafa, Kyiv and farther up the Dnieper.

Throughout his journey, Nikitin took notes titled "Traveling beyond three seas". Following his death, the notes were acquired by Mamrev, a civil servant of the Grand Prince of Moscow Vasily, and further included in the Russian chronicle. 19th century Azerbaijani Orientalist Mirza Kazim Bay was one of those who initially took heed of those notes and published them.

Josaphat Barbaro (died in 1493) was a Venetian nobleman and diplomat. Barbaro came from an old noble family that included many people engaged in diplomacy, military science, art and sciences, as well as owned major commercial enterprises. During his commercial activity in 1436-1452 Barbaro lived in Tana (Azov), which at that time was the main center for Venetian trade on the Black Sea. Barbaro visited Crimea, the North Caucasus and the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus. In 1469, Barbaro served as the governor of the Republic of Venice in Shkodra, Albania. In 1471-1473, he acted as the Venetian ambassador to the court of the Aq Qoyunlu ruler, Uzun Hasan.

The conquest of Constantinople by the Turks in 1453

Marco Polo

had an adverse impact on the Venetian trade. Therefore, Venice established diplomatic relations with Uzun Hasan of Aq Qoyunlu, Turkey's rival in Asia. Venice, which maintained ties with Aq Qoyunlu by running embassies in the Shah's court, was represented there by Caterino Zeno and Barbaro in 1471 and Contarini in 1473. The purpose of the embassies was to coordinate the military action of Venice and Aq Qoyunlu against Turkey.

Barbaro traveled from Venice to Cyprus, Cilicia on the Euphrates, Tabriz, Sultaniye and Isfahan, and also reached Samarkand and India. During his return trip he headed to Tabriz, Shamakhi, Derbent, Moscow, as well as Poland and Germany. Upon his arrival in Venice Barbaro compiled a description of his journey, which included extensive information about Azerbaijan. He provided a comprehensive description of the state of Aq Qoyunlu, including versatile and valuable data pertaining to geographical conditions, natural resources, the ethnic composition and domestic life of local residents, economic and social relations, the political system, military affairs, and even cultural monuments.

Ambrogio Contarini (15th century) was a Venetian diplomat who hailed from an ancient aristocratic family. The latter included a number of statesmen, scholars and artists and had a prominent position in the Venetian trade. In 1473-1477, Contarini served as the Venetian ambassador to the court of Uzun Hasan, a diplomatic post aimed at coordinating Venice and Aq Qoyunlu's hostilities against Turkey.

Contarini traveled from Venice through Germany, Poland, Kyiv and onward to Kafa whence he headed toward Batum by sea along the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus, via Guria toward Poti and then to Kutais, Gori, Lori and Tabriz. On August 4, 1474, he arrived in Tabriz and then went to Sultaniye, Qom, Kashan and Isfahan where he met Barbaro and along with him was received by Uzun Hasan on November 4.

Contarini headed to Tabriz with Uzun Hasan. On June 28, 1475, Contarini left Tabriz, while Barbaro stayed there. He traveled through Tbilisi, Imereti, Mingrelia and Guria. Having reached the mouth of the Rioni River, he learned about the capture of Kafa by the Turks (July 1475), which prompted him to return to Tbilisi and stay there until October 21. Contarini further opted to travel via Shamakhi, Derbent and onward to Astrakhan by sea, arriving there by April 30. Until January 1477, he stayed in Russia and arrived in Venice as late as on

April 10, 1477. Contarini compiled a description of his journey, which included interesting information about Azerbaijan. Contarini's "Journey" is a travel diary reflecting his personal impressions regarding the visited locations. Both Contarini and Barbaro, who truly represented the Venetian school of diplomacy, provided scarce information about their "journeys" intended for the general public or their diplomatic mission. Instead, Contarini cited a number of interesting facts about all the locations he traversed along the way (Shamakhi, Derbent, Tabriz, etc.) This information pertained to the local population, its ethnic background, natural wealth, trade, customs, cities and fortifications. The "Journey" of Contarini was published for the first time in Venice in 1487.

Paul Iovy Novokomsky (died in 1552) was a bishop who hailed from the Lombardy city of Kole in Italy. He wrote a number of political and geographical compositions, including "The Book about the Ambassade sent by Vasili Ivanovich, Grand Prince of Moscow, to Pope Clement VII". The "Book about the Ambassade" is extremely biased, but it contains information about Azerbaijan and neighboring countries.

Anthony Jenkinson made a voyage in 1546 along the Atlantic coast of Europe and the Mediterranean Sea (Germany, Holland, Spain, Portugal, Mediterranean islands, the European part of Turkey, Syria, Palestine and the Mediterranean coast of Africa), drawing the attention of the Moscow (Muscovy) Trading Company, which was established in England in 1555. The founding of the company paved the way for English expeditions in the second half of the 16th century to Muscovy and onward to Azerbaijan, Central Asia and Persia along the Volga-Caspian route. Jenkinson initiated and participated closely in those journeys and expeditions, making four such trips in 1557-1571. He also provided descriptions of all the trips. One of these was an overview of his journey to the Safavid state, which is of great importance for the history of Azerbaijan. Jenkinson arrived in Astrakhan on June 10, 1561 and further visited Derbent, Shamakhi, Javad, Ardabil, Tabriz and Qazvin, which was home to Shah Tahmasib's residence at that time.

Jenkinson provided a precise economic and geographical overview of his entire journey through the Caucasus, describing the cities he visited in detail. He portrayed the Turkish-Safavid rivalry that occurred in that time period as a struggle for trade routes, and above all, the route of transporting Shirvan and Gilan silk to Europe. Jenkinson also compiled a map of his travel along the shores of the Caspian Sea.



Ruy de Clavijo

In this period, the Muscovy Trading Company sent the following employees to Azerbaijan on trade and diplomatic missions: **Richard Johnson** (1565; he was the organizer of a British expedition to the south through Azerbaijan, who provided a description of that trip); **Arthur Edwards** (he participated in three expeditions and drew up a description of his trip that took place in 1565-1567, which included information about trade in Azerbaijan, mainly in Shamakhi); **Lawrence Chapman** (he participated in one of the expeditions in 1568 with a stopover in Azerbaijan and left behind a detailed description of it); **Christopher Barrow** (in 1579-1581 he participated in the company's expedition, visited Azerbaijan and left a detailed description of the journey).

Stefan Kakash and Tekdander. **Stefan Kakash**, a native of Semigradie (Transylvania), was delegated in 1602 by the German Emperor Rudolf II Habsburg in the capacity of Ambassador to Safavid Shah Abbas I. The delegation was sent in response to the embassy mission of Huseyn Bay and Anthony Shirley, an Englishman, which was delegated by Shah Abbas in 1600. The mission was expected to seek the Shah's support in the struggle against Turkey. Kakash was accompanied by Tekdander, his secretary (died in 1614), and Aqelast, his aide. Kakash died on October 25, 1603 in the vicinity of Lankaran, prescribing that others would take over and fulfill the diplomatic mission vested in him.



Aqelast died in Qazvin in early November, and **Tekdander** had to carry out the assignment on his own. Upon return following his meeting with Shah Abbas I, Tekdander presented a detailed description of his journey to Emperor Rudolf II in Prague on January 8, 1605. Shortly thereafter, it was circulated by print media.

Kakash and his assistants traveled from Prague to Krakow, Minsk and Moscow, then to Kazan and onward to Astrakhan along the Volga river and via the Caspian to Lankaran on board a merchant ship. Tekdander further went to Qazvin and returned to Tabriz. Shah Abbas I, who had arrived in the Iranian city by then, received Tekdander there. He then traveled with the Shah, who was launching a campaign, to Marand, Julfa, Nakhchivan, and Irevan, and witnessed the siege of this city. Tekdander further traveled "through the Gordian and Moskhi Mountains to the Koisu river and then to

Stefan Kakash

Terek, onward to Astrakhan by sea and then through Moscow to Prague via the same route. Tekdander precisely described his entire trip, in particular, his travel to Lankaran, Qazvin, Tabriz, Irevan, Julfa and Terek on the Koisu river bank. The meetings with Shah Abbas were described in detail.

Mikhail Nikitich Tikhonov was a Muscovy nobleman. In 1613-1614, he was delegated to Shah Abbas I as Ambassador together with Alexei Bukharov, in a bid to restore Moscow's diplomatic relations with the Safavids, which soured during the so-called "troubled times".

In November 1613, Tikhonov's ambassador, together with Safavid Ambassador Amir Alibay, who was visiting Moscow, was en route to Nizhny Novgorod, Samara and Urgench, since Mikhail Romanov's reign had not yet been established in Astrakhan and the Caspian route was closed. Furthermore, the diplomats arrived in Kizilagac on December 18, having traveled through Mashhad, Qazvin and Ardabil. They were received by Shah Abbas on the following day. On December 25, Bukharov left for Shamakhi, while Tikhonov, himself, stayed there for a few days to conclude the negotiations with Shah Abbas and visited Lankaran together with him. On his way back, Tikhonov traveled via Shamakhi, Derbent, Tarki, Terek and Astrakhan.

Ivan Brekhov was a Kazan-born Muscovy nobleman. Brekhov, who was a career serviceman, participated in battles in the North Caucasus and military campaigns against the Poles. In 1614-1615, he was delegated to the Safavid state together with Stepan Afanasyev, an interpreter. Having left Moscow on July 23, 1614, Brekhov traveled through Terek, Tarki, Derbent and Shamakhi. On October 23, the embassy mission visited the camp of Shah Abbas I near Tiflis. The delegates were hosted by the Shah on October 26 and together with him traveled onward to Kizilagac where they joined the embassy mission of Tikhonov, subsequently starting their return trip from Lankaran. In June 1615, the ambassador returned to Moscow simultaneously with Tikhonov's delegation.

The documents of Tikhonov and Brekhov's embassy missions contain data depicting the situation in the Caucasus in the early 17th century after Shah Abbas I asserted his power in the Safavid state.

Grigory Shakhmatov was a Moscow boyar who was delegated in 1615-1616 to Shah Abbas I with a letter from the Tsar together with Yermola Grigoryev, a translator. He traveled via Moscow, Astrakhan, Terek,

Adam Olearius

Tarki, Derbent, Shamakhi, Ardabil, Qazvin, Sava, Qom, Kashan and Isfahan. The Tsar's letter was handed over to the Shah on August 30, 1615. Shakhmatov stayed in Isfahan until early November. He returned to Moscow by June 15, 1616. Shakhmatov's message whereby he reported on the fulfillment of his mission upon his return included considerable information about Azerbaijan.


Mikhail Petrovich Baryatinsky, a prince, served as a war chief in a number of cities and took part in battles against the Poles. In 1618, he teamed up with I. I. Chicherin, a nobleman, and M. Tyukhin, a clerk, heading an embassy mission seeking to secure a cash subsidy from Shah Abbas I for the Moscow authorities. The delegates left Moscow on May 23, 1618, traveling via the waterways (the Moskva, Oka and Volga rivers) to Astrakhan, via the Caspian to Nizovaya whence they headed to Shamakhi, Ardabil and Qazvin, arriving there on November 3. The Shah hosted the visitors on the following day. Though Baryatinsky's mission enjoyed a warm welcome, it was a complete failure. The delegates spent the winter in Qazvin where Baryatinsky died later. Chicherin and Tyukhin left Qazvin on September 16, 1619 and returned to Moscow via Ardabil, Shamakhi, Shabran, Derbent, Tarki, and Terek.

Fedor Afanasyevich Kotov, a Moscow merchant representing "the sovereign's treasury", visited the Caucasus and Persia along with eight fellow travelers in 1623, in accordance with the Tsar's decree, and compiled a travel diary upon return "about traveling to the Persian kingdom and from Persia to Turkey and to India and Ormuz where the ships arrive". Kotov left Moscow on May 5, 1623, traveling by waterways (Moskva, Oka and Volga rivers) to Astrakhan and to Niyazabad by sea, arriving there on August 14, and then continued his journey by caravans. The travel diary was compiled according to the following routes: 1. Astrakhan, Terek, Niyazabad (by water), "Shevran"; 2. Astrakhan, Terek, Tarki, Kaitag, Derbent, "Shevran" (overland route); 3. "Shevran", Shamakhi, Ardabil, Zanjan, Sultaniye, Abqar, Qazvin, Saveh, Qom, Kashan, Natenz, and Isfahan. The distances covered by the travelers were cited as the number of days spent on the road. An emphasis was placed on the description of individual urban centers, mainly from the viewpoint of trading (bazaars, caravanserais, etc.). Moreover, the travel diary contained a lot of interesting general data such as topography of the terrain, buildings and the everyday life of local residents. It also provides in-



formation about Derbent, the "Derbent area", a village located one Verst (an old Russian measure of length) away from Niyazabad, as well as Shamakhi and Ardabil. There is also a description of such Muslim holidays as "Bayram-Nosurus", "Bayram-Romazan" (Ramadan), and Ashura, the day of mourning. This is followed by descriptions of the trips from Persia to Turkey and India (apparently not made by Kotov himself): 1. Shamakhi, Ganja, Irevan, Alashkert (Malazgirt), Erzurum, Erzincan, Karahisar, Tokat, Amasya and Constantinople; a note was added that trips were also made from Ardabil to Tabriz and from Qazvin to Baghdad and Basra; 2. Isfahan, Kashan, Qom, Varamin, Tehran, Farabad, Mashhad, Kandahar and onward (very briefly) to Hormuz.

Artemy Sukhanov was a Russian nobleman and the personal secretary of the Moscow Patriarch. In 1637-1640, Sukhanov participated in F. Volkonsky's ambassade



Passage from a book by Ambrogio Contarini. 15th century

to Kakhetia. In 1649-1653, Sukhanov was delegated to the eastern provinces and traveled through Azerbaijan in 1651-1652 on his way back. Afterwards, he made a lot of relevant comments in his travel notes called "Proskynetarion". During his trip through Azerbaijan he traveled via Erzurum, Ganja, Shamakhi, Tbilisi, Mtskheta, and then again via Shamakhi, as well as Derbent and Tarki.

Adam Olearius was a German scholar born circa 1600 in Aschersleben near Magdeburg. He graduated from Leipzig University in 1627 with a master's degree in philosophy. He moved to Holstein due to wars. Serving as the ambassadorial secretary and later as an adviser, he was part of the Holstein ambassades of Philip Kruse and Otto Brugemann to Moscow and the Safavid state, which were aimed at concluding treaties with both countries on carrying out silk trade through Moscow to Holstein, which had a conducive location between the Baltic Sea and North Sea. Olearius visited Muscovy and Azerbaijan twice in 1636-1639 as part of the embassy mission. Olearius also held the position of chief librarian and headed the cabinet of curiosities in the court of the Dukes of Holstein-Gottorp. He enriched the library with a great number of Persian and Arabic manuscripts brought from the East. As for the items stored in the cabinet of curiosities, he acquired the famous collection

of Dr. Paludan for this purpose. He also oversaw the creation of the well-known Gottorp globe, which was subsequently presented to Peter the Great in 1713. Olearius compiled the Arabic-Persian-Turkish dictionary, translated the "Gulustan" by Saadi into German and wrote the Holstein chronicle. He learned Oriental languages during his trip and upon his return home spent time processing the collected data. He is known for describing his trip to Moscow, the Caucasus and Persia. The first edition (1647) provides this description as a travel diary; in 1656, the text was scientifically processed and supplemented with detailed descriptions of Moscow, the Caucasus and Persia.

Following their departure from Moscow on June 30, 1636, the delegates traveling by waterways visited Astrakhan, went to Terek by sea, as well as Niyazabad; they used a caravan to reach Shamakhi and Jevat, at the confluence of the Kura and Araz rivers, and also traveled to Ardabil, Sultaniye, Qazvin, Qom, Kashan, and Isfahan, arriving on August 3 and eventually staying there until December 21. On their way back, they traveled via Qazvin, Rasht, Gilan, Kizilagac, Mughan, Shamakhi, Derbent, Tarki, Terek, and Astrakhan.

Olearius provided very detailed descriptions of the areas of the Caucasus he visited, along with a comprehensive and precise overview of various ethnic groups and geographical regions of the Caspian Sea. He paid great attention to the natural conditions, flora and fauna of the country, crafts of the local population and the social structure. His impressions of the trip are combined with scientific observations and comments based on the accounts of earlier well-known travelers and writers. The book of Olearius is amply illustrated. The edition is supplemented by maps of the Caucasus, the Caspian Sea and Gilan. Olearius, himself, attached great importance to the corrections and elaborations he had made in the maps of the Caspian that existed at that time. Cornelius Klaus Kluting, a Dutch captain and engineer, who was in charge of the ship carrying the embassy mission and later, upon the instruction of the Moscow authorities, fortified the city on the Terek, was the closest associate of Olearius in compiling the maps. *

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Map compiled by Anthony Jenkinson indicating the countries he visited



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*A caravan on the Great Silk Road.
Medieval miniature painting*



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PhD in History

EMBASSY OF NADER SHAH AFSHAR IN RUSSIA

Nader Shah. 18th century painting by an Oriental artist



In the 18th century, running permanent diplomatic missions within the courts of other states was not yet an established practice in the East. Therefore, exchanges among embassies, along with diplomatic correspondence, were the main option in establishing and maintaining intergovernmental contacts. Information about the embassies of the ruler of Iran (Persia) Nader Shah is interesting in many ways. This data sheds light on the relations among major empires, the political situation in the Caucasus region, the diplomatic etiquette and ceremonial rituals of that time period. The issue of Nader Shah's embassies is also fascinating from the viewpoint of assessing the extent of the impact of cultural and civilizational differences on the course and outcomes of diplomatic negotiations.

The political and socio-economic crisis that engulfed the Safavid state by the early 1720s ultimately led to its collapse, which was largely facilitated by the uprisings of the conquered nations. One of such riots, staged by the Afghan Ghilzai tribe in the Kandahar province, brought about the formation of an independent Afghan principality. Taking advantage of the military and political weakness of the Safavid state, **the Afghan feudal elite carried out a raid into the Safavid state's territory in 1722, which resulted in the seizure of its capital, Isfahan.** The Shah's regime, led

Crowning portrait of Empress Anna Ivanovna

by Shah Sultan Hussein (1694-1722), surrendered to the Afghan leader Mir Mahmud, admitting that it was completely incapacitated (2, p.15).

Capitalizing on the conducive situation, the Russian Empire and the Ottoman Empire seized a part of the Safavid state's territory (the Caspian region campaign of Peter the Great in 1722-1723 and the hostilities of 1723-1726, respectively). As a result, **Russia captured the narrow Caspian zone stripe, while Turkey took control of the rest of the southeastern Caucasus and western Iran**. Nevertheless, the conquerors' expectations on submissive subordination of the weakened Safavid state to outside forces turned out to be erroneous. The bitter ramifications of the Afghan, Turkish and Russian assault triggered a rise of the liberation struggle against the invaders under the leadership of **Nader**, a talented military leader from the Afsharid dynasty (footnote 1).

Information about Nader's childhood years and adolescence is essentially unavailable today. It is only known that he was captured together with his family during one of the raids by Khorezm Uzbeks, but escaped soon thereafter. Having returned to Khorasan, he enlisted in service for the ruler Abivarda Baba Ali Bay, changing his name to Nader Gulu Bay. Having formed a small army, Nader gradually subjugated several provinces of Khorasan. According to available sources, during this very time period, **in 1726, 37-year-old Nader Gulu Bay began his service for Shah Tahmasib II** (footnote 2) under the name Tahmasib Gulu Khan. According to Avramov, "on September 8 (1726), Nader Gulu Bay, an Afshar, whose rank was changed by the Shah and who was named Tahmas Kuli Khan, arrived in Kachan [Kuchan-Khabushan] with about 5,000 people-strong cavalry and infantry (8, I. 19A and 19B). Following the death of Fath Ali Khan Qajar in 1726 (footnote 3), Tahmasib II appointed Nader commander-in-chief of the Shah's armed forces.

Nader started working for Shah Tahmasib during the period when the Safavid territories in the South Caucasus were occupied by Russia and the Ottoman state. Despite this challenging situation, **Nader accomplished a seemingly unattainable task: first, he expelled the Afghans, and soon thereafter, he achieved liberation of the South Caucasus, essentially restoring the previous borders of the Safavid state.**

According to M.Aksworsi, if it weren't for Nader Iran would have faced the same fate as Poland, i.e. partial or full division among its neighbors (3, p. XV). Taking ad-



vantage of the setback in the war with the Ottomans, Nader Khan overthrew Tahmasib II in August 1732 and proclaimed his underage son Abbas III as the Shah. However, from then onward, Nader Khan ruled the country on his own.

As his reins of power strengthened, Nader forced the Ottoman Empire and Russia to return all of the seized Safavid territories. Russia, which realized that it would not be able to control the land in the Caspian region any further, agreed to hand them over under the **Treaty of Resht (January 21, 1732) and the Treaty of Ganja (March 21, 1735)**. In conclusion of hostilities and long-lasting negotiations, the Ottoman Empire also returned the seized Safavid land. In accordance with the **agreement signed in March 1736, the Ottoman-Safavid borders envisaged in the 1639 treaty were reinstated** (13, p. 201-202). Also in March 1736, Nader, who had become the sovereign ruler of the country by that time, deposed the Safavids at a congress in Mughan and proclaimed himself as the shah (6, p.104).

Nader Shah did not settle for the restored borders of the Safavid state and soon embarked on the path of



Empress Anna Leopoldovna

their expansion. The following inscription minted on a coin in honor of his accession to the throne speaks volumes about his imperial ambitions: *"Let the whole world be aware of the enthronement of Nader, the future conqueror of the Universe."*

In the winter of 1738, he began a **campaign in India, which ended in March 1739 with the capture of Delhi, the capital of the great Mughal Empire.** Overall, **Nader Shah reached the peak of his power by 1739.** By that time, the Russians and the Ottomans were expelled from all the formerly possessed Safavid areas, Khiva and Bukhara were conquered and the Mughal emperor, who had been accused of aiding the Afghans, was overwhelmingly defeated. Following the takeover of Delhi, the victor seized control over the entire treasury and the untold wealth of the Mughal dynasty.

While in Hassan Abdal, Nader Shah delegated exuberant ambassadorial missions to Istanbul and St. Petersburg in the fall of 1739 (12, p. 190) to notify his foes of the conquest of India. The ambassadors embarked on their long trip on October 23, 1739. Representatives of each embassy were carrying valuable gifts, including elephants to be presented to the two monarchs.

Undoubtedly, as an outstanding strategist and

pragmatist Nader was pursuing far-reaching goals. He sought to demonstrate his might to Russia, thus preventing further intrusions into the South Caucasus from the north. Interestingly, Nader Shah issued instructions to his ambassadors, including those on hiring ship foremen in order to equip and develop his own shipbuilding and shipping in the Caspian Sea. The new shah's other plans pertained to the Ottoman Empire as he intended to forge a new alliance with this state.

Throughout the first half of the 18th century, Nader Shah had rather intense diplomatic exchanges with Russia. **The importance he attached to the relations with the Russian Empire is evidenced by his embassy mission delegated to the court of Empress Anna Ivanovna in 1739.** Prior to sending the mission, he instructed his secretary and historiographer Mehdi-kuli Khan Astrabadi while still in Delhi to send a letter to the Russian resident representative in Isfahan, I.P. Kalushkin, which was subsequently received on October 5, 1739. A list of gifts slated for Anna Ivanovna, her sister and niece was attached to the letter. That letter was included in Kalushkin's report to the Russian government and its copy was later found in the Astrakhan archives (10, p.11-12).

Sardar Bay Kirklu was put in charge of the embassy in Russia. However, in the wake of the delay relating to the embassy in Kizlyar, Sardar Bay had to come back and was succeeded by Muhammad Hussein Khan. P.G. Butkov noted, "Upon defeating the Mughals, Nader sent an embassy mission of his close relative and grand equerry to the St. Petersburg court in order to announce this victory in early 1740 with 16,000 troops and 20 cannons" (9, p. 209). The new embassy of Nader Shah departed on October 23, 1739, reaching St. Petersburg as late as October 2, 1741.

The purpose of the embassy of Muhammad Hussein Khan, a family member of Nader Shah, was primarily **to report on the victories over Bokharans and Indians, as well as to resolve a number of controversial issues.** One of the available sources says, "As a representative of a powerful monarch who bragged about conquering the whole world, Hussein Khan was heading to St. Petersburg with very generous gifts and 14 elephants. The ambassador was accompanied by a dressed-up entourage comprised of 128 people...Certainly, not a single embassy had appeared until then before the court of a friendly power with such an impressive military force. On December 9, 1739, the Afshar embassy arrived in Kizlyar where the alarm

Bracelets. Gold, porcelain enamel, precious stones.
State Hermitage Museum, Saint Petersburg

was sounded. Furthermore, the embassy mission was barred by the Astrakhan governor, Duke Sergei Golitsyn, as no orders had been issued in this regard from St. Petersburg beforehand. Five infantry and six dragoon regiments were dispatched hastily to the Volga and they set up a camp in front of Astrakhan. The ambassador was informed that the Afshar troops were not allowed to cross the border and it would be impossible to provide food for the servicemen along the route. Therefore, they were advised either to go back or disband the troops. Following long-lasting talks Nader Shah acquiesced and the ambassador, accompanied by 2,000 people-strong entourage (footnote 4), which was followed by 14 elephants, embarked on a long trip. Pending further travel, the embassy mission stayed in Kizlyar until August of the following year. Finally, permission was granted for the embassy to leave St. Petersburg. On September 11, 1740, Hussein Khan solemnly entered Astrakhan and was greeted there by the governor with troops and a proper ceremony, salutation and cannon firing" (14).

On September 18, 1740, the embassy left Astrakhan for Tsaritsyno with 170 horse wagons. In the Don steppes, 120 more people from the entourage joined the ambassadors. Therefore, the newly appointed chief commissioner, Major-General S.F. Apraksin issued an order to have the embassy representatives seated and place their baggage on 800 carts. While on his way Hussein Khan wrote a notifying letter to Vice-Chancellor A.I. Osterman, saying, "The dignified and plenipotentiary, supremely honorable, superior minister and supreme vizier, may his happiness last forever in prosperity! I wish you well-being bestowed upon by God and happy being to the fullest extent. Upon announcing friendly compliments, may your highness be aware that I am Hussein Khan, a trusted ambassador of the great Nader Shah" (14).

According to the source, Hussein Khan made a stop-over in Kuzmina Gat in the vicinity of Tambov, on March 7, 1741. On the following day the ambassador solemnly entered Tambov; a Siberian dragoon regiment lined up with an orchestra and banners. Local officials were in attendance as well. At 4 p.m., Hussein Khan, who was until then resting in a Bokino hut, attached a feather of the Shah to his hat and saddled his horse, starting a ceremonial procession all the way to Tambov along the so-called Great Astrakhan Road. **On June 2, the Afshar embassy left Tambov with 700 wagons. Exactly one month later, the Embassy solemnly entered Moscow.** The mission was greeted near the Danilov Monastery by troops, chan-




celery employees, equestrian Moscow merchants and a large choir of trumpeters. The procession was moving in the following order: a team of grenadiers was walking in front. The merchants and servants were moving along. They were followed by ceremonial coaches, Semyonovsky Lifeguard Regiment and General Apraksin's cavalry. The marchers proceeded with elephants and embassy music. The ambassadorial cavalry, commissaries and the acting state councilor, Duke Golitsyn, who was inferior to the ambassador, were marching behind them. They were followed by Ambassador Hussein Khan himself, with an Afshar flag, in addition to the assistants and an Afshar military detachment. A total of 2,128 Persians entered Moscow, and as soon as the ambassador arrived in his apartment, the Moscow commander-in-chief came to visit him" (14).

Hussein Khan, who was satisfied with the hospitality he enjoyed in Moscow, wrote in a letter to Nader Shah, "As the dignified ambassador, Amir Hussein Khan, who was exalted by the infinite mercy of the king of kings, I sacrifice myself upon your blessed feet. You are the king of kings who bestows light to kings with well-being, decorates heads with wreaths and rules all nations... Here's my message..." (14).

On September 29, Hussein Khan solemnly entered Petersburg. "The ceremonial procession was as follows: Horse Guards; 14 elephants, two each in a row; Afshar music; the embassy carriage; imperial cavalry with factory horses with non-commissioned stallmaster and riders; generals, the headquarters and subaltern officers; Princes Dolgoruky and Shakhovskoy; Count Saltykov and Hussein Khan riding in a carriage of horses harnessed in pairs. They were accompanied by grooms, butlers, stalwarts, and fast walkers. Trailing the procession were the bearers of the Afshar banner" (14).

Since the embassy mission was on its way to meet Anna Ivanovna, but arrived to be hosted by Ivan Antonovich (under the regentess Anna Leopoldovna), the



*Dagger. Steel, gold, enamel, emeralds, rubies.
State Hermitage Museum, Saint Petersburg*

sion could have been to seize Astrakhan and also carry out notable conquests if it witnessed unreinforced borders. However, his real intention was apparently to ask princess Yelizaveta Petrovna's hand in marriage, and he pledged to introduce Christian law in his states. He was then 60 years old. Perhaps, the princess could have complied with this request, but it seemed extremely questionable and was thereby rejected" (9, p. 210).

Thus, the following answers were given to the main demands of Hussein Khan: "1. the Shah sought to enter a relationship with Russia based on wedlock and this was rejected (i.e. the hand of crown princess Yelizaveta Petrovna); 2. Afshar prisoners as well as the Georgians and Armenians were not handed over at the Shah's request; 3. the Nogais were not ceded to the Afshar side; 4. shipwrights were not provided for shipbuilding in Persia; 5. chapelmasters were not sent in to teach music; 6. weavers of woolen wallpaper were not provided; 7. Afshar merchants were not authorized to trade without duties" (14).

Solemn presentation of the Shah's gifts began in conclusion of the ambassador's speech. "Anna Leopoldovna, Ivan Antonovich and Yelizaveta Petrovna were presented with pieces of precious satin, diamond belts, golden cups decorated with diamonds, a small valuable table, three feathers for decorating caps and hats, finger rings and boxes...At the same time, Hussein Khan announced that the ruler of the world had ordered to free all Russian prisoners..." (11)

A total of 22 items, 15 rings and 14 elephants were delivered to the Russian side (10, p. 12). The gifts of Nader Shah included a golden ring decorated with rubies, emeralds and a big diamond that belonged to Shah Jahan (1627-1658), one of India's powerful rulers from the great Mughal dynasty (footnote 5).

It is noteworthy that **thanks to those gifts of Nader Shah, the Hermitage Museum currently possesses a unique collection of Indian golden vessels dating back to the 17th century and the early 18th century. Such exhibits are not available even in the museums of India itself.** The gifts presented by Nader Shah's embassy to the Russian Tsar's court later became a one-of-the-kind collection, despite its rather small size, which is about 20 items (10, p. 14).

The embassy mission was in Petersburg during the 1741 coup and returned in November 1742 with friendly letters from Empress Yelizaveta and gifts, which mostly included wines and vodka. Evidently, **the political out-**

Afshar embassy representatives were introduced to the ruler Anna Leopoldovna on October 2, 1741. Entering the audience hall, Hussein Khan made three bows in front of the throne and having handed over the shah's letter in the prescribed manner, began the following high-flown speech: "*This is a friendly and highly benevolent letter on the part of His Majesty, the supreme and dignified Solomon, who illuminates the state, decorates the power's throne, who was granted authority and possession of the world by the mercy of God, the ruler of the Iranian state, Nader, who bestows the crown upon the Indian and Turanian kings...*" (14).

P.G. Butkov noted, "*The ambassador, in a speech made as he was hosted by the emperor's mother, Grand Duchess Anna, said that his sovereign wanted to divide the attained Mughal riches with such a kind ally as the Russian emperor. A part of the Petersburg ministry feared that the Shah's actual intent in sending this embassy mis-*

Jewelry box. Marble, gold, emeralds, rubies.
State Hermitage Museum, Saint Petersburg



come of the visit turned out negative, and it was not a mere coincidence that armed clashes broke out on the two countries' shared border as early as in 1742. Nader Shah threatened to conquer Russia, Russian resident representative in Iran I.P. Kalushkin reported.

In the wake of the souring of bilateral relations, the Russian Empress sent a reinforced corps under the command of Lieutenant-General Tarakanov to the borderline area (12, p. 250-251). Another reason for the tension was apparently Russia's unwillingness to have another powerful Islamic neighbor, along with the Ottoman Empire. In any case, the subsequent Russian policy in the region was aimed at undermining the power of the Afshar state.

Footnotes:

Footnote 1. The Turkic origin of the Afshar tribe is confirmed by a number of sources, including al-Kashgari,

who said, "Afshars pertain to one of the branches of the Turkic Oghuz people. Oghuzes are Turkomans consisting of 22 branches" (15, p. 55-56); Ali Akbar Dekhoda: "Afshars are one of the notable Turkic tribes" (1, p. 3112), etc.



Tray and a little box. Gold, enamel.
State Hermitage Museum, Saint Petersburg



Bracelets. Gold, a corundum, rubies, emeralds. State Hermitage Museum, Saint Petersburg

Footnote 2. The son of Shah Sultan Hussein, Tahmasib (1722 (9)-1732), who fled Isfahan, accompanied by 800 Qajars, back in June, declared himself Shah Tahmasib II in November (7, p.113).

Footnote 3. Fath-Ali Khan Qajar, the ruler of Astrabad, was one of the most powerful rulers of the Safavid state, who acted as the commander-in-chief of Shah Tahmasib's army.

Footnote 4. P.G. Butkov notes that the ambassador was allowed to "take only 3,000 people with him and he had to leave everyone else behind" or "his retinue was comprised of 3,000 people, as well as 14 elephants, which were sent to the emperor by the shah (during the reign of under-age Ivan) (9, p. 209-210).

Footnote 5. Only 17 items and one ring remained from among the presented gifts (4). The following inscription is stamped on the inner side of the ring: "The second possessor of the rapprochement of two luminaries in the same sign." That ring was slotted for archery; it was to be put on one's thumb to protect it when releasing the bowstring. It is a ceremonial item shaped as a combat ring (22, p.12-13). 

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*Plate. Gold, enamel.
State Hermitage Museum, Saint Petersburg*

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RELATIONS BETWEEN THE IREVAN KHANATE AND THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE IN THE 2ND HALF OF THE 18TH CENTURY

The Irevan Khanate is one of the small Azerbaijani states that emerged in the South Caucasus in the period of feudal division following the break-up of the empire of Nader Shah Afshar (1736-1747). It maintained flourishing political and diplomatic ties with the neighboring countries, including the Ottoman state (17, 14, 9, 19, and 20).


During Nader Shah's tenure and in a short period after his death, the Ottoman state and Russia were wary of openly interfering with the affairs of the South Caucasus, limiting their involvement to closely following the ongoing developments. The region was of strategic importance for the Ottoman Empire due to its territorial, ethnic and religious proximity. Therefore, the Irevan Khanate was a centerpiece in the country's foreign policy.

The Russo-Turkish War over the Black Sea coast occurred in 1768-1774, with hostilities taking place in the Balkans and the Caucasus (21, p. 346-363). This war ushered in a new stage of rivalry between the two powers over the South Caucasus. **Russia sought to put pressure on the Azerbaijani khanates and secure its in-**



Banner of Huseyn Khan of Irevan. National Museum of History of Azerbaijan, Fund of Weapons and Banners

View of the outskirts of Irevan. A drawing by Dubois de Montpereux. 1830s




fluence over them by means of the Christian population of the region and the Georgian Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti, while the Ottoman state was leveraging diplomacy to unite the khans to fight the Russo-Georgian alliance.

The Irevan Khanate, located in the vicinity of the battle ground, was attracting keen interest of both sides. Taking advantage of this, **Huseynali Khan (1759-1783) was doing his utmost to expand his ties with the sultan's court. In his letters to the sultan, he expressed a wish for the khanate to be under the patronage of the Ottoman Empire** (16, p. 39). In the 60s, Ottoman delegations frequently visited Irevan, delivering letters and gifts from the Sultan. The gifts presented to the khan included sable fur, precious stones, a saber with gold inlay and 2,000 pure gold coins (16, p. 41-43). Huseynali Khan also enjoyed friendly ties with the local Ottoman rulers, especially the Pasha of Kars (16, p. 43-44).

Huseynali Khan, who was essentially dependent on the Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti at the time, suspended payments of levied duties to the kingdom and joined some other Azerbaijani khans in seeking military aid from

the Sultan. King Heraclius II described the Irevan Khanate's policy in a letter to Count Panin dated October 5, 1770 as follows: "*In addition to the Lezgins and other barbarians surrounding us, the Irevan Khan has become our adversary. Having defied the oath he took before us, he rejected our patronage and sided with the Turkish party; he provided much assistance to the seraskier who previously arrived in Kars, both with food supplies and otherwise, urging him to demand more troops from the sultan to fight us; likewise, he is trying to prompt Kerim Khan and the Kuban Khan to take up arms against us. The Turks, capitalizing on the Irevan Khan's zeal, are seeking to win over a few more khans through him and by presenting valuable gifts*" (13, p. 244).

Huseynali Khan requested military and financial assistance from the Sultan in order to launch a campaign against the Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti (17, p. 301-302). While expecting the assistance, he managed to repel an attack by Heraclius II in 1769 and the siege of Irevan (11, p. 67). Nevertheless, the anticipated assistance was never provided. The Ottoman state was waging a grueling war with Russia and faced dire challenges. As a result, the khan had to conclude a peace treaty with Kartli-Kakheti



View of the Irevan Fortress on a painting by V. Mashkov (derived from the "Irevan offensive in 1828" painting)

to avoid a new offensive and resume payments of duties to the Kingdom (13, vol. 1, p. 301-302; 25, p. 187).

In conclusion of the triumphant war waged in 1768-1774, **Russia bolstered its positions in the Black Sea and the northern Caucasus region and became noticeably more active in the South Caucasus. Such a course of developments was certainly in line with the long-standing plans of Heraclius II, Russia's ally, to take over a number of Azerbaijani territories**, including the Irevan Khanate. Faced with this imminent threat, the Azerbaijani khans began to seek assistance from the Ottoman Sultan.

Correspondence of numerous Azerbaijani khans with the Sultan indicates that the latter was utterly concerned over a potential new attack on the Irevan Khanate by Heraclius II. Shaki Khan Muhammad Hasan, Ardabil Khan Nazarali and Khoy Khan Ahmad stated that they would forge an alliance in that case and in return asked the Sultan to render military and financial assistance (22, p. 67).

In 1776, Huseynali Khan, who was relying on the support of the Sultan and Karim Khan Zand of Isfahan (1759-1779), suspended tribute payments to Heraclius II again. Using this move as a pretext, the latter launched a new attack on Irevan in September 1779 (5, p. 156; 11, p. 68-70). A part of the khanate's population took their belongings and fled to the neighboring Kars and Bayazet pashaliks (provinces) of the Ottoman Empire (15, p. 68; 5, p. 22). Heraclius II besieged Irevan, but faced tough resistance from the fortress defenders led by the Khan himself and was forced to retreat (11, p. 69), ruining the areas around the city. **The position of Suleiman Pasha, the Chidir city governor, significantly contributed to the lifting of the siege. Though Suleiman Pasha**

did not render the requested military assistance to the Irevan khan, he threatened to attack Tiflis (22, p. 74-75). In turn, Huseynali Khan decided to conclude a peace deal with Heraclius II to avoid new devastating raids on his possessions and sent several delegations to Tiflis for this purpose (2, p. 451; 16, p. 88-89 and 91-96; 14, p. 18-20). The Khan also sent several letters to the Kartli-Kakheti ruler asking him to release the residents of the Irevan Khanate who were taken captive. However, the Kartli-Kakheti czar was in no hurry to reach peace and release the prisoners. Therefore, **the Irevan khan sought mediation from the Chidir and Akhaltsikh Pashas, who were instrumental in the conclusion of peace.**

The successor of Huseynali Khan, his son Gulamali, wrote about this in one of his letters to the Ottoman Sultan. "In past years, a special agreement on borders was concluded with Georgia upon the initiative and thanks to the efforts of... Your Honorable Vizier, ruler of the Chidir province, Suleiman Pasha," the letter said (16, p. 73).


Following the conclusion of the peace treaty, the Irevan khan began pursuing a more cautious foreign policy. However, **Heraclius II had no intention to relinquish his claims to Azerbaijani land. In order to realize his plans, he presented a special project to the Empress of Russia Catherine the Great.** For Russia, which had expansion plans in the South Caucasus, this initiative came in handy. On July 24, 1783, the parties concluded the Treaty of Georgievsk, which turned the Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti into a protectorate of the Russian Empire (7, p. 2, p. 11; 6, p. 277-286; 17, p. 168-171; 24, p. 118-128). Afterwards, two battalions of the Russian army under the command of S. D. Burnashov were stationed in Tiflis (8, 18).

Fortress and city of Irevan on a sketch drawn up by the Russian military command in 1828


The Treaty of Georgievsk triggered **further aggravation of the Russian-Ottoman rivalry over the South Caucasus, including the Irevan Khanate**. The Ottoman court embarked on a new diplomatic offensive to convince the Azerbaijani khans to jointly wage struggle against the Russian-Georgian alliance. **Even a special decree of the Sultan was issued whereby the Azerbaijani khans were urged to unite around the cause of Ahmad Khan of Khoy for the sake of defending Irevan** (16, p. 73). In turn, the most powerful khans, who maintained close ties with the Sublime Porte, Fatali Khan of Guba, Ibrahim Khalil Khan of Karabakh and Ahmad Khan of Khoy, openly opposed Heraclius II. At the same time, the Sultan sent out decrees to the governors of the eastern Erzurum, Kars, Childir, Bayazet and Akhaltsikh Pashaliks, urging them to provide comprehensive assistance to Huseynali Khan (22, p. 102-103; 17, p. 203). Simultaneously, in order to ensure the latter's loyalty, the Sultan issued a special decree awarding him the title of Beylerbey of the Anatolian provinces (16, p. 119-120). Nevertheless, the Irevan khan sought to pursue a balanced foreign policy and hosted both Ottoman and Russian diplomatic missions with equal honors (16, p. 115-116; 5, p. 265-266). This political course of Huseynali Khan apparently did not go down well with some circles in the Ottoman Empire.

In Erzurum, a group of Irevan pilgrims was arrested on its way back from Mecca. Each of the pilgrims had to pay a fine worth 200 Tomans, and they were released after their horses, wagons and other belongings were confiscated. The incident significantly heightened tension in the relations between the Irevan Khanate and the Erzurum Pashalik. The tension subsided only after the Khan sent a letter to the Sultan asking him to facilitate return of the confiscated property and the issue was solved thanks to the latter's involvement (16, p. 121-122). Moreover, **the governor of the Bayazet Pashalik, Iskhak Pasha, was organizing raids on the borderline villages of the Irevan Khanate from time to time** and kidnapping their residents, and also strongly supported those opposing the Khan and incited riots (16, p. 12-14).

On November 9, 1783, Huseynali Khan died unexpectedly (5, p. 274; 4, p. 342; 12, p. 55). Gulamali, his eldest son, ascended to the throne. The Irevan Khanate's further rapprochement with the Ottoman Em-



pire occurred during his eight-month tenure. Taking advantage of the new khan's young age and lack of experience, representatives of neighboring Ottoman pashaliks attending the condolence ceremony strongly urged him to hand over the Irevan Fortress to the Sultan (1, p. 285). In addition, a confidential Ottoman mission led by Khalil-Efendi visited the South Caucasus in late 1783 and early 1784 (18, p. 147-148; 17, p. 203). The latter held talks with Gulamali Khan in Irevan, which were successful. **The Sultan ordered the governors of the eastern pashaliks to provide comprehensive aid to the Irevan khan, if necessary, while** the latter, in turn, requested the assistance to be rendered as soon as possible (16, p. 68-69). **Gulamali Khan also established close ties with Ahmad Khan of Khoy, an active ally of the Ottoman state**, and even sought to become a member of his family (16, p. 62-63, 80-81). As a result of diplomatic moves taken by the Ottoman court, the Irevan khan severed his ties with the Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti and stopped tribute payments (1, p. 243). On June 8, 1784, he fell victim of a conspiracy staged by his internal and external foes (18, p. 183-184, 193-203).



*Horseback stunts near the Sardarabad Fortress walls.
Drawn by Prince G. Gagarin. 1830s*

Following the death of Gulamali Khan, his step-brother, 12-year-old Muhammad (1784-1805) became the Khan at the insistence of the majority of the population. In this period Irevan was a stage of stand-off between the supporters and opponents of the Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti. Heraclius II decided to take advantage of this situation to subdue the Irevan Khanate, but **Ahmad Khan of Khoy and Bayazet governor Iskhak Pasha countered his plans by sending their representatives to Irevan**, who managed to end civil strife and restore stability there (22, p. 95-96). Nevertheless, Sultan Abdul Hamid I bewared of a possible increased influence of Heraclius II on Muhammad, whose mother was Georgian. In fall 1784, he sent a delegation comprised

of 60 people to the Caucasus (17, p. 206; 9, p. 75-76; 15, p. 115-116). The delegation members also visited Irevan, handing the Khan a decree and gifts on behalf of the Sultan. In the decree, the Sultan called on the Azerbaijani khans to join effort with Ahmad Khan of Khoy in the struggle against the Russo-Georgian alliance.

"We want to prevent harm to the laws of Islam, but first and foremost, to free your khanate from liars and murderers. We hereby warn that the Tiflis tsar, having united with Russia, set out to disrupt the unity between Azerbaijani khans by means of lies and treacherously do away with them by prompting them to side with Russia. May Allah save us from this. We should strive for successful, legitimate unity. In order to encourage the Azerbaijani khans to be vigilant, we ordered the governor of Childir Salman Pasha and the ruler of Bayazet Iskhak Pasha to conduct uninterrupted correspondence with them. We urged everyone to be particularly cautious when giving promises to Russia and King Heraclius. King Heraclius has sold out to Russia. According to the orders of our envoy, proceed the same as other khans... We warn that you must act in the name of the laws of Islam and endure all the hardship. On that condition you can rely on any help from us. Be vigilant to make sure that King Heraclius does not harm the Irevan Khanate and your governance. We have ordered all the leaders to gather troops at

View of the Sardarabad Fortress on a painting by V. Mashkov (derived from the "Sardarabad offensive in 1828" painting)



View of the outskirts of Irevan on a 19th century painting




the border should you need any assistance...Let neither the Azerbaijani khans nor your khanate be harmed. We wish that all Azerbaijani khans would rally around Ahmad Khan of Khoj for the sake of the canons of Islam" (3, p. 964).

In addition, the new Khan's mother, who was an ethnic Georgian, maintained close ties with the Tiflis court and regularly informed it of the developments ongoing in Irevan. Thus, she passed on the above-mentioned decree of the Ottoman Sultan to Tiflis through Mirza Gyurgen, an authorized representative of Heraclius II (3, p. 967-968). Therefore, Russia was promptly receiving comprehensive information about the contacts between the Irevan Khanate and the Ottoman state. Moreover, **the mother of the young Khan and her supporters returned the Sultan's gifts and sent a letter in August 1784 on behalf of the Khan to the ruler of the Akhaltsikh Pashalik Suleiman declaring loyalty to Heraclius II** (3, p. 717). Influenced by this letter, Usmi Bey, an Irevan nobleman, and his son, encouraged by Suleiman Pasha, masterminded a plot against Muhammad Khan in March 1785, which was later exposed. Usmi Bey fled the scene, but was detained on the border of the Kars Pashalik and imprisoned (3, p. 324). Following this incident, the Irevan Khanate stopped paying dues to the Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti.

The second Russo-Turkish war of 1787-1791 further heightened tension in the South Caucasus (21, p. 363-387). Against the backdrop of growing strife among

the Azerbaijani khans, the Ottoman court once again resorted to active diplomacy, seeking to foster reconciliation and bring the Azerbaijani khanates together to ward off the Russo-Georgian threat (3, p. 771).

Having learned about the plans of Heraclius II to seize Irevan with the aid of Russia, Muhammad Khan sent a letter to the Sultan on November 26, 1787 requesting military aid to counter this threat (22, p. 122-125). However, amid the ongoing war with Russia the Ottoman authorities were unable to provide such assistance and confined themselves to ordering the borderline pashaliks to assist Irevan and other Azerbaijani khanates, if necessary. On the other hand, **the Irevan Khanate's relations with the pashaliks in that period were far from perfect. In the summer of 1787, the tension even sparked a war with the Bayazet Pashalik.** The war was caused by the policy of Iskhak Pasha of Bayazet, who openly supported rebels in the Irevan Khanate and provided them with refuge if necessary (16, p. 128-131). Furthermore, the relations between the Irevan and Karabakh Khanates soured in May as their rivalry continued over the throne of the Nakhchivan Khanate. Iskhak Pasha, who had been instructed by the Sultan to reconcile the parties, sent a letter to Muhammad Khan with relevant advice, but the latter replied that he could not establish friendly ties with the Karabakh ruler Ibrahim Khalil without consent of his friend, the Tiflis czar (23, p. 92, 333). This response letter triggered a conflict that lingered on for two years.



Mirror salon at the Sardar Palace on a painting. 1890

On August 12, 1789, the Irevan khan besieged the Bayazet fortress. However, the besiegers began to loot the surrounding villages, which allowed Iskhak to launch a sudden foray into the rear area. The battle ended with an overwhelming defeat of the besiegers. Nevertheless, Muhammad Khan managed to mobilize new forces and attacked Bayazet again after receiving reinforcement from Nakhchivan. Having failed to seize the fortress, the Irevan army plundered several villages and took home a plentiful prey (14, p. 137).

Realizing that a protracted war could have bitter ramifications, Muhammad Khan sent a complaint to the Sultan. Amid the ongoing war with Russia, it would have been completely useless for the Ottoman Empire to estrange Azerbaijani khanates, therefore, the Sultan issued a decree to both sides urging them "to forget the bygone grievances and establish good-neighboring relations and friendship" (16, p. 132-133). Afterwards, the parties halted the hostilities and concluded a peace treaty in fall with the mediation of the head of the Erzurum Pashalik Abdullah (16, p. 132-133).

Meanwhile, tensions rose in the region again. Agha Mohammad Qajar, who seized power in Iran in 1779 as a result of struggle against the Zends (10, p. 110-113), put forward his claims to the Azerbaijani khanates and Kartli-Kakheti and managed to subjugate most of the South Azerbaijani khanates by 1791 (10, p. 111). However, a number of other rulers, namely, the khans of Karabakh, Irevan, Lankaran, Khoy, and Urmia, as well as the Kartli-Kakhetian czar, led by Karabakh Khan Ibrahim Khalil, opposed the Qajar leader (7, p. 2, 320). At the same time, the khanates came under growing pressure from Russia. **Caught between a rock and a hard place, some Azerbaijani khans, including the Irevan**

ruler, requested support from the Ottoman state to counter Agha Mohammad Khan. On May 9, 1794, the Irevan khan sent an authorized delegate to the Ottoman court. P. Butkov wrote about this in his commentary. *"In 1794, Shusha Khan Ibrahim-Khalil and the Irevan Khan, who hoped that the Porte would not leave them to their own devices, came out against Agha Mohammad Khan. Relying on the old-time friendship between them, they delegated their representatives to Istanbul to secure patronage of the Porte against an attack by Agha Mohammad Khan. However, the Porte turned a deaf ear to their request, saying that it had an agreement with the Iranian people,"* he wrote (7, p. 332).


In the meantime, Agha Mohammad also sent a decree to the Irevan Khan urging the latter to personally host him. This served as clear evidence of an imminent threat. Therefore, Muhammad Khan ordered to reinforce the fortress, simultaneously sending letters to the Sultan and the rulers of the neighboring pashaliks whereby he asked them to provide shelter for the Irevan Khanate's residents. Thus, **a letter, which was dated May 15, 1795 and sent to the Sultan, cited a likely outflow of 20,000 to 30,000 refugees from the Khanate in the event of an attack by Agha Mohammad Khan** (22, p. 145-146).

Thus, the unfavorable outcome of the two wars with Russia prompted the Ottoman state to pursue a more cautious policy in the Caucasus. According to available sources, in the researched period the Ottoman court refrained from military intervention in the region, confining itself to measures of active diplomacy with regard to the Azerbaijani khanates, including the nearby Irevan Khanate, in order to bring them together for the struggle against the Russo-Georgian alliance. ♦

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*Goy Mosque in Irevan.
19th century painting*



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Firdovsiyya AHMADOVA
PhD in History

FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE AZERBAIJAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Mammadhasan Jafargulu oghlu H. Hajinski (1875-1931) served as the first foreign minister of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (ADR).

M. H. Hajinski started his diplomatic activity prior to his appointment as minister of foreign affairs. During the talks held with representatives of the Ottoman state in Batum, Hajinski joined effort with Muhammad Amin Rasulzade to secure an outcome that would meet the interests of the Azerbaijani people. The Seim's Muslim faction in Tiflis was making decisions in accordance with their suggestions made as a result of the Batum discussions. Since the Ottoman Empire had a final say on military affairs in the region, this state played a key role in determining the fate of the Caucasus nations. For this very reason, representing Azerbaijan at the negotiations with Ottoman representatives was a great responsibility and vesting this mission in M. A. Rasulzade and M. H. Hajinski was not a mere coincidence. Thus, M. A. Rasulzade chaired the Transcaucasian Seim's Muslim faction, while M. H. Hajinski acted as its deputy chairman. The Azerbaijan Republic was proclaimed in Tiflis as both of them continued holding talks in Batum. M.A.Rasulzade and M.H.Hajinski were the Batum-based representatives in charge of sending consultative letters regarding these developments. Taking into consideration their mission and their status in the Muslim faction, M. A. Rasulzade was appointed Chairman of the Azerbaijan National Council, established on May 27, 1918, while M. H. Hajinski was named Foreign Minister in the first government of the Azerbaijan Republic, which was declared by the Council, in the absence of Rasulzade and Hajinski.

Fatali Khan Khoyski, the head of government, vested his first assignment in the foreign minister on May 29. Following the proclamation of the Republic, F. Khoyski

said in a letter sent to M. H. Hajinski from Tiflis that he was sending him the text of the cable about the declaration of Azerbaijan's independence in Russian and French due to various obstacles that stood in the way of sending it.

The telegram on Azerbaijan's independence was expected to be the first document to be signed by M. H. Hajinski in the capacity of foreign minister and he was authorized to do so by Prime Minister Fatali Khan Khoyski. Hajinski was to send the telegram from Batum to Istanbul directly via radio and onward to other recipients. The newly established state, which had to select a temporary capital for itself, was in need of foreign aid and support. From this point of view, the cable sent to Ottoman Foreign Minister Ahmed Nesimi Bey could be considered the first document signed by the foreign minister. Requesting that Turkish embassies undertake the task of housing Azerbaijan's representations in European capitals, Hajinski wrote in a confidential cable sent from Batum that the technical capacities of the newly independent Azerbaijan Republic for pursuing its foreign policy were extremely limited. The minister requested Azerbaijan's representation in all European capital cities where Turkish embassies were based, including Moscow. Hajinski also asked the Ottoman Foreign Ministry to broker recognition of Azerbaijan's independence by Russia and European countries.

The first intergovernmental agreement of the Azerbaijan Republic was also signed by Foreign Minister M. H. Hajinski with Turkey. The friendship treaty between Azerbaijan and the Ottoman Empire, inked in Batum on June 4, 1918, was a substantial outcome of the talks held there by M. H. Hajinski and M. A. Rasulzade. In keeping with Clause 4 of the treaty, Hajinski and Rasulzade requested military assistance from the Ottoman state for

Mammad Hasan Hajinski

the Azerbaijani people, who faced a massacre committed by the Armenian Dashnaks. On June 4, a number of international documents were also signed. These included a deal among the Ottoman, Azerbaijani and Georgian governments on operating the Baku-Batum oil pipeline and an agreement among the Ottoman state, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia on dividing the South Caucasus rail lines.

Foreign Minister Hajinski faced crucial objectives regarding the future destiny of the Azerbaijani state. These goals included declaring the liberated Baku the capital city, efforts aimed at international recognition of the Azerbaijan Republic, resolving territorial issues with the country's close neighbors, securing foreign aid for meeting the essential needs of the newly established state, etc. In a bid to precisely define the borders of the South Caucasus republics, Hajinski suggested establishing joint commissions to the Georgian and Armenian governments. However, first and foremost, it was pivotal to focus on liberating Baku, which necessitated not only countering internal rivals but also waging struggle internationally. The "Baku issue" was of international importance. The newly independent Azerbaijan Republic had to become involved in tough rivalry for this cause against the Soviet Russia, Britain and Germany. Though military power was a deciding factor, prompt diplomatic efforts were crucial as well.

Certainly, sparing no effort to solve the "Baku issue" prior to eliminating other imminent threats would have been inappropriate. During the first month of the post-independence period M. H. Hajinski had to issue numerous protest notes on behalf of the Azerbaijani government in the wake of territorial claims put forward by the ADR's close neighbors. The issue of delineating the state borders among the South Caucasus republics had not been comprehensively resolved until the fall of these states. However, the Foreign Ministry put forth a clear-cut stance from the very outset with regard to the affiliation and future fate of the Azerbaijani territories. M. H. Hajinski, who signed the credentials granted to the Azerbaijani delegation by the government along with F. Khoyski to attend the conference due in Istanbul, sought to normalize the challenging situation facing Azerbaijan by forging military, financial and economic cooperation with other countries. On behalf of Azerbaijan, M. H. Hajinski co-signed the agreement with the Ottoman military railway and seaport administration, along with



Minister of Roads K. Malikaslanov, on July 14, 1918. Hajinski regularly maintained formal communication with the head of the Azerbaijani delegation in Istanbul, M. A. Rasulzade. Rasulzade consistently informed Hajinski of the meetings and negotiations he was holding in Istanbul. Hajinski, in turn, informed Rasulzade of the situation in the Caucasus and Azerbaijan and consulted with him regarding pertinent issues, and also tried to provide the Azerbaijani delegation with important documents and other content.

The investigative body, established on the foreign minister's initiative, was of great importance not only for the period of its existence but also for the time that came a century thereafter. On July 15, 1918, he stated in an appeal to Prime Minister F. Khoyski that it was necessary to establish an emergency investigation commission to scrutinize the mass killings perpetrated by the Armenians against Turkic-Muslim civilians.

As battles raged over Baku Hajinski frequently visited the frontline area. Following the liberation of Baku, Hajinski continued to serve as foreign minister in the government that was relocated to the city from Ganja till October 6, 1918. Until that date Hajinski also temporarily



Fatali Khan Khoyski

held the position of Minister for State Control. Afterwards, Hajinski acted as ADR's Minister of Finance until the opening of parliamentary sessions, i.e. until the resignation of the second cabinet. Taking charge of the republic's financial well-being over two months was a daunting task. That time period saw crucial changes in the region and throughout the world. The British military, which represented the winners of World War I, oversaw the South Caucasus. Therefore, it was quite challenging to carry out state administration under the command of the British troops entering Baku. During this period the Azerbaijan Republic not only pursued a policy aimed at peaceful co-existence with its neighbors but also provided them with political and moral support, as well as financial assistance. In accordance with the agreement it concluded with the Mountainous Republic of the Northern Caucasus (Mountain Republic) on November 28, 1918, Azerbaijan allocated interest-free bonds worth 10 million Rubles to its northern neighbor. The document was signed by M. H. Hajinski and B. Javanshir on behalf of Azerbaijan.



Memorial plaque on the house in Baku where Fatali Khan Khoyski lived

Although Hajinski did not serve as foreign minister in the subsequent administrations, he essentially worked in this field. One of the key tasks facing the republic was to achieve its international recognition. The delegation that headed to the Paris Peace Conference for this purpose also included Hajinski, who was a government official and member of parliament. During the Paris peace talks Hajinski and A. Topchubashov had meetings with the leaders, officials and diplomats of the United States, Britain, Germany, Italy, Turkey, Iran and other countries, informing them of the Azerbaijani people's quest for independence, the country's facing a severe economic situation and its rich oil reserves. Hajinski also co-signed an agreement in Paris on September 16, 1919 -- along with A. Topchubashov -- on appointing M. Robinov, a US citizen, a financial consultant of the Azerbaijani delegation. While in Paris, Hajinski also contributed to the drafting of a bilateral agreement between the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (ADR) and the Mountain Republic.

Following his return to Azerbaijan, Hajinski left for



Adil Khan Ziyadkhanov




*Memorial plate on
A. Ziyadkhanov's home in Ganja*

Tiflis in November 1919 with Prime Minister Nasib Yusif bayli to hold talks with the Armenian government. On November 23, he took part in the signing of a peace treaty between the ADR and the Republic of Armenia. During the visit Hajinski made a report to the Georgian government in Paris in the capacity of the chairman of the Azerbaijani-Georgian economic department, informing his interlocutors that major and lucrative economic agreements had been drafted for Azerbaijan and Georgia to be concluded with large British and US companies. According to the decision passed by the State Defense Committee on December 9, 1919, Hajinski was included in the governmental delegation that was to attend an Azerbaijani-Armenian conference, along with Fatali Khan Khoyski and Mammadraza Bay Vakilov. Addressing the conference, Hajinski said disputed territories were the main hurdle for establishing friendly relations between the Republics of Azerbaijan and Armenia. According to him, if the Caucasus republics acceded to a union such as a confederation as independent states, these outstanding issues would cease to exist.

Following the relocation of the Azerbaijani government to Baku from Ganja in September 1918, Adil Khan Afulfat Agha oghlu Ziyadkhanov (1872-1954) served as the acting foreign minister. Ziyadkhanov, who took up his duties amid a complicated political situation when Turkish troops were obliged to withdraw from Azerbaijan under the 1918 Armistice of Mudros concluded between Turkey and the Entente, while the Allied Powers' forces were expected to enter the country, prepared a report on the ongoing developments. The report, which was released during the 1919 Novruz holiday, was a comprehensive overview of his diplomatic activity.

Ziyadkhanov, who formally greeted General Thomson on November 17 together with Interior Minister Behbud Khan Javanshir, reminded him of the responsibility for the future fate of Azerbaijan. Thomson replied that he would not interfere with the republic's internal affairs.

In January 1919, Ziyadkhanov hosted the commander-in-chief of British troops, Gen. George Milne. In the wake of the state of war that had emerged between Georgia and Armenia, Ziyadkhanov, who was seeking



Alimardan Bay Topchubashov continued his struggle for independence even after the fall of the ADR

to mend ties and maintain peace with the close neighbors, sent a diplomatic note to the Georgian and Armenian foreign ministers in late 1918, expressing concern over the armed clashes resulting from a territorial and border-related dispute in the Borchali region. He noted that the territories of the region populated by the Turks were an integral part of Azerbaijan. The diplomatic note, published by the "Azerbaijan" newspaper on January 7, 1919, said that up to 300 Azerbaijanis drowned in the Araz River while attempting to escape Armenian violence and persecution in the Irevan governorate. The diplomat voiced protest over the arbitrariness in the governorate's part that is undisputed territory of Azerbaijan, urging action to prevent it. Ziyadkhanov, who learned about the halt of military conflict between the two neighboring republics three days thereafter, sent a congratulatory letter to their foreign ministers, reiterating that border disputes could be resolved strictly on

the basis of accord among the three states. Ziyadkhanov condemned the Armenian government agencies' move to establish a customs checkpoint in the Gazakh province within the boundaries of Azerbaijan as an obvious and gross violation of the neighboring state's rights and urged to shut it down. Furthermore, Ziyadkhanov issued a particularly strongly worded diplomatic note, which was released on February 12. The atrocities committed around Goyche were prompting the Azerbaijani government to take more hardline steps. Ziyadkhanov warned the Armenian authorities of the threat of sparking further ire amongst his people, which meant that his government would not be responsible for a potential recurrence of the tragedy or a failure to bring the culprits to book. A copy of the diplomatic note was also sent to the command of the allied states in the Caucasus. Ziyadkhanov also informed the Azerbaijani delegation of the situation in Azerbaijan at the Paris Peace Conference in a ciphered letter. Moreover, Ziyadkhanov sent an urgent cable on June 26, 1919 to Jafar Bay Rustambayov, the Azerbaijani diplomatic representative at the Kuban government, regarding diplomatic ties with the command of Denikin's Volunteer Army.

"Definitely be aware that the Azerbaijani people will not go anywhere and will only form their own Institutions or another assembly. Our government's view is that no matter who it is -- Bolsheviks, Mensheviks or anyone else, whoever assaults the independence of Azerbaijan is its enemy... Our stance with regard to the Volunteer Army is as follows: a final and resolute decision has been passed to prevent Volunteer Army units from entering the territory of the Azerbaijan Republic; a call should also be made for a pullout of such units from Dagestan and the Azerbaijani troops' withholding them till the Dagestan demarcation line." Having familiarized themselves with this message, members of the Azerbaijani delegation in Paris were "profoundly content" with it, hailing Ziyadkhanov's "firm, decisive and patriotic policy".

Ziyadkhanov, who was appointed the ADR's diplomatic representative in Iran, left for Tehran in January 1920 with a delegation of diplomats. Iran was said to have made an effort to defend the rights of Azerbaijanis and their cultural and educational activities. In a letter to the Azerbaijani foreign minister, he noted that unlike Iran's government agencies, the country's Turkic Azerbaijani community had a friendly and fraternal attitude toward the ADR and that Iran supported the Azerbaijanis' endeavors aimed at gaining autonomy and independence.

Members of the Azerbaijani delegation at the Paris Peace Conference



Following the opening of the Azerbaijani Parliament's sessions, the third government cabinet was formed. The prime minister in the new administration, Fatali Khan Iskandar Khan oghlu Khoyski (1875-1920) also served as foreign minister. F. K. Khoyski, who had the honor to send out radio telegrams regarding the declaration of the independent Azerbaijan Republic to the world's political powerhouses on May 30, 1918, continued acting as a member of parliament and also headed Azerbaijan's delegation at the Azerbaijani-Armenian conference convened in November 1919 to address territorial issues. The tenure of Khoyski, who was appointed foreign minister in the new cabinet that was established on December 22, 1919, is a glorious page in the history of Azerbaijani statehood.

Khoyski, who was striving to achieve the Azerbaijan Republic's recognition by the Soviet Russia, repeatedly sent relevant diplomatic notes to the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic's People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, G. V. Chicherin. Khoyski courageously rejected the insidious plan of the Commissar, who ignored Azerbaijan's aspirations and instead sought to draw the republic to an anti-Denikin union. In his re-

sponse to Chicherin, Khoyski insisted that the Azerbaijani government deemed the Soviet Russia's struggle against the Denikin forces as an internal affair of the Russian people and interference with this matter would be unacceptable. After stating a clear-cut stance to the Soviet Russian government and managing to defend Azerbaijan's independence based on the logic of jurisprudence and diplomatic skill and to adequately respond to Russia's high-flown and harsh diplomatic notes, Khoyski was gladdened and encouraged by the news that Azerbaijan's independence was recognized at the Paris Peace Conference.

"This is truly a festive occasion," Khoyski said while informing participants of the solemn parliamentary session in this regard on January 14, 1920. "This is a great day not only for us but also for the whole Turkic nation and the Turkic world. Other nations have endeavored for decades for this day to come. However, we have made it happen in just a year and a half. I am convinced that a nation that has attained independence in such a short period of time will hold on to it firmly. I extend congratulations to you on behalf of my government on this joyous occasion. I am utterly delighted to have

been at the helm of the government during the proclamation of our independence. And now I declare to you its endorsement."

The forces that had allowed that festive occasion to take place left the newly independent republic at the mercy of fate, i.e. at the hands of Bolshevik Russia. Khoyski and Chicherin's exchange of strongly worded diplomatic notes was part of the crafty process. Having sought to mislead Azerbaijan with diplomatic tricks, Russia finally achieved its goal on April 27, 1920 as Azerbaijan was invaded and the republic collapsed.

The Red Army units approached the northern borders of the Azerbaijan Republic after defeating the Denikin forces in the North Caucasus in mid-April 1920. Therefore, Khoyski sent a diplomatic note to the Soviet Russian authorities on behalf of his government on April 15. On April 27, the 11th Red Army crossed Azerbaijan's borders, in defiance of international law, and launched an offensive operation on Baku. As a result, the Azerbaijan Republic ceased to exist.

Following the invasion, Fatali Khan Khoyski immediately decided to continue his activity in Tiflis, but was murdered there on June 19 by an Armenian terrorist, namely, a mercenary linked to Dashnaksutyun.

Alimardan Bay Alakbar Bay oghlu Topchubashov (1863-1934) significantly facilitated shaping up and pursuing the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic's foreign policy. Topchubashov made an unmatched contribution to international recognition of the newly independent state. Initially serving as a minister without portfolio in the second government cabinet, he was appointed foreign minister on August 20; shortly thereafter, on August 23, he was delegated to Istanbul as the ADR's extraordinary envoy and authorized minister. Topchubashov, who undertook extensive diplomatic efforts in Istanbul, held discussions there with the authorized representatives of Britain, the United States, Italy, Holland, Sweden, Iran, Ukraine, as well as others. He also voiced protest over the 11th and 15th provisions of the Armistice of Mudros relating to Azerbaijan. Topchubashov was seeking unification of the Caucasus nations under a single federation as he believed this would allow them to forge closer ties and join effort in countering external interference with their affairs.

Topchubashov was elected the ADR parliament speaker in absentia during the first parliamentary session at the proposal of M. A. Rasulzade. A. Topchubashov was also put in charge of the Azerbaijani delegation at the Paris Peace Conference, in accordance with a de-

cision passed at a joint meeting of the Government and the Parliament's Council of Elders. The meetings and negotiations held by the delegation members, who finally arrived in Paris in May 1919 after tough challenges, began to yield fruit. On May 28, 1919, US President Woodrow Wilson hosted the Azerbaijani delegation led by Topchubashov. During the meeting Topchubashov mentioned the possibility of establishing a confederation of the Caucasus peoples, namely, Azerbaijanis, Armenians, Georgians and mountaineers, and presented a memorandum of the Azerbaijan Republic's representatives to the US president.

In an appeal to President Wilson, Topchubashov said, *"We hereby appeal to You, Mr. President, a representative of the powerful America, with a request to hear out information from us about our country, nation as well as ourselves, given that we frequently witness erroneous, false and untrue reports concerning Azerbaijan circulated by European and US media. True, we are not well-known yet and this our first visit to Europe, but we assure You that the conference attendees will hear us out and we will be allowed to join the League of Nations here. We are convinced that we will receive assistance based on Your high principles, just like all other nations."*

In conclusion of the appeal, Topchubashov said decisively, *"We declare that we will not recognize Kolchak, Denikin or anyone else who intends to reinstate power within the boundaries of the old (defunct) Russian Empire. We recognize and will continue to recognize only our own Parliament and our own Government in Azerbaijan."*

A. Topchubashov was re-elected chairman of the ADR Parliament in December 1919 though he was in Paris at the time. The Azerbaijan Republic's delegation, which worked hard under Topchubashov's leadership, achieved de-facto recognition of Azerbaijan's independence. On January 11, 1920, the supreme council of the Paris Peace Conference stated that it was de-facto recognizing the independence of Azerbaijan and Georgia. On January 15, A. Topchubashov and Mohammad Maharramov were invited to France's Foreign Ministry and formally informed of this decision.

Following the fall of the ADR, Topchubashov continued his political activity in Paris. He attended the Geneva meeting of the League of Nations in November 1920, as well as the conferences in London and Genoa in 1920 and in Lausanne in 1923, comprehensively informing participants of the occupation of Azerbaijan by Bolshevik Russia and the crimes committed by the Bolsheviks in Azerbaijan. Topchubashov also discussed the possibility

Mahammadyusif Jafarov

of establishing a Caucasus confederation with representatives of the other Caucasus republics, and they further met in Paris on May 8, 1921. On June 10, authorized representatives of the three Caucasus republics agreed to establish a political and economic union at a meeting chaired by Topchubashov. During the meeting Topchubashov said Azerbaijani representatives strongly backed the Caucasus confederation idea. Shortly before his death, in 1934, as a member of the Azerbaijan National Center council, Topchubashov co-signed together with M. A. Rasulzade the "Caucasus Confederation Declaration" in Brussels in a ceremony joined by Georgian and North Caucasus representatives. Topchubashov, who struggled for the independence of not only his people but also Turkic Muslim nations throughout Russia, continued making an effort to achieve restoration of Azerbaijan's independence for the rest of his life.

Mahammadyusif Hajibaba oghlu Jafarov (1885-1938) served as one of the ADR's foreign ministers. Prior to this appointment, M. Jafarov had a track record of diplomatic service. He held the position of the ADR diplomatic representative in the Republic of Georgia from late June 1918 to mid-March 1919. In this capacity, he contributed to forging friendly ties between the Azerbaijani and Georgian governments and dividing the property of the former Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic, and also closely participated in the conference joined by representatives of Georgia and the Mountainous Republic of the Northern Caucasus in Tiflis, as well as co-signed an agreement on the emission of extra transitional paper money between Azerbaijan and Georgia. M. Jafarov served as foreign minister in the fourth government cabinet formed on March 14, 1919 and held the position until December 22, 1919. As a dedicated diplomat Jafarov defended the Azerbaijan Republic's cause. His extensive merits in this regard are clearly illustrated by the Azerbaijani-Georgian agreement on military and defense cooperation that he signed, along with the agreement among the Republics of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia, as well as his efforts to protect the interests and property rights of the Muslim population, his diplomatic notes condemning the genocide and policy of discrimination against Azerbaijanis sent to the Armenian Foreign Ministry and those on defending Azerbaijan's territorial integrity, addressed to the command of the British troops in the South Caucasus and Baku, etc.



All of the ADR's foreign ministers conscientiously served for the sake of the newly independent republic's interests. All of them pursued a consistent policy aimed at ensuring the territorial integrity of the Azerbaijan Republic, achieving its formal international recognition and countering outside threats and aggression, serving their country with professionalism and devotion to the paramount principles of statehood. ♦

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STRUCTURE AND COMPOSITION OF THE AZERBAIJAN REPUBLIC'S MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AS OF EARLY 1920



This building was the seat of government of the Azerbaijan Republic, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in June-September 1918. Ganja, present-day photo

The "Address Book of the Azerbaijan Republic" was published in early 1920. The unique directory, which was compiled and released under the guidance of A. Stavrovsky in the state-run "Azerbaijan" Publishing House, is currently an important source of information about the structure and composition of the government agencies of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic and the steps taken on the path of state-building.

Interestingly, the directory contains 60 pages of purely advertising content, including newsletters of major privately owned companies that operated in the republic. Therefore, it was published with a large print run, using paper of very high quality, fetching significant funds to the state treasury. The revenue is said to have been used to meet the needs of the orphanages overseen by the Ministry of Welfare.

The structure of the ADR Foreign Ministry, as well as the foreign missions, which were registered in the republic's territory and referenced in the directory, is indicated below while retaining the stylistic features of the 1920 edition.

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS


(Sadovaya Str. 11, tel.; Office of the Minister: 51-43; Office of his Associate: 42-34, director's office: 43-771; secretary's office: 57-34; official operator for special assignments on duty: 51-38, chancellery: 53-05 and 57-14. The minister's visiting hours: from noon to 2 p.m. on Mondays, Wednesdays and Saturdays; the deputy minister hosts visitors from noon to 2 p.m. on Tuesdays, Thursdays and Sundays; verification letters are issued daily from 11 a.m. to 2 p.m.

Foreign Minister Fatali Khan KHOYSKI (Nikolayevskaya Str. 1. tel. apt. 16-20 and 29-30).

Deputy Minister Mammad Khan TEKINSKY (tel. apt. 42-47). Director of the Chancellery Ismayil Bay KHURAMOVICH (Irevan Str. Lalayev house, tel. apt. 30-13); Associate Director of the Chancellery Konstantin Davidovich SULKEVICH (Marinskaya Str. 64, t. apt. 58-90).

Secretary Abdullah-Bay SUBKHANVERDIKHANOV (Persidskaya Str. 123, tel. 45-41). Special assignments officer Karim Bay Zeynalov.

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Front page of the "Address Book of the Azerbaijan Republic for 1920"

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АДРЕСА И НОМЕРЫ ТЕЛЕФОНОВ ДИПЛОМАТИЧЕСКИХ ЧЛОСТИ И КОНСУЛЬСТВ ВЪ АЗЕРБАЙДЖАНЪ БАКУ/			
ГРАДОСТИ	ФАМИЛИИ И ИМЕНА	АДРЕСА	НР ТЕЛЕФОНОВ
Грузія	Н. С. Алишібая	Поліцейська, 20	
Арmenія	Арутюнянъ	Телефонная, 3	каб. 3040 нині 3041 8-14
Персія	М. Саидуль-Возда	Губерн.уг.Спасс.	
Італія	О.Икоомъ, Замѣтъ <i>Профаніе</i>	Молочанская, 25	9-70
Данія	О.Ф.Біернігъ/и отвѣтъ/	Бирзевалъ, 32	8-00
Греція	Кусикъ	Уг.Тогол.и Молок.	3-72
Бельгія	Аббевель	Горчаковская, 19	
Латвія	Марковский	Повеновская, 15	
Латвія	Каменистая, 223	
Англія	Гевелькіе	Кладбищенская, 11	
Імперія	Коттьо, Замѣтъ.Белльръ	Биржевая, 14	10-65
Франція	Дюруа	Гостин."Европа"	

Addresses and phone numbers of the embassies based in Baku in 1920

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REGISTRATION DESK. Registrar: Sarra Naumovna WELSHLEY, her assistant: Jeyran Kanim Suleymanova. ARCHIVES. Archivist: Ahmad Bay AGHAYEV.

Representatives of Azerbaijan Republic abroad

Azerbaijani Peace Delegation in Paris: Chairman: Ali Mardan Bay TOPCHUBASHOV; Members: A.A.SHEIKH-UL-ISLAMOV, M. MAHARRAMOV and M. MIR-MEHDIYEV; adviser: B. Hajibayov.

Diplomatic Representatives: Diplomatic Representative to the Government of the Republic of Georgia: Farist Bay VAKILOV; Diplomatic Representative



This building was the seat of government of the Azerbaijan Republic, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, from September 1918 to April 1920. Baku, present-day photo

to the Government of the Republic of Armenia: Abdurahman Bay AKHVERDOV; Counselor: Agha Salah MUSAYEV; Diplomatic Representative to the Government of Persia: Ahmad Khan KHIATKHAN, Deputy: Alakbar Bay SADIKHOV; Representative in Constantinople: Yusif Bay VAZIROV; deputy and financial consultant: Jangir Bay GAIBOV.

Consul General in Batum: Mahmud Bay AFANDIYEV; Consul in Ukraine: Jamal Sadikhov. Consular agent in Crimea: Sheikh-Ali USEYNOV.

Foreign missions in Baku

- ENGLAND - Vice-Consul GEVELKE (Kladbisch-chenskaya Str., 11, chancellery of Russian-Asian Bank, phone: 52-40);
- ARMENIA - diplomatic representative G. A. BEKZAD-YAN (Telefonnaia Str., 5, phone: 9-43).
- BELGIUM - Consul AYVAZOV (Gorchakovskaya Str., 19, phone: 3-67).
- GREECE - Consul KUSIS (the corner of Gogol and Molokan Str., phone: 3-72).
- GEORGIA - diplomatic representative N. S. ALSHIBAY (Politseyskaya Str., 20, phone: 7-09).
- DENMARK - Consul E.F. BISRING (Birzhevaya Str. 32, "Electrical Power", phone: 8-00).
- ITALY - head of the eighth mission, Enrico INSOM (Molokan Str. 35, phone: 9-7 and Consul L. GRI-KUROV (Krasnovodskaya Str. 8, phone: 32-50).
- LITHUANIA - Consular agent V. I. MITSKEVICH (Pozyonovskaya Str. 15, phone: 11-53).
- PERSIA - Consul General SAAD-UL-VIZIROV (Gubernskaya Str., Spasskaya Str. corner, phone 8-54).
- POLAND - Consular agent S. RYLSKY (Politseyskaya Str. 15, phone: 95).
- NORTH AMERICA. UNITED STATES - Vice-Consul RANDOLPH (Krasnovodskaya Str. 8, chancellery: GIMNAZICHESKAYA Str., House of Armenian Philanthropic Soc., phone 3-08).
- UKRAINE - Vice-Consul: Ukrainian National Council).
- FINLAND - Nobel consular office, phone: 10-93).
- FRANCE - consular agent YEMELYANOV (Vodovoznaya Str., Mitrofanov House, phone: 10-45).
- SWITZERLAND - Consul CLOTTEU (Birzhevaya Str., 14, phone: 10-58).
- SWEDEN - Consul R. K. WANDER-PLUGG (the corner of Persidskaya and Gubernskaya Str., phone: 40-99). *

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STRUGGLE FOR BEING HEARD AT THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

***Stay of the Azerbaijani diplomatic delegation to Istanbul
(January-April 1919)***

*Alimardan Bay Topchubashov - head of the
Azerbaijani delegation at the Paris Peace Conference*



The formation of the third cabinet of ministers of the Azerbaijan Republic, chaired by F. K. Khoyski, was completed on 28 December, 1918. On the same day, the new prime minister, jointly with the Par-

liament's Council of Elders, approved the composition of the diplomatic delegation to be dispatched to France for participating in the Paris Peace Conference (1). In fact, this delegation was to decide the fate of the independence of Azerbaijan and other states that emerged from the former Russian Empire.

Ali Mardan Bay Topchibashi (Topchibashev), one of the prominent figures in the Azerbaijani national liberation movement, who simultaneously acted as chairman of the country's parliament, was appointed head of the delegation. The delegation also included Mammad Hasan Hajinski, Minister of State Control and Member of Parliament, as well as MPs Ahmad Bay Aghayev and Akbar Agha Sheikhlislamov (2).

According to the general mandate issued to the delegation on 7 January, 1919, these persons were authorized to "take part in the peace conference of the powers and nations, which was to be held after the world war, as well as in all conferences, unions and agreements among states and nations, with the right to conclude all types of contracts on behalf of Azerbaijan and join any political, economic, commercial and financial alliances

*ADR delegation to
the Paris Peace Conference at work. 1920*



and treaties" (3). Moreover, MPs Mammad Maharramov, Mir Yagub Mehdiyev, as well as Jeyhun Bay Hajibayov (Hajibayli), editor of the state-run "Azerbaijan" newspaper, were appointed advisers to the delegation (4).

Since Topchibashi was in Constantinople at that time, as Azerbaijan's Envoy extraordinary and plenipotentiary to the Ottoman Empire, as well as to Armenia and Georgia, appointed in October 1918, the other members of the delegation left Baku without him. The delegation, which was temporarily chaired by M. H. Hajinski, arrived in Batumi on 14 January, 1919 and departed for Constantinople on 18 January. Representatives of the British authorities based in the capital of the Ottoman Empire were notified of its departure through a telegraph message on the same day (5). Upon their arrival in Constantinople on 20 January, members of the Azerbaijani diplomatic delegation began seeking ways of obtaining entry visas to France, which was hosting the Paris Peace Conference. It was a daunting task. A special entity had been established in the French capital by the end of 1918. The organization, the "Russian Political Council in Paris", was essentially a joint representation of the White governments of Siberia, northern and southern Russia. Shortly before the Paris conference, Admiral A. Kolchak, had been recognized by all White governments as the "supreme ruler of Russia", established the Russian political delegation as the executive body of the Russian Political Council. This body, which included four members, namely, the former head of the provisional gov-

ernment of the city of Lvov, former Russian ambassador to France V. Maklakov, Foreign Minister S. Sazonov and the head of the provisional government of the Northern Province N. Tchaikovsky, was to act as the unified White diplomatic mission at the Paris conference. One of the main tasks of the delegation was to counter all political movements of non-Russian nations seeking independence after the fall of the Tsarist Empire, in keeping with the principle of "a united and indivisible Russia".

While demagogically recognizing the right of non-Russian peoples to ethnic and cultural autonomy, just like the White generals themselves, members of the Russian political delegation ruled out any secession by nations that had been part of the Russian Empire before 1914, Poland being the only exception. A declaration dated 9 March, 1919 addressed by members of the Russian political delegation to the chairman of the Paris conference, noted that "all issues concerning the determination of the future status of the nations included in these boundaries could not be resolved without the consent of the Russian people." The declaration further stated that "no final political decision could be made in this regard until the Russian people are able to express their free will upon these issues and contribute to their solution" (6). In other words, the right to independence of the nations that had been conquered and enslaved by the Russian Empire was subordinated to voluntary consent of the conquerors themselves to grant this right.

to their own victims. At the same time, members of the Russian political delegation began working hard to discredit the governments of non-Russian nations and their representatives seeking to travel to Paris to attend the Peace Conference. Presenting the national governments of non-Russian peoples as facilitators of German imperialism and referring to the sacrifices made by Russia in World War I "for the sake of the Allies' common cause", the leaders of the Russian delegation initially managed to exert significant influence on the French government. Their efforts were facilitated by the fact that Georges Clemenceau's administration, which took a hard-line anti-German stance, believed that in order to offset an anticipated revival of Berlin's power, France needed a powerful ally in the East like Russia, which would serve as a counterbalance on the eastern borders of Germany. Since Paris considered the Bolsheviks who came to power in Russia to be henchmen of Germany and also refused to repay the enormous debt of the Tsarist government to France, Clemenceau generally relied on the White anti-Bolshevik movement and disapproved of the quest for independence of non-Russian nations, including even the Poles (7). In this regard, the French policy ran counter to the political course of British Prime Minister David Lloyd George, who was seeking a compromise with the Bolsheviks. Lloyd George disbelieved the prospects of the White movement and was much less critical of the idea of state independence of non-Russian nations. The British Prime Minister's main concern was the speediest solution of the Russian issue as he hoped to relieve Britain of the increasingly challenging military and financial burden (8). In addition, Lloyd George was keen on opening up the Russian market for British goods, which, in his opinion, would probably facilitate gradual liberalization of the Bolshevik regime, shifting it in the direction that would be favourable for the Europeans.


On 12 January -- prior to the formal opening of the conference -- the French-British differences affected to the fullest extent the parties' views about whom they should consider the representative of Russia at the Conference. French Foreign Minister Stephen Pichon had to concur with the Britons that the Russian Political Council in Paris could not be recognized as a formal representation of Russia until the Allies recognized Admiral Kolchak's provisional Omsk government, which, in turn, "was not strong enough to represent Russia as a whole" (9). However, Pichon sought to secure a privileged status for the White representatives in a different way, suggesting that members of the Russian Political Council

be allowed to address the conference informally. As a result, the parties agreed that though Russia should not be officially represented at the conference, both the mentioned representatives of this country and those who were not cited by Pichon could be heard by the conference attendees as private individuals. They could also be asked to submit memoranda (10).

Given that the arrival in France of representatives of states that emerged in the territory of the defunct Russian Empire completely depended on the goodwill of the French authorities, the approval of Pichon's proposal by the Entente's Supreme Council immediately meant that France had a final say in the admission or barring of any delegation heading for its capital city.

Realizing that the French were trying to take advantage of the conference venue solely for the protection of the Whites' interests, US President Woodrow Wilson, jointly with Lloyd George, put forward an initiative on 21 January to convene a conference on the Princes' Islands in the Sea of Marmara to be joined both by the Bolsheviks and all the anti-Bolshevik governments of the former Russian Empire (11). Having stated that he "opposed in principle negotiating with the Bolsheviks, not because they were criminals, but because by saying that they were worthy to negotiate with us we would raise them to our level", Clemenceau nevertheless had to approve the holding of the conference under pressure of the Britons and Americans (12). However, the initiative to call a conference on the Princes' Islands fell through, since neither the Bolsheviks nor their White opponents were keen on sitting down at the negotiating table. On 25 January -- four days after the decision to call a conference, Sazonov, speaking on behalf of the Russian Political Council in Paris, declined to participate in the event (13). On the same day, G. Chicherin, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR), in an effort to assert the status of Russia's official government for the Bolsheviks, sent a cable to the Paris conference requesting a formal invitation of the Bolshevik government representatives to the Princes' Islands. Lloyd George, who was not willing to give such a trump card to the Bolsheviks, stated that a regular invitation, which was sent to all potential conference participants, was sufficient (14). Moreover, in violation of the truce that was urged by the Supreme Council ahead of the conference, the Bolshevik command dealt new powerful blows on the White army, whose manpower was largely demoralized by the news regarding the Allies' readiness to launch negotiations with the Bolsheviks (15).

“Big Four”: David Lloyd George, Vittorio Orlando, Georges Clemenceau, Woodrow Wilson



On 28 January, members of the Georgian delegation, who had already arrived in Paris, refused to participate in the conference as they did not consider Georgia to be part of Russia (16).

Ultimately, the Allies had to admit by the end of February that the idea of convening a conference on the Princes’ Islands was a failure.


M. Topchibashi, who did not want to get ahead of himself, preferred to wait and see the outcome of the Supreme Council initiative. Official representatives of Britain and France called on him to do the same, explicitly noting that he should stay in Constantinople until the issue of convening a conference on the Princes’ Islands was clarified (17).

Interestingly, unlike other diplomatic delegations, the Armenian delegation, chaired by A. Agaronian, left Constantinople for Marseille without hindrance as early as 20 January -- when the issue of holding the planned conference on the Princes’ Islands was not completely resolved, and subsequently arrived in Paris on 4 February (18). On 26 February, the joint delegation, comprised of both Caucasus and Turkish Armenians, was heard by the Entente’s foreign ministers. The Armenians opted to act single-handedly, though the Azerbaijani delegates met with the Armenian delega-

tion members in Batumi as early as 15 January in a bid to find common ground for joint statements in the international arena, while Topchibashi, a dedicated Caucasus confederate, deemed it necessary from November 1918 to establish a unified Caucasus delegation, which was the only way to attain success (19). In addition, the Armenians sought to solve their problems at the expense of the Azerbaijanis and Georgians by compromising the latter (20).

The situation took a different turn in early March after it became clear that the planned conference on the Princes’ Islands would not take place. From then onward, Britain did not see any reason to deny representatives of non-Russian nations the right to arrive in Paris and the Entente countries as a whole. On 1 March, the British Foreign Office issued a telegram, addressed to Admiral Richard Webb, British Assistant High Commissioner in Constantinople, which said, “His Majesty’s government have no objection to North Caucasian and Azerbaijan delegations, now in Constantinople, being allowed to proceed to Paris provided French authorities at Constantinople agree.

If necessary military authorities may at their discretion detain any members to whom they have special objections” (21).



Mandate of the ADR government issued to the Azerbaijani delegation at the Paris Peace Conference

Having appealed to representatives of the British military command, Topchibashi received a message on 6 March saying that the British government did not object to the Azerbaijani delegation's participation in the Paris Peace Conference if the latter managed to obtain an entry permit from the French authorities (22).

Further challenges caused the Azerbaijani delegation to stay in Constantinople for two more months. First, the French command issued travel permits to only four of the six members of the delegation, demanding that not only the other two representatives, but also the entire technical staff comprised of secretaries and translators stay in Istanbul (23).

In an effort to obtain permission for the entire delegation to visit Paris, along with at least part of the secretariat (three secretaries), Topchibashi wrote a letter to Louis Francois Franchet d'Esperey, a French general who served as the commander-in-chief of the Entente's army in the Middle East. The letter noted that since the delegation consists of people from different backgrounds and the Azerbaijanis do not have diplomatic representatives either in France or elsewhere in Europe, unlike

the other Caucasus nations, the absence of two members of the delegation and technical staff would irreparably harm its activity (24).

The appeal had a reverse effect as Franchet d'Esperey, himself, was reportedly a staunch supporter of "a united and indivisible Russia" who was hostile to both the Bolsheviks and the national aspirations of the non-Russian peoples. As early as in January 1919, the French general told Lloyd George that he was in favor of a "united Russia" (25). Perhaps, the French stance regarding the Azerbaijani delegation did not improve, but to the contrary, became even tougher, under the influence of d'Esperey's views.

On 15 March, Topchibashi received a letter from Colonel Foulon, the technical adviser to the High Commissariat of the French Republic in the Middle East, saying that "a new circumstance" had prompted him to make a request in Paris to grant an entry permit to both Topchibashi and Muhammad Hashim, his secretary, to go to France (26). By that time, all the delegations of the Caucasus nations in Constantinople had received an entry permit and either arrived in Paris or were on their way to the French capital. Though Topchibashi sent a special note on 21 March, addressed to G. Clemenceau, Chairman of the Paris Peace Conference, requesting approval for the Azerbaijani delegation's arrival in Paris (27), a message was received on 25 March from Gustav Leon, a second-class Commissioner of the French Republic. Leon informed Topchibashi that French Foreign Minister Stephen Pichon had ruled out a visit to France by any member of the delegation (28). Afterwards, messages were received from the US Commissioner and Italy's High Commissioner saying that the US and Italian governments had no objections to a visit by an Azerbaijani delegation to Paris provided that they managed to obtain French visas (29).

A comparative analysis of the available sources suggests that the French authorities sought to exert such pressure in order to prompt three members of the delegation to start a visit to Paris without Topchibashi, leaving him in Istanbul. On 28 March, Topchibashi paid a personal visit to general Franchet d'Esperey and asked him for assistance. On the following day, the French general sent in a packet notifying the Azerbaijani side that only two members of the delegation could go to Paris. Topchibashi wrote in a report on the same day addressed to Azerbaijani Prime Minister F. K. Khoyski, "At this point it is being clarified who will visit Paris, i.e. whether two or three members of the delegation will go there. As for me, a decision has been apparently made to keep me here for a while" (30).

Realizing that it would be better to achieve a modest result than to achieve nothing at all, the delegation members decided to divide it into three parts. One of the groups, including M. H. Hajinski, M. Maharramov and J. Hajibayov, would go to Paris; another group, comprised of M. Y. Mehdiyev and A. A. Sheikhulislamov, was supposed to leave for London, while Topchibashi, himself, was to stay in Constantinople (31).

This situation was extensively described in a telegram sent by French consul Defrance to Paris from Constantinople and addressed to S. Pichon. The document said that "at the insistence of the commanding general to whom numerous demarches were made by Azerbaijani representatives, who agreed to break away from their chairman (i.e. Topchibashi - G. M., R. A.), I deem it necessary to allow the departure for France of two of them, namely, Muhammad Hasan Hajinski, the deputy chairman, and Mammad Maharramov (mistakenly referred to as Mugaremov - G. M., R. A.), whose trip there, by the way, has already been approved by the High Commissioners of England and Italy. Under these circumstances and upon consent of Your Excellency, the two above-mentioned delegates, accompanied by the secretary, Jeyhun Bay Hajibayov with his wife, will leave within the next week." (32).

In fact, the situation changed dramatically in favour of Azerbaijan just a few days later. The military success of general Denikin's Volunteer Army revived the hope in the Entente's Supreme Council for an imminent fall of Bolshevism, simultaneously sparking debate between the Allies regarding economic measures that should be taken against the Red-controlled Moscow in addition to the Volunteer Army's offensive. As part of these efforts, the issue concerning the oil fields of the Caucasus, which were producing about 90 percent of oil in the former Russian Empire before 1918, came to the fore. According to available sources, this question became the subject of special correspondence between French and US representatives. Since the Entente leaders were seeking to carry out an economic blockade of Bolshevik Russia, they were particularly concerned over the plans of the oil industrialists Nobels, the owners of major oil fields in the Baku province, to sell Azerbaijani oil to the Bolsheviks for economic gain. In order to counter these plans, they had to appeal to the Azerbaijani authorities.

On 14 April, the French government, which was keen on toppling Bolshevik rule in Russia, sent a letter addressed to Robert Lansing, US Secretary of State and the head of the US delegation at the Paris Peace Confer-



Azerbaijani delegation wrote to the leadership of the Paris Peace Conference to secure recognition of the ADR

ence. The letter said that "the lack of fuel and lubricants should shortly lead to a complete halt of the transportation service in Russia and also deal an extremely heavy blow upon the Bolshevik dictatorial regime" (33).

Since the Entente countries had repeatedly opposed maintaining any relationship with the Bolsheviks, it was believed that the Nobels should be prevented from resuming economic ties with Moscow, regardless of the amount of profit that could be made from oil trade with the Bolsheviks. Therefore, it was necessary to support the government of Azerbaijan, which owned the country's oil reserves, adhered to an anti-Bolshevik stance and was also interested in exchanging oil for the direly needed manufactory goods, which could not be provided by civil war-ravaged Russia. In addition, the Entente countries, which were facing a crisis with the supply of petroleum products, would be interested in importing oil from the Caucasus when the conditions of their transportation by sea improved (34).

"Under such circumstances, the government of France would not favor supply of oil products to the Soviet government, which, in its opinion, may lead to an

extremely deplorable outcome," the document said in conclusion (35). Thus, the above-mentioned considerations, namely, the efforts to implement an economic blockade against the Bolsheviks and secure a part of the Baku oil for the future, fostered a shift in the French stance regarding the admission of Azerbaijani representatives to the Paris Peace Conference. Moreover, US President Woodrow Wilson was instrumental in making this happen. It was at this very time that the US government was thoroughly considering the possibility of assuming a mandate over the territory of a part of Eastern Turkey and the Caucasus if a further course of events turned out favourable (36).

During a meeting of W. Wilson, Lloyd George and Clemenceau held on 2 May, the US President cited the Azerbaijani delegation's arrival in the French capital as a primary issue. Wilson stated that the representatives of Azerbaijan had long sought to travel to Paris. They had a delegation in Constantinople that had been awaiting an entry permit. However, the French government had been declining to grant the required permission for a long time, Wilson said.

"The Georgians and other representatives of the Caucasus republics were all in Paris, and there seemed to be no reason for this exception," he added (37).

According to the minutes of the meeting, Clemenceau and Lloyd George "undertook to look into the matter" (38). Taking into account that the Azerbaijani delegation left Constantinople for Europe as early as 28 April, a few days prior to this conversation, presumably, US representatives previously had similar discussions with the French side.


On 6 May, R. Lansing sent a letter to S. Pichon wherein he brought to the French foreign minister's attention A. M. Topchibashi's letter to President Wilson, dated 21 March, 1919, adding that "the statements made in the letter have interested President Wilson very much" (39). On behalf of Wilson, Lansing asked Pichon to authorize the Azerbaijani delegation's visit to France. Undoubtedly, that document summarized the content of the conversations on the issue that took place between the Americans and the French in April. This broke the ice in this matter. On 22 April, the entire Azerbaijani delegation left for Italy on board the "Bulgaria" steamship, en route from Constantinople to Naples through Thessaloniki, Piraeus and Messina. On 2 May, the delegation members arrived in Rome whence they headed to Paris by train on 7 May (40). ■

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HISTORY OF THE RECOGNITION OF AZERBAIJAN'S DE FACTO STATE INDEPENDENCE AT THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

The *de facto* recognition of the state independence of Azerbaijan by the Supreme Council of the Entente was the main aim of the Azerbaijani diplomatic delegation to the Paris Peace Conference, which arrived in the capital of France on 9 May 1919 headed by A. M. Topchibashi.

The process of the recognition of the Azerbaijani state proved time-consuming and difficult, demanding a lot of effort on the part of members of the Azerbaijani diplomatic delegation in Paris.

From mid-June 1919, the main focus of the efforts of the Azerbaijani as well as Georgian and North Caucasus delegations was to combat the claims of the White government of Admiral A. Kolchak formed in Omsk in order to win recognition as the official government of the territories that were formerly part of the defunct empire of the Romanovs. The leaders of the Russian White movement were adamant supporters of a "united and indivisible Russia" and they refused to recognize the right of the

non-Russian peoples of the former Russian Empire to independence, making an exception only for the Poles.

It should be noted that the issue of Kolchak led to sharp differences in the British government, the main ally of the Whites in the supply of assistance in weapons, equipment and uniforms. Winston Churchill, the Secretary of State for War of the British Empire, was a strong supporter of Kolchak, Denikin and other White generals, having an indifferent and often hostile attitude to the national aspirations of the non-Russian peoples. In his view the Caucasus should return to Russia after the overthrow of Bolshevism; he believed that British troops should remain there only in order to support Denikin, not allowing the local governments to take any action against him.

The opposite view was held by Lord George Curzon, who worked as acting Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs from the summer of 1919 and officially took this position in October of the same year. The former Viceroy of India Curzon was well aware that the aim of any Russian



*Participants in a ceremony to mark de facto recognition of Azerbaijan by the Entente countries.
January 1920*

imperial government will inevitably be expansion into the South and the Middle East, which threatened British interests in these regions, argued for the creation of independent states not only in the Caucasus but also in Central Asia, to build a reliable barrier to the further expansion of Russian imperialism. For the same reason, British officers who were in the Caucasus were also divided into two categories. The officer corps of the 27th British Division, which was stationed on the Baku-Batumi line from the end of 1918 and consisted of officers of the so-called "Indian Service", had a generally negative attitude to both White and Red Russian imperialism. On the contrary, officers who served in British units on the Western front during the First World War had a sympathetic attitude to the White movement, seeing them as yesterday's allies.


Prime Minister David Lloyd George, who had little trust and sympathy with the Russian White movement, served as a kind of regulator of relations between Churchill and Curzon, and in principle, was favorably inclined toward the small nations of the former empire of the Romanovs. Nonetheless, the main priority for him was to grapple with the debt crushing British finances after the First World War (1). It is from this perspective that Lloyd George considered the matter of military aid to the Volunteer Army of General Anton Denikin operat-

ing in southern Russia and the presence of British troops in the Caucasus.

In March 1919, the presence of British troops in the Caucasus was a big subject of discussion in the cabinet, where Lloyd George, Churchill and Curzon expressed their views on this issue. Aware that Britain would have to withdraw its troops from the South Caucasus for financial reasons, as well as that in this case, Azerbaijan and Georgia would remain one on one with the Volunteer Army, Curzon put forward his own scheme for the settlement of the problem, which minimized, at least in the near future, the risk of the Transcaucasia republics being occupied by the Whites.

On 6 March, the Inter-Departmental Committee, which met under the chairmanship of Lord Curzon, decided to recommend the following tripartite policy to the government: 1. Start preparations for the evacuation of the Caucasus. 2. To compensate for this, to supply General Denikin with arms and military equipment, as well as to send a British military mission to Yekaterinodar. 3. To make such support conditional on the fact that General Denikin should not interfere in the affairs of the independent states in the Caucasus (2).


Thus, Curzon considered the supply of arms to General Denikin as a means of giving him the opportunity



Letter delegating Mammad Amin Rasulzade and the accompanying negotiators to Istanbul to hold talks. May 1918

to fight against Bolshevism on the one hand and on the other, to prevent the possible aggression of the Volunteer Army against the Transcaucasian states. According to Curzon, it was necessary to delay supplies to the Volunteer Army for several months, giving the weapons in stages in order to maintain control over Denikin (3).

Although Churchill did not feel sympathy for Azerbaijan and Georgia, he was also against drawing Denikin into a conflict with these republics, rightly considering that it would lead to the scattering of the White forces, whose main aim was to fight the Russian Bolsheviks. As a result, the aforesaid scheme of relations with Denikin was adopted, which allowed London to gain the necessary leverage over the Volunteer Army, despite the fact that by September 1919, British troops were withdrawn from Azerbaijan (4). Although in the second half of July 1919 the Volunteer Army managed to temporarily occupy the North Caucasus, creating a direct threat to



Letter delegating Alimardan Bay Topchibashi (Topchubashov) and the accompanying negotiators to Istanbul to hold talks. 23 August 1918

Azerbaijan from Dagestan and the Caspian Sea, Denikin, who depended on military assistance from the Entente, did not dare to invade the Transcaucasia.

In the same month, Curzon managed to get Oliver Wardrop, one of the founders of Georgian studies in Britain, a renowned expert on the Caucasus, and in general, a staunch supporter of the independence of the Caucasian peoples, appointed as British High Commissioner in the Caucasus. On 5 August, before his departure to Tiflis, Wardrop turned to Curzon with his recommendations, and one of the main recommendations was the issue of recognition of the independence of the South Caucasus states by London. According to Wardrop, Britain should recognize the republics, as was already done in 1918 by Germany and Turkey, which recognized Georgia and Azerbaijan. If the decision could not be taken immediately, London had to give Wardrop the right "[...] to inform the three republics

Heads and members of Georgian and Azerbaijani delegations at the Paris Peace Conference


that His Majesty's Government is ready to recognize them so soon as they have given undoubted proof of their intention to live in peace and amity together and maintain a benevolent attitude towards General Denikin so far as his policy is directed to the support of a free, democratic government truly representative of a regenerated Russia" (5).

On 12 August, the day of his departure to the Caucasus, Wardrop himself visited the Azerbaijani delegation and made a "good impression" on Topchibashi. Fully understanding the importance of regional cooperation for the state independence of the peoples of the Caucasus, in his conversation Wardrop made a major emphasis on the need for a maximum rapprochement between Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia (6).

Arriving on 29 August in Tiflis, where representatives of the Georgian government gave him an enthusiastic welcome (7), Wardrop immediately made arrangements for the structural organization of his commissariat. In all the important cities of the South Caucasus, officers subordinate to him were appointed, and their purpose was to inform the High Commissioner of the developments on the ground in a timely manner and accurately. In Baku, this representative of the High Commissioner was the Indian-born Colonel Claude Bayfield Stokes, a career intelligence officer, who was British military attaché in Tehran in 1907-1911 and served in the intelligence department of the General Staff of the Indian Army before the First World War. Like most other British officers of the "Indian Service" and by virtue of his posts, Stokes was well aware of Russian imperial ambitions in the Middle East (8). In the words of Stokes himself, he had an extremely good attitude to Azerbaijanis and was a staunch supporter of the independence of Azerbaijan and Georgia (9).

Seeing totally eye-to-eye on this issue, Wardrop and Stokes regularly sent messages to London in an effort to persuade the British government to recognize the independence of the South Caucasus republics. Initially, these reports did not find support in the UK government, as in September and October 1919 the Volunteer Army was on the crest of a military success and its units were near Orel and in the Moscow direction.

Then, however, under the influence of the rapidly developing military failures of the Volunteer Army, which quickly fell back under the pressure of the Bolsheviks in



late October, the opinion of the Allied Supreme Council in relation to the concept of "one and indivisible Russia" became more and more critical and began to change for the better in relation to the South Caucasus states.

Although in the first week of November, those changes only began to emerge in the foreign policy of the Entente states, Topchibashi immediately noticed them.


In December, when the total defeat of Denikin became completely clear, the British government began to tend to recognize the independence of the South Caucasus republics, and to discuss with the allies how to proceed.

Apparently, in the early days of January 1920, steps were taken to recognize Azerbaijan and Georgia's independence. Thus, on 2 January, British foreign experts had already prepared a report on the form of recognition of Azerbaijan and Georgia. According to this document, *de facto* recognition "differs from *de jure* recognition only in the fact

1) That in the case of a state such as Azerbaijan, which has had no previous independent existence, *de facto* recognition is a necessary step to the grant of *de jure* recognition, and

2) *de facto* recognition involves a qualification to the effect that it is only granted on a specified condition such as e.g. the maintenance of stable Government or the decision of a Conference" (10).

De facto recognition will dispel suspicions in the republics about the allies supposedly waiting for the restoration of a united Russia. In the case of Azerbaijan, it is useful for dealing with Turkish influence. At the same time, only moral responsibility towards these countries falls on the Allies. London does not prevent these republics from concluding an agreement with the Bolsheviks in



on favorable terms, it only strengthens their position and prevents the Bolsheviks from crushing and incorporating them into the Bolshevik system. For these reasons, the Foreign Office believes "that *de facto* recognition would meet the wishes of the republics for the time being. *De jure* recognition would depend on the decision, taken by the League of Nations or the Allies" (11).

On 6 January, a memorandum prepared on the orders of Churchill and dedicated to the settlement of the Turkish problem, also concerning the problem of the Caucasus, advised precautions in the event of London's recognition of the independence of the Transcaucasian republics: "Should it be decided to establish the independence of Georgia and Azerbaijan, the British Representative with general Denikin should be given timely warning to prepare the field and to make it clear to Denikin that he will lose Allied official support if he resists the policy of the Peace Conference in this respect" (12).

Perhaps, the final push to the recognition of the independence of Azerbaijan and Georgia was a telegram received in London on 9 January from the High Commiss-

*Letter from the head of the Azerbaijani delegation,
Alimardan Bay Topchubashov,
at the Paris Peace Conference*

sioner of Britain in the Transcaucasia Wardrop, in which the latter reported that Colonel Stokes, the political representative of the High Commissariat in Baku, had sent him a letter. Stokes wrote in it that on 7 January, he met with Fatali Khoyski, the foreign minister of Azerbaijan, at the request of the latter. Showing Stokes a telegram from Chicherin, people's commissar of Bolshevik Russia for foreign affairs, dated 2 January and received in Baku on 6 January, Khoyski said that the Bolsheviks proposed that Azerbaijan and Georgia, together with the Bolsheviks, attack the Volunteer Army. The "successful advance of Bolsheviks on both sides Caspian Sea has brought Bolshevik danger to door of Transcaucasia and Azerbaijan must decide very soon her policy towards Bolsheviks" (13). According to Stokes, it is possible that the Bolsheviks will try to stage a mutiny in Baku in order to force the government to take a decision that is advantageous to them. Although the current government of the country has resolute anti-Bolshevik positions, "if Great Britain will not come to its assistance, it may be compelled to make terms with Bolsheviks", Khoyski said (14).

After a comprehensive review of this issue, the Azerbaijani government decided to appeal to the UK to protect the interests and very existence of Azerbaijan. This decision was not made for any sentimental reasons. It was dictated by the immediate interests of the country and, according to Khoyski, supporting Azerbaijan, the British will also better serve their own interests, protecting the shortest way to Persia. Since the Volunteer Army will soon cease to exist, London should take an immediate decision to support Baku if it wants to save Azerbaijan from Bolshevism.


Commenting on Khoyski's words, Stokes pointed out that, in his opinion, the foreign minister of Azerbaijan was not exaggerating the danger hanging over his country. "Unless we are willing to see Bolsheviks rampant in Azerbaijan a decision to support that country cannot be taken too soon" (15). Taking into account the seriousness of the situation created by the defeat of the Volunteer Army, Stokes recommended "immediate grant of full independence and whole-hearted support to Azerbaijan, dispatch of arms and equipment including uniforms for her army and of breach blocks and ammunition for two six-inch guns at Baku" (16) and in addition, the rapid payment of the entire amount the



Passport of a member of the Azerbaijani delegation at the Paris Peace Conference

British owed Azerbaijan for their military presence in the country. "These measures would, I consider place the Government in a position to suppress Bolshevik organizations within its borders and enable it to prevent Bolsheviks obtaining control of country", Stokes said (17).

Realizing that the Caucasus could be protected from a Bolshevik invasion only if the British took over the Caspian Sea, which, in itself, meant the return of Denikin's Caspian flotilla under British command with the replacement of its demoralized personnel by British sailors, Stokes wrote: "I have already drawn attention to Bolshevik danger on Caspian Sea and in Trans-Caspia and to situation in Dagestan which form part of same problem as safeguarding of Azerbaijan and I submit that the replacement of British Naval personnel [of Russian sailors] on armed ships in Caspian and adoption of policy towards Turks and Dagestan similar to that advocated for Azerbaijan are equally urgently required. Admiralty would doubtless demand safe line of communication before undertaking control of Caspian. Recognition of Georgia and Azerbaijan as independent States would, in my opinion, secure this" (18). The last proposal was referring to the issue of security of communications on the Baku-Batumi line, without which the British Admiralty refused to take control of the Caspian Sea. As we can see, Stokes cleverly tied this fact to the recognition of the independence of Azerbaijan and Georgia. With the explicit aim of neutralizing the pro-Russian military who tried to talk only about autonomy, not independence for the Transcaucasian states at the time, Stokes pointed out that in the eyes of Baku and Tiflis "no promise of autonomy in any shape given by any existing Russian Government even if guaranteed by Allies will carry any weight.



Encrypted letter of the Azerbaijani delegation at the Paris Peace Conference

"Policy advocated above may be regarded as drastic but in my opinion half measures would be of no avail and delay would mean disaster" (19). "I entirely concur", added Wardrop at the bottom of Stokes' message (20).

On 10 January 1920, Paris hosted a meeting of the foreign ministers of the Entente, which decided to recognize Azerbaijan and Georgia *de facto*. Coming up with this initiative, Curzon noted that at the meeting of the Supreme Council on the same day, Lloyd George pointed out the seriousness of the situation in South Russia and the Caucasus, which was facing the danger of a direct invasion by the Bolsheviks. The matter had not only a military but also a political aspect. Based on

this, he wanted to submit his following considerations to the heads of the Entente governments: The fate of Armenia will be resolved by the Peace Conference separately, as part of the settlement of the Turkish problem. As for Georgia and Azerbaijan, countries subjected to a triple threat from Denikin, the Bolsheviks and the Turks, he proposes granting those states *de facto* recognition. "The countries he mentioned had shown a firm desire to become real states. [...] To recognize their "*de facto*" governments would be equivalent to according them support" (21). The Allies acted in the same way in respect of the Baltic States.

Philippe Berthelot, Secretary General of the French Foreign Ministry, said that he had already spoken on this matter with Lord Curzon in London and reported the contents of this conversation to Clemenceau, who supports the *de facto* recognition of Azerbaijan and Georgia with the proviso that the boundaries of these states with Armenia must be established afterwards. Curzon agreed with this view. Italian Foreign Minister Vittorio Scialoja said that he was also inclined to *de facto* recognition on the same conditions as in the case of the Baltic countries. Hugh Wallace and Keishiro Matsui, US and Japanese representatives, said that they would request the views of their governments in this regard. Thus, Berthelot said that the *de facto* recognition of Azerbaijan and Georgia should be a joint act of the Entente Supreme Council.

As a result, the minutes of the meeting recorded the decision that "the Principal Allied and Associated Powers should together recognize the Governments of Georgia and Azerbaijan as "*de facto*" Governments, subject to the reserve that the representative of the United States and the representative of Japan would request instructions from their Governments on the question" (22).

On the same day, Lord Curzon sent a telegram to the Foreign Office in London, in which he reported that on his initiative, the Entente Supreme Council decided to recognize Azerbaijan and Georgia *de facto*; representatives of the British Foreign Office could inform the two governments (23).

At the same time, the telegram emphasized that "recognition of *de facto* independence of Georgian and Azerbaijan Governments does not of course involve any decision as to their present or future boundaries, and must not be held to prejudice that question in smallest degree" (24).


On 12 January, Wardrop informed the governments

in Tiflis and Baku of this decision (25). By this time, the representatives of the Azerbaijani delegation in Paris were aware of the decision, although the Azerbaijani delegation received the official text of the resolution on *de facto* recognition only on 30 January (26) after a special request to the General Secretariat of the Conference to send the text (27).

De facto recognition opened up new prospects for the Azerbaijani delegation in Paris. Now that the whole world is convinced of the commitment of the Azerbaijani people to the ideals of independence and their ability to establish a stable government with a positive agenda, the Western powers were ready to start new specific forms of cooperation with Baku. The fact that at the end of April 1920 the country's independence was crushed by the Bolshevik boot amounted to a temporary triumph of brute force. In an historical perspective, the commitment of the Azerbaijani people to independence was unswerving, as events have shown 70 years later. ♦

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ADR'S FOREIGN POLICY IN 1918-1919

The Transcaucasian Seim and Azerbaijan's diplomacy. In the history of any state, diplomacy always played a special role in protecting national interests on the world political stage. Diplomacy assumes a particularly significant role as a foreign policy tool during a nation's struggle for national independence and statehood. Successful development of the state system hinges on the ability of the diplomatic corps to assert the interests of the people and their country in a fierce struggle for territorial integrity and sovereignty.

The developments relating to the emergence of national republics in the North and South Caucasus after the fall of the Tsarist autocracy have always drawn particular interest of the scientific community. The great quest for freedom of the Caucasus nations and their aspiration toward establishing independent states at the historical "crossroads" of the 20th century led some of them to a successful accomplishment of their coveted goal, while the others faced a complete failure and collapse of the idea of independence and statehood.

"In the 20th century the people of Azerbaijan, its political figures and emerging diplomacy succeeded twice in raising the banner of independence and fought hard amid complicated conditions in the region and internationally for the establishment and strengthening of national statehood, namely, in 1918-1920 and in the 90s of the last century"(1)

A remarkable achievement of Azerbaijani diplomacy dwells upon the fact that it managed to ensure the inclusion of its people in the ranks of the global political community. Thanks to the efforts of progressive Azerbaijani intelligentsia, the Azerbaijan Democratic

Republic (ADR) was established on May 28, 1918 (2). The geopolitical standing of Azerbaijan has always been of great importance for the world economy and politics. Ancient states emerged here in the past, along with the development of trade and industrial relations, and this was a starting point for a network of routes that linked the countries of the Middle East, Europe, India, China and the entire Asia through commerce and economic relations. Rivalry for control over strategic trade routes along the shores of the Caspian Sea has sparked clashes among different nations and powers from time immemorial. Diverse military and political forces superseded one another for many centuries, exerting erratic geopolitical pressure on the Caspian region. The Caspian region and Azerbaijan undoubtedly had a tremendous role to play and impact on the North Caucasus nations, as was the case in world politics and culture overall. The Caspian region and the nations that lived in these territories have been historically associated with the North Caucasus since the ancient times. During the Russian Empire's conquest of Transcaucasia "the dignified replies of Javad Khan of Ganja to the insulting letters of General Tsitsianov, supplemented by his heroism on the battlefield, wrote down glorious pages in the history of Azerbaijani diplomacy."

Following the collapse of the Russian Empire's monarchial system and the ensuing coup of October 1917, the nations of the Caucasus, thrown by the authorities into the whirlpool of civil war, embarked on efforts to restore order and peace, as well as establish a political system in their historical territories. The nations of Transcaucasia sought to institute the Transcaucasian

Members of the Azerbaijani delegation at the Paris Peace Conference



Democratic Republic, while the peoples of the North Caucasus proclaimed the Mountain Republic. The interference of Russia and the Quadruple Alliance with these developments triggered a collapse of peace in the Caucasus. Following the dissolution of the Transcaucasian Democratic Republic, the peoples of Transcaucasia launched a program aimed at building their national republics.

The Azerbaijani faction in the Transcaucasian Seim. Diplomatic strides on the path to Azerbaijan's independence were made on the eve of the Trabzon Conference, which started on February 26, 1918. The Azerbaijani faction held a session two days before the conference to mull the issue of a return of Armenian units from the frontline and their accommodation in Baku. Moreover, information was available that the German army planned to "take control over Baku oil" and that "the national Azerbaijani faction sought to conclude a peace treaty with Turkey" (3) in order to establish peace and stabilize the situation in Transcaucasia.

Shortly before the Trabzon Conference peacemaking and related issues were discussed in numerous caucuses of the Transcaucasian Seim and the positions of the parties were clarified. During the Seim's session significant differences emerged between F. K. Khoyski and Y. Gegechkori on a host of issues pertaining to peace talks. The Seim participants had divergent views regarding further peacemaking with Russia and the countries of the Quadruple Alliance. The Georgian faction was leaning toward Germany, while the Azerbaijani faction was focused on Turkey, and the Armenians were seeking to gain territory by any means to build their own state.

Realizing the complexity of the situation ahead of the Trabzon Conference, M. Mehdiyev suggested at the Seim session to declare Transcaucasia's independence. "As long as there is no real independence, the negotiations will be fruitless," he said. History showed further that these words were true. (4)

On March 3, 1918, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was signed between Soviet Russia and the Quadruple

Alliance (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey). This move meant Russia's formally rejecting the decree "On Turkish Armenia" drawn up by Lenin and Stalin two months ago. The agreement said that Russia would do its utmost to clear Eastern Anatolia and return it to Turkey. The Russian army was to be evacuated from the Ardahan, Kars and Batum provinces. Russia was also obliged to refrain from interfering with the forging of new state legal relations in those provinces. In addition, the borders that existed shortly before the Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878) were to be restored in the Kars, Ardahan and Batum sanjaks (Turkish administrative divisions) (5).

In accordance with the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, Russia not only confirmed the transfer of Kars, Ardahan and Batum to Turkey, but also pledged to disarm the Armenian volunteer detachments in the territories of Turkey and Russia, in keeping with the additional protocol concluded between the RSFSR and Turkey (6).

Despite Turkey's insistent requests and the pledge of assistance, the Transcaucasian government refused to take part in the Brest-Litovsk negotiations. The Transcaucasian Seim ruled that any agreement pertaining to Transcaucasia and its borders concluded unbeknownst to it and without its approval was not binding. (7)

On the one hand, without proclaiming independence the government and parliament of Transcaucasia had not acquired the status of an international entity and furthermore recognition by the neighboring states as a player on the world political stage. On the other hand, they did not recognize the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk signed by the Bolshevik government of Russia as they did not consider themselves to be an entity of Soviet law or the Russian geographical space. This illogical approach in policymaking became the main obstacle faced by the delegation of Transcaucasia at the Trabzon conference in March 1918.

"During the conference Transcaucasian representatives protested the clauses of the Brest Treaty relating to the Caucasus. The insistent grievances of the Transcaucasian delegates regarding the provinces of Batum and Kars, their refusal to recognize the terms of the Brest peace accord and a number of other issues aggravated the discrepancies between the parties. The delay in proclaiming independence was diminishing Turkey's interest in these negotiations. Referring to this issue, A. Chkhenkeli said, "Frankly, Turkey is interested in Transcaucasia's independence. This independence would guarantee Turkey's security from the north." (8)

Turkish representatives stated that if Transcaucasia was interested in the outcome of the Brest negotia-

tions, it should formalize its rights based on the norms of international law and ensure its own recognition by other states. (9) "Therefore, even if Transcaucasia is recognized now, it still cannot voice protest over the missed opportunities." (10)

A. Chkhenkeli noted bitterly, "The tragedy of our situation is that Transcaucasia has not yet managed to become organized and our delegation was not persistent in putting forth its demands. We came here unprepared. And the Seim itself was not united enough so that we could vigorously assert our stance." (11)

The Trabzon conference showed the unpreparedness of the Caucasus nations to unite under one flag into a single state system. The only feasible solution was to empower each of these nations to address their problems independently. Peace talks were suspended by mutual agreement to enable the parties to hold consultations with their statesmen.

The heated debate that kicked off in the Transcaucasian Seim after the Trabzon conference reflected the deep-rooted differences among the peoples of Transcaucasia. The Armenians and Georgians, who rejected Turkey's demands regarding a number of territorial claims, stipulated by the Brest-Litovsk agreement, called for launching war against this country. In contrast, the Azerbaijani faction urged reaching agreement with the Ottoman Empire on the basis of mutual concessions.

On March 25, representatives of all Muslim factions of the Seim and the North Caucasus highlanders met at the Tiflis palace. The meeting was chaired by M.Y. Jafarov and Rahim Bay Vakilov acted as the secretary. The North Caucasus was represented by Zubair Temirkhanov, Muhammad-Ghazi Dibirov, Heydar Bammatov, Tapa Chermoyev and Ingushetia's Liyanov. The broad public discourse centered on the issue of unification of the North Caucasus and Transcaucasia. The Azerbaijani delegation supported the initiative of the North Caucasus nations. In his remarks, N. Usubbayov said the highlanders of the Caucasus and the Turks of Transcaucasia belonged to a single Muslim family, welcoming their aspiration to form a single state in the South Caucasus.

The news about the March 1918 developments in Baku further heightened tension at the peace negotiations in the Seim itself. The March coup jointly staged by the Bolsheviks and Dashnaks in order to seize power in Baku and the genocide of the Muslim population in the Baku province that they orchestrated in April clearly demonstrated the attitude of Soviet Russia toward Azerbaijan's attempt to enforce the principle of self-

Copy of the “Azerbaijan” bulletin released by the Azerbaijani delegation at the Paris Peace Conference to promote awareness about the realities of Azerbaijan. Edition dated 13 October 1919 focused on the Nakhchivan issue


determination of nations that had been proclaimed by Russia from the outset. S. Shaumyan was quite upfront when he wrote about the true goal of that coup, saying “if they could get the upper hand in Baku, the city would have been declared the capital of Azerbaijan...”(12)

The tragic events that took place in Baku and the ambiguous attitude of different factions of the Transcaucasian Seim toward this matter showed the inability of the Seim to find common ground. Soviet Russia was using the conventional principle of the difference of nations and religions in the post-imperial space, in Baku and Azerbaijani provinces, to assert its authority.

“The ethnic genocide perpetrated in the Baku province not only exacerbated the relations among the Seim members, but also had a significant impact on the course of the negotiations with Turkey. In addition, the Armenians committed similar actions in Turkey in mid-March 1918... Turkey, which was weary of ruminating the same issues at the negotiating table, put forth an ultimatum to Transcaucasia on April 6, calling for a clear answer within the following 48 hours whether or not it recognized the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. At the same time, Turkey said that if Transcaucasia sought to enter into contractual relations with this country, it had to declare sovereignty, which was a prerequisite for launching diplomatic negotiations.”(13)

On April 13, the Transcaucasian Seim passed an erroneous decision to declare war on Turkey. “K. Mammadbayov said in his speech that in doing so, the government and the Seim trampled on the rights of Muslims and in this case it was impossible to work together with the Armenians and Georgians. He suggested seceding from the Seim and further discussing the future fate of the Caucasus Muslims with Ingush and Chechen representatives (14). Transcaucasia’s short war with Turkey lasted only eight days. The takeover of Batum was officially announced in Istanbul on April 15.

Peace talks resumed in Trabzon at the initiative of Turkey. The Muslim faction in the Seim firmly cited the need for declaring Transcaucasia’s independence. Otherwise, the faction warned, it would have to start “discussing the possibility of proclaiming the independence of Azerbaijan.”(15)




The Azerbaijani delegation led by M.G. Hajinsky played a tremendous role in the negotiations between Turkey and the Transcaucasian Seim. Peace efforts were resuscitated and the negotiating process became friendly.

“Late at night on April 22, the Seim proclaimed the formation of the Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic by an overwhelming majority of votes. (16) A decision was passed to set up a commission to draft the Constitution of the newly established state. The proclamation of independence was a great victory for the Azerbaijani faction, and above all, the Musavat party.

The declaration of independence of the South Caucasus completed the process of political, military and diplomatic estrangement from Soviet Russia and became a landmark event ahead of the declaration of independence of Azerbaijan and other nations of Transcaucasia. On April 28, the newly independent Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic was recognized by the Ottoman Empire.”(17)

The reluctance of Soviet Russia to recognize the government of Transcaucasia bolstered the latter’s unwillingness to witness Russia’s involvement at the Batum negotiations.



Cable dated 30 May 1918, which was sent out via telegraph communication to the capitals of world powers to notify them of the founding of the Azerbaijan Republic

The declaration of Transcaucasia's independence did not affect its domestic and foreign policy. The Seim did not have a specific program on overcoming the stalemate and the rift between its factions showed no signs of abating. Inter-ethnic differences became an insurmountable hurdle. "The controversy at the Batumi negotiations further boosted the Azerbaijani delegates' orientation toward Turkey." (18)

Assessing the Azerbaijani stance at the Batumi talks, M. Mehdiyev wrote, "Germany cared about Azerbaijani oil and Turkestan cotton, seeking ways of rapprochement with these regions. The Muslim nations of the Caucasus favored the Turks more than the Germans. Therefore, the Muslim delegates in Batumi had a chilly attitude toward the Germans, while looking at the Turks with a great deal of confidence and hope." (19)

The lack of unity was particularly evident during the negotiations with Turkey. In his speech, Tsereteli noted that the Georgian faction of the Seim was convinced that it was impossible to bring together the nations of Transcaucasia around the slogan of independence and dissolution of Transcaucasia was imminent, which necessitated proclaiming Georgia's independence. In response, F.K. Khoyski said on behalf of the entire faction that "the proximity of the Transcaucasian nations is dictated by their interests, which could hardly be divided".

"However, if this is the decision made by the Georgian people, the Azerbaijanis cannot hamper it and have nothing left to do but pass a relevant decision based on the logic of the situation that has emerged," he said. (20)

The Muslim faction of the Transcaucasian Seim upheld F.K. Khoyski's proposal.

"The last session of the Transcaucasian Seim was held on May 26. Following Georgia's announcement on its withdrawal from the Federation, the Seim passed a decision to disband itself. On May 26, the Georgian National Council declared Georgia's independence." (21) The new government's first foreign policy move was the signing of a previously drafted agreement with Germany. Thus, the latter assumed patronage over Georgia from May 28.

Despite the Azerbaijani faction's extensive effort to maintain the union, the dissolution of the South Caucasus Seim was an inevitable outcome in the political game of the superpowers, namely, Russia, Germany and England on the one hand, and Turkey on the other.

The proclamation of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic. In the spring of 1918, Azerbaijani diplomacy covered a challenging road leading up to the declaration of independence. On May 28, 1918, the interim National Council of Muslims of Transcaucasia proclaimed the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic in Tiflis. This histori-

**Letter from F. K. Khoyski to M. A. Rasulzade
delegating A. M. Topchubashov to Istanbul.
August 23, 1918**

cal document stated, "The Muslim National Council of Azerbaijan, elected by a popular vote, publicly declares:


1. Henceforth, the people of Azerbaijan are the holders of sovereign rights and Azerbaijan, comprised of Eastern and Southern Transcaucasia, is a full-fledged, independent state.
2. A democratic republic is established as the form of political order of the independent Azerbaijan." (22)

"By proclaiming its declaration dated May 28, 1918, the National Council confirmed the existence of the Azerbaijani nation. The word "Azerbaijan" is not only a geographical, ethnographic and linguistic term; it now acquires political essence." (23) *

to be concluded

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FOREIGN POLICY OF THE AZERBAIJAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC AMID INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

1. Overview of Azerbaijan Democratic Republic's (1918-1920) foreign policy

Clues of the foreign policy pursued by the Azerbaijan (People's) Democratic Republic are clearly reflected in Clause 3 of the Declaration of Independence consisting of six clauses, which was announced on May 28, 1918 and read out by National Council Secretary Hasan Bay Aghayev⁵. That clause says *Azerbaijan People's Republic strives to establish good relations with all members of the international community, especially with the neighboring nations and states bordering it*, emphasizing that a foreign policy concept oriented to peace would be followed⁶. With the establishment of the independent Azerbaijani state, the word "Azerbaijan", which had been a geographical term till that time, was transformed into a state name and therefore gained a political meaning no longer limited to an ordinary geographical, ethnic and linguistic word⁷.

The founding of the independent state titled "Azerbaijan" annoyed Soviet Russia and Iran the most. In particular, there was fear that the idea of independence would spread to Turks in South Azerbaijan, which was at the core of Tehran's reaction. However, the declaration of independence also indicated that Azerbaijan's government deemed "establishing friendly relations with neighboring states" as a centerpiece in its foreign policy and preferred to use the name "Caucasus Azerbaijan" in its foreign affairs in order to appease this reaction of Iran¹⁰. On the other hand, Tehran also opted to recognize Azerbaijan as "Caucasus Azerbaijan"¹¹.

Following the announcement of the Declaration

of Independence, M. H. Hajinski served as Minister of Foreign Affairs in the first and second interim governments established by Fatali Khan Khoyski. On May 30, 1918, the new government aired the declaration regarding the ADR's establishment via radio to Istanbul, Berlin, Rome, Washington, Sofia, Bucharest, Tehran, Madrid, the Hague, Moscow, Stockholm, Kyiv, Oslo and Copenhagen¹². According to the mentioned document, upon Georgia's secession from the Transcaucasian Seim, the Azerbaijan National Council indicated that Ganja would be the temporary seat of government as declared by the Azerbaijan Republic¹³.

2. ADR's relations with Ottoman Empire

On June 4, 1918, Turkey officially recognized Azerbaijan under the Treaty of Batum signed with the country¹⁴. The Treaty of Batum also stood out for being the first international agreement concluded by ADR¹⁵. Afterwards, Petroleum Treaty was signed between Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan. In the following days, the Georgian and Armenian governments claimed that the agreement had been signed under pressure, but they lacked funding at hand to change the status quo¹⁶.

Rescuing Baku from the Bolshevik occupation was one of the most significant challenges facing the government after the declaration of independence. The military power of the Baku Soviet was completely based on Russian and Armenian troops and after it started genocide aimed at the Turkic and Muslim population in the spring of 1918, Rasulzade wrote, "*Turkey is the only hope for salvation in the emerging situation. Only*

this fraternal nation can save Azerbaijan from the atrocity of enemies."¹⁷ In fact, some confidential agreements were also concluded during the Batumi negotiations held between the Ottoman Empire and Azerbaijan on June 4, 1918. According to Clause 4 of the mentioned agreement, the Azerbaijani government reserved the right to request military aid from Turkey for providing public order at home.¹⁸ In keeping with this provision, a delegation headed by Azerbaijani National Assembly Chairman Rasulzade arrived in Istanbul in June 1918, seeking assistance in saving Baku from the Bolshevik invasion.¹⁹ The Ottoman military support for Azerbaijan utterly perturbed the Germans, who were attaching great importance to the Baku oil. In June 1918, Germany's Ambassador in Istanbul, Bernsdorf, who held talks with Rasulzade, stated that in case of an attack by the Islamic Army of the Caucasus, Bolsheviks would devastate Baku and destroy oil fields, expressing his concern over this possibility and trying to dissuade the ADR government regarding an intervention by the Ottoman Empire²⁰. Despite this move by Germany, its ally, the Ottoman Empire accepted the request of Azerbaijani representatives and the Islamic Army of the Caucasus comprised of Ottoman soldiers and Azerbaijani volunteers was established. Enver Pasha started work from March 1918 to send soldiers to Baku. In order to avoid drawing fire from Germany, he decided to name that military force "Islamic Army of the Caucasus", ostensibly emphasizing that it did not have a direct link to the Ottoman state.²¹ In compliance with the Treaty of Batum, the Islamic Army of the Caucasus entered Azerbaijan under the command of Nuri Pasha to provide assistance and after rescuing Baku on September 15, 1918 the capital city was transferred there from Ganja.

As is known, the Ottoman Empire negotiated and signed treaties with South Caucasus representatives in Batumi independently, drawing a response from the allies, mainly Germany.²² The Istanbul Conference was convened to create a platform for negotiations and it brought together representatives of the Ottoman Empire, its allies and the states that had declared independence in the Caucasus. One of the initial steps taken by the second government, which was established in Azerbaijan on June 17, was to determine the composition of the delegation to be sent to the Istanbul Conference to be held between the alliance of Central Powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria) and the Caucasus states (Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia and Dagestan).²³ The delegation, which was comprised



Map indicating the territory of South and North Azerbaijan (Persian and Caucasus Azerbaijan). 1919

of Rasulzade, K. Khasmammadov and A. Safikurdski, was authorized to hold talks with the representatives of countries attending the conference on political, economic and warfare issues and to sign political, economic and military agreements. In addition, the government empowered the diplomatic delegation heading to Istanbul to sign all types of confidential political and military agreements with the Ottoman Empire.²⁴

3. Azerbaijan Democratic Republic's activity in international arena

Although the lack of proper conditions stood in the way of carrying out substantial organizational work during the early years of the Azerbaijan Republic, which was established in Tbilisi, some matters related to the activity of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were resolved, including personnel issues, and first steps were taken to establish operational sections. As part of these efforts, using the potential of the Ottoman Empire's Foreign Ministry was deemed appropriate to overcome the challenges in inter-governmental relations.²⁵ As a matter of fact, in the early period of its independence, Azerbaijan was recognized by 18 countries, including Turkey; given that it was not possible to open embassies in those countries, Foreign Minister Hajinski sent a confidential cable to Ottoman Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Nesimi, requesting to have a representation of Azerbaijan within the Ottoman Empire's embassies active in European countries.²⁶ After 1917, the Ottoman Empire also tried to develop a versatile relationship with Azerbaijan, which was "The Golden



Bridge of Turan", according to Nasibli. For this purpose, the Caucasus Branch of the "Union and Progress" operating throughout the Caucasus was established and Hasan Rovsanı was put in charge of the organization.²⁷

Following the declaration of independence, the National Council considered achieving international recognition of the newly established state as one of the most pressing issues. Even prior to the liberation of Baku from occupation, in June 1918, one of the most well-known personalities of the South Caucasus, Mehmet Yusuf Jafarov, was appointed the diplomatic representative in Georgia. Moreover, shortly before entering Baku, the government made a decision on September 12 to send its diplomatic representatives to Germany, Ukraine, Iran and Armenia.²⁸ On the other hand, a decision was passed on October 6, 1918 to establish a special commission to provide information about the independence of Azerbaijan in the capitals of European countries.²⁹ Moreover, Topchubashov was delegated to Istanbul in August 1918 in the capacity of full-fledged ambassador and fulfilled these duties for seven months.³⁰ In addition, in 1919-20, Yusif Vazir Chamanzaminli, who was the author of the world-famous "Ali and Nino" novel, served as the first ADR ambassador in Istanbul.³¹

When appointing diplomatic representatives to foreign countries an emphasis was placed on selecting the persons who were well-versed about a given country, focusing on the most frequently addressed matters. For example, starting with border-related topics, the outstanding legal issues with Armenia were pivotal for the appointment of Deputy Minister of Justice Teymur Bay Makinski as the representative to Armenia on October 22, 1918. On October 23, 1918, the Cabinet of Ministers also passed a decision on opening a representation in Crimea. Accordingly, a decision was made on November 1, 1918

Official opening of the Embassy of the Azerbaijan Republic in Iran. 1920

to name Mir Yusif Vazirov, who had been appointed as the diplomatic representative in Ukraine, as the Azerbaijan Republic's representative in Crimea as well.³²

In accordance with the decision to forge diplomatic relations with the countries established in nearby territories, Abdurrahim Bay Hagverdiyev was delegated to the Dagestan Republic, while Jafar Bay Rustambayov and Akbar Agha Sadigov were assigned to the Kuban and Zakaspi governments respectively.³³ In the wake of the Russian advances toward the South Caucasus, Azerbaijan stepped up its diplomatic contacts with neighboring countries. In fact, the Gajar state (presently Iran), which was concerned over its security due to the Russian advances, held talks with a group of Azerbaijani diplomats led by Topchubashov in Istanbul and Paris.³⁴ On November 1, 1919, a treaty was signed between the two states in Paris and the Gajar government recognized the independence of Azerbaijan, which laid the foundation for diplomatic relations between the two countries. Furthermore, a bilateral "Peace and Friendship" treaty was signed between the two states on March 20, 1920. In addition to these deals, the two countries inked agreements on customs, commercial mail, telegraph communication and consular relations. Ultimately, an Azerbaijani embassy in Tehran and Azerbaijan's Consulate in Tabriz were opened.³⁵ Consulates were also launched in all the major cities of South Azerbaijan located on the border with Iran.³⁶

Meanwhile, Armenia named T. Bekzadyan as its diplomatic representative on September 14 and Georgia appointed N. Kartsivadze to represent the country in Baku.³⁷ In September 1918, following the transfer of the capital to Baku, Germany appointed Baron Fontier Goli as its representative for military and commercial affairs, while Austria-Hungary's diplomatic representatives arrived in Baku on September 10.³⁸ Though Germany had delegated a representative to Baku, it later voiced support for Russia. In a statement, it said there were no international legal norms for recognizing Azerbaijan and Armenia.³⁹

Despite the developing diplomatic relations, some political mishaps carried over from the past persisted in 1919. However, the attack of pro-Czarist General Denikin on Dagestan and his southward advances necessitated Azerbaijani-Georgian cooperation. In fact, a military defense agreement was signed between the two countries on June 16, 1919 for a three-year peri-

od. According to the pact, the signatories undertook a commitment to provide all types of military aid to each other in case the independence and territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and Georgia came under threat of military intervention by any country.⁴⁰

4. ADR's foreign policy after Armistice of Mudros (October 30, 1918)

The Ottoman Empire's signing the Armistice of Mudros on extremely rigid terms on October 30, 1918 had a very adverse impact on the Azerbaijan Republic's foreign policy as Turkey's defeat deprived the newly established republic of its only supporter.⁴¹ Clause 11 of the ceasefire accord envisaged an immediate withdrawal of the Ottoman troops from within the Caucasus and Iran. Upon the pullout of the Turkish troops from Azerbaijan in compliance with the agreement, on December 17, 1918, British army units comprised of Indian soldiers entered Baku under the leadership of General Thomson.⁴² However, England, which lacked military power to counter the Bolsheviks during the initial period of Azerbaijan's occupation due to challenges in its domestic policy and colonies, was reluctant to recognize the Azerbaijani government and Gen. Thomson even regarded Baku as a "Russian city". In addition to this stance of England, the attempts of Bicherakhov and Armenian Revolutionary Federation forces to establish an invading regime in Baku posed a serious threat to Azerbaijan's independence.⁴³ Subsequently, Thomson altered his stance and recognized the Khoyski-led government on December 28 as the only legitimate authority in Azerbaijan. Afterwards, England stated that it was officially recognizing Azerbaijan and withdrew its soldiers from Azerbaijan in the summer of 1919.⁴⁴

Since the establishment of ADR its biggest concern was the possibility of becoming part of the Soviet expansion. In a bid to ward off this threat, the ADR founders availed of all opportunities available to draw the world community's attention to the situation facing the newly established republic and sought its recognition as an independent country subject to international law with policy and security guarantees based on the rudiment of mutuality.⁴⁵ Rasulzade embarked on these efforts in a time period that followed the surrender of the Ottoman Empire and Germany in the aftermath of the signing of the Armistice of Mudros, seeking to ensure a bright future for Azerbaijan by diplomatic means as opposed to military action.⁴⁶ Therefore, Azerbaijan's participation at the Paris Peace Conference after World War I with a



Copy of the "Azerbaijan" bulletin released by the Azerbaijani delegation at the Paris Peace Conference to promote awareness about the realities of Azerbaijan. Edition dated 15 March 1920 focused on the recognition of the South Caucasus republics by European states

delegation headed by Ali Mardan Bay Topchubashov was an important step in terms of promoting recognition of the state worldwide as well as gaining experience in diplomacy. On December 7, 1918, a decision was passed during the first session of the Azerbaijani parliament to send a delegation to France to represent the country at the conference. Furthermore, the composition of the delegation was selected on December 28, 1918.⁴⁷ However, the Azerbaijani delegation's attendance in the Paris Peace Conference materialized exclusively as a result of an extensive diplomatic and political effort. The Azerbaijani delegation heading to Paris arrived in Istanbul on January 20, 1919 to participate in the conference, which started on January 18, 1919. Nevertheless, visas were not issued to the members of the delegation until April 22, 1919 and some of them were barred from attendance due to their links to the Union and Progress. Armenian and Georgian delegations previously joined the event, but the ADR

delegation was invited to Paris just shortly before US President Woodrow Wilson formally raised the issue and was able to arrive in Paris on May 7.⁴⁸

The ADR delegation attending the Paris Peace Conference gained diplomatic experience by participating in an international event and had the opportunity to promote recognition of the newly independent state in the international arena. The defeated Ottoman Empire was not invited to this conference, which was pivotal for shaping up a new international system after World War I and holding talks regarding the terms of an agreement to be signed by the countries which had lost the war. One of the most severe conditions of the Treaty of Sevres for Anatolian Turks envisaged establishing an Armenian state on Turkish territory, according to Clauses 89-93, prepared for signing by the Ottoman Empire after the negotiations. The lack of an Armenian majority in all of the cities designated for establishing an Armenian state and the fact that its borders were determined in accordance with Clause 89 of the Treaty of Sevres by the US president, who had never been in Anatolia and most likely did not have much knowledge about the geographical and ethnic composition of the region, would lead to a complete abolition of Turkey's territorial and national integrity.⁴⁹ From this viewpoint, the ADR delegation's visit to Paris and at least expressing its opinion to other countries on the issues related to Turkey prevented the imposition of one-sided Armenian propaganda upon those countries.⁵⁰ In Paris, the Armenians, who stayed in Paris for at least three to four months, campaigned against Azerbaijan and Turkey and published a number of reports about the developments ongoing in the Caucasus.⁵¹

Despite all the challenges, the delegation had the opportunity to inform representatives of numerous countries about the founding of the ADR and also met with US President Woodrow Wilson on May 2, 1919. These negotiations were a significant diplomatic step on the path to the ADR's international recognition, given that the Allied Powers, which ran colonies in many regions of the world, were shying away from dividing the world into small countries; they nevertheless officially acknowledged the delegations of the newly independent states at the Peace Conference, adhering to the idea of encouraging the independence movements in their colonies. In keeping with the policy of that time, Wilson deemed the concept of a "united and indivisible Russia" appropriate and therefore was not upbeat about Azerbaijan's recognition.⁵² Although the Azerbaijani del-

egation's demands on recognizing the country's independence were rejected by Wilson on these grounds, official acceptance of the delegation was considered a major diplomatic success for Azerbaijan.⁵³ Upon Wilson's proposal, Topchubashov, the head of the delegation, presented a memorandum at the conference, briefly outlining the ADR's basic foreign policy objectives. The memorandum laid out the following issues:

- Azerbaijan's independence shall be recognized
- Wilson's principles shall also be valid for Azerbaijan
- Azerbaijani Delegation shall be represented in negotiations at the Peace Conference
- Azerbaijan Democratic Republic shall be admitted to membership in the League of Nations
- Diplomatic relations shall be established between Azerbaijan Democratic Republic and USA.⁵⁴

The delegation additionally met with British delegation member Luis Mallet on May 23, 1919 before holding talks with Wilson, exchanging views on political, military and economic issues, as well as the status of the soldiers of allied states in Azerbaijan.⁵⁵ The Azerbaijani delegation made an extensive diplomatic effort aimed at the recognition of ADR's independence, presented various data to the representatives of other countries concerning Azerbaijan's history, culture and economic resources and sought to forge ties with neighboring countries.⁵⁶

In the initial period following the end of World War I, recognition of ADR's independence was perceived as part of the "Russian issue" by the allied states, which planned to recognize the independence of the national states formed on the lands of the former Russian Empire in connection with the formation of Soviet Russia.⁵⁷ Following the Bolsheviks' coming to power, however, the apprehension of a significant threat posed by communist ideas to the governments in Europe altered the views of the allied states on the issue of recognizing Azerbaijan's independence. In addition, the emergent new status after the war and the fact that rendering military aid to unrecognized countries was considered a measure contradicting the international system of relations made the recognition of Azerbaijan and Georgia inevitable.⁵⁸ British Prime Minister Lloyd George noted that a united Bolshevik Russia would pose a significant threat to Europe and therefore backed the idea of recognizing Georgia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Moldova, the Baltic countries, Finland and probably Siberia.⁵⁹ As the conference was drawing to a close, on January 12, 1919, British Foreign Secretary George Curzon submitted a proposal to the supreme council on the de-facto recognition of Azerbaijan and Georgia's indepen-

Memdukh Shevket Esendal, Turkey's diplomatic representative in Baku

dence. On the following day, the supreme council of the Allies passed a decision based on Curzon's proposal, declaring that the Allies⁶⁰ and their partner countries actually recognized Azerbaijan and Georgia.⁶¹


Though the Allied Powers de-facto recognized Azerbaijan, they made a decision that sending in soldiers was nonetheless impossible, instead pledging support by delivering weapons, military equipment and ammunition.⁶² In particular, the economic and political instability in England after the war and the quest for independence in India and Egypt, which were deemed its most important colonies, were making it impossible for England to allocate military and economic resources for foreign aid. Despite the Allies' reluctance to allocate military aid to Azerbaijan at the Paris Peace Conference, their de facto recognition of the ADR allowed some Western countries such as Finland, Belgium, Holland and Switzerland to open consulates in Baku. Similarly, Iran recognized Azerbaijan as a government on March 20, 1920, in accordance with a friendship agreement signed between the two countries, and in the following days, Azerbaijan opened an embassy in Tehran, a consulate general in Tabriz and vice-consulates in Enzeli and Mashad.

Prior to the Russian invasion in April 1920, a decision was made to open diplomatic representations in England, France, Italy, USA, Sweden, Poland, Lithuania, Finland, Ukraine, Romania, Germany, Russia, Estonia and Latvia. Likewise, Georgia, Armenia, Iran, Belgium, Holland, Greece, Denmark, Italy, France, Switzerland, Sweden, England, USA, Ukraine, Lithuania, Poland, and Finland had official diplomatic missions in Baku at different levels.⁶³ Furthermore, General Denikin officially recognized Azerbaijan's independence on February 7. Around the same time, the government of Japan announced that it was seeking to establish diplomatic relations with Azerbaijan. Moreover, the Pope based in Rome delegated his representative to Baku.⁶⁴ In conclusion, the ADR, which had been built despite all adversities and with great sacrifices, ceased to exist on April 26, 1920 with the Red Army invasion. ♦

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
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5. İsmail Mehmetov, *Türk Kafkasyası'nda Siyasi ve Etnik Yapı*, Ötüken Neşriyat, İstanbul, 2009, ss. 578-579.
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7. Hesenli, a.g.e., s. 76.
8. Nəsib Nəsibzadə, *Azərbaycan Xarici Siyaseti (1918-1920)*, Azərbaycan Araşdırma Vəqfi, "Ay-Ulduz" Nəşriyyatı, Bakı, 1996, s.37.
9. Damirli, a.g.e.
10. Vugar Akifoğlu, *Azərbaycan'da Milli Direniş (1917-1930)*, DTCF Dergisi 57.2 (2017): 776-795, s. 782.
11. Hesenli, a.g.e., s. 84.
12. XX. Əsr Azərbaycan Tarihi, II. Cild, Azərbaycan Respublikası Təhsil Nazirliyi, Bakı, 2014, s. 179.
13. Hesenli, a.g.e., s. 77.a
14. 4 Haziran 1018'de Osmanlı Devleti Gürcistan ve





First and last pages of A.M. Topchubashov's letter to Lord Harding. 31 March 1920

- Ermenistan ile de ayrı ayrı barış anlaşmaları imzalımıştı ve bu ülkeleri resmen tanımlamıştır. Bkz. Kurat, a.g.e., s. 477.
15. Hesenli, a.g.e., s. 80.
 16. Selami Kılıç, "1917-1918'de Kafkasya'daki Bazı Siyasi ve Askeri Gelişmelerin İşgi Altında Bağımsızlık Yolundaki Gürcistan ve Berlin Gücü Komitesi'nin Bu Konudaki Çalışmaları, A.Ü. Türkiye Araştırmaları Enstitüsü Dergisi, Sayı 4, 1996, s. 46.
 17. Mehmetov, a.g.e., s. 581.
 18. Kurat, a.g.e., s. 477.
 19. Kurat, a.g.e., s. 507.
 20. Gerçekten de Lenin, petrol rezervlerinin Türklerin eline geçmesine müsaade etmemek için Stepan Şaumyan'a Bakü elden giderse, büyük petrol teşisleri imha edilsin talimatı vermişti. 23 Haziran 1918'da ise Şaumyan, Lenin'e "eğer Bakü'yü ko-



rumak mümkün olmazsa ... o zaman sizin reçeteyi uygularız" şeklinde cevap vermiştir. Bkz. Vasif Gafarov, Birinci Dünya Savaşı'nın Sonunda Kafkasya'da Osmanlı-Almanya Çatışması ve Osmanlı-Alman Protokolü (23 Eylül 1918), Amasya Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, Cilt 1, Sayı 2, Aralık 2017, s. 105

21. Hesenli, a.g.e., s. 85.
22. Almanya, Bakü'ye yönelik Türk müdahalelerinden öylesine endişe etmektedi ki, savaş sırasında müttefiki olan Osmanlı ile silahlı çatışmaya girmekten dahi çekinmemiştir. Örneğin, 10 Haziran'da Borçalı'dan Azerbaycan'a doğru ilerleyen Türk birlikleri ile Alman-Gürcü birlikleri karşı karşıya gelmiştir. Ancak bu baskın da Osmanlı birliklerini durduramamış ve neticede çok sayıda Alman-Gürcü askerinin esir alındığı başarılı bir operasyon yürütülmüştür. Ancak bu olay sonrasında Tiflis'te daha fazla tutunamayan Milli Şura ve hükümet 18 günlük faaliyetten sonra Gence'ye taşınmak zorunda kaldı. Ayrıntılı bilgi için bkz. Hesenli, a.g.e., s. 86.
23. Abdurrahman Bozkurt, "Osmanlı Devleti ile Ermenistan Cumhuriyeti Arasındaki İlişkiler (1918-1920)", OTAM, 34/Güz 2013, s. 35.
24. Hesenli, a.g.e., s. 92.
25. Hesenli, a.g.e., s. 76.
26. Dursun Ali Akbulut, "Paris Barış Konferansı Yolunda Azerbaycan Cumhuriyeti", Vakanüvis, cilt. 2, Kafkasya Özel Sayısı, 2017, s. 31.

27. Nəsib Nəsibzadə, Azərbaycan Xarici Siyaseti (1918-1920), Azərbaycan Araşdırmaçıları Vəqfi, "Ay-Ulduz" Nəşriyyatı, Bakı, 1996, s. 41.
28. Hesenli, a.g.e., s. 136.
29. Hesenli, a.g.e., s. 137.
30. Mehdi Genceli, Ali Merdan Bey Topçubaşov, İrs/Miras, s. 15. Topçubaşov'un 7 aylık elçiliği resmi sıfatla olmadığı için AHC'nin ilk resmi elçisi Çemenzeminli olarak kabul edilir.
31. Şelale Ana Hüremetli, "Alim-Yazar Yusuf Vezir Çemenzeminli Eserlerinde Asya", s. 851; Ramim Sadigov, "Azerbaycan Cumhuriyeti'nin İlk İstanbul Sefiri Yusuf Vezir Çemenzeminli'nin Fransa'daki Muhaceret Yılları", Ankara Üniversitesi Tarih araştırmaları Dergisi, Cilt 33, Sayı 56, 2014, s. 387.
32. Hesenli, a.g.e., s. 137.
33. Hesenli, a.g.e., s. 137.
34. Azərbaycan Tarixi, s. 274.
35. Azərbaycan Tarixi, s. 275.
36. Azərbaycan Tarixi, s. 276.
37. Hesenli, a.g.e., ss. 136-137.
38. Hesenli, a.g.e., s. 138.
39. Hesenli, a.g.e., s. 139.
40. Azərbaycan Tarixi, s. 274.
41. Azərbaycan Tarixi, s. 273.
42. Azərbaycan Tarixi, s. 274.
43. Asker ve Paşa, a.g.e.,
44. Azərbaycan Tarixi, s. 274.
45. Vasif Gafarov, The Azerbaijani Delegation to the Paris Peace Conference History, July - August 2012, <http://www.visions.az/en/news/404/6a7cabf7/>, (11.11.2018).
46. Nəsib Nəsibzadə, Azərbaycan Xarici Siyaseti (1918-1920), Azərbaycan Araşdırmaçıları Vəqfi, "Ay-Ulduz" Nəşriyyatı, Bakı, 1996, s.
47. Gafarov, a.g.e.
48. Gafarov, a.g.e.
49. Tehcir Kanunu'ndan önce de Ermenilerin söz konusu şehirlerdeki nüfusu %20'nin üzerinde değişti.
50. Her ne kadar Batılı ülkeler, Sevr Anlaşması'nda çoğunluğu Türklerden oluşan bu şehirlerde bir ermeni devleti tahayyül etseler de kendileri de coğrafi, etnik ve dini bakımdan böylesi bir devletin kurulmasının hukuki ve ahlaki gerçeklerle bağdaşmadığını aslında bilmekteydiler. Örneğin, 1877-78 Osmanlı Rus Savaşı'nda sonra İngiliz Büyükelçi Sir Henry Layard Londra'ya yazdığı raporda, Ermeni Patriği Nerses Varjebedyan'ın "özerk bir Ermenistan" kurulması için İngiltere'den yardım istediğini ancak kurulmasını istedikleri şehirlerin hiçbirinde Ermenilerin çoğunlukta olmadığını söylemesi üzerine Patriğin gerçekleşmez önerilerde bulunduğu – Ermeni devletinin kurulmasının düşünüldüğü şehirlerde Müslüman nüfusun çeşitli yöntemlerle yok edilmesi gibi- yazmaktadır. Dolayısıyla Batılı ülkelerin zaten bildiği bu hakikatin AHC heyeti tarafından tekrar dile getirilmesi, Türkiye açısından önemlidir. Ermenilerin hayali "Büyük Ermenistan" toprakları Azerbaycan'dan da bazı toprakları içermektedir.
51. Azərbaycan Tarixi, s. 275.
52. Azərbaycan Tarixi, s. 275.
53. Niyazi Qasımov, "Paris Barış Konferansı'nda Azerbaycan Halk Cumhuriyeti Nümayende Heyeti'nin Çalışmaları", Akademik Tarih ve Düşünce Dergisi, Cilt:IV, Sayı:XI, Mayıs /MMXVII, s. 81.
54. Qasımov, a.g.e., s. 92.
55. Cemil Hasanlı, "Versay Dünya Barış Konferansı'nda Azerbaycan Demokratik Cumhuriyeti'nin Tanınması Azerbaycan Diplomasisinin Önemli Bir Başarısıdır", İRS Tarih, No 1, 2012, s. 40.
56. Gafarov, a.g.e.
57. Rahman Mustafayev, "Birinci Cumhuriyet'in Son Baharı-2", İRS Tarih, <http://irs-az.com/new/pdf/201205/1338466887113373348.pdf>, (21.10.2018).
58. Hasanlı, a.g.e., s. 41.
59. Gafarov, a.g.e.
60. 12 Ocak 1919'da Paris Barış Konferansı'nda kurulan Yüksek Konsey (Yüksek Şura) başlangıçta beş ülkeden oluşurken (ABD, İngiltere, Fransa, İtalya, Japonya) Mart 1919'da Japonya'nın ayrılması ile Konseye üye ülke sayısı dörde inmiştir.
61. Gafarov, a.g.e. Söz konusu karar, İngiltere, Fransa, İtalya ve daha sonra Japonya tarafından onaylanırken, ABD tarafından reddedilmiştir. Bkz. Mustafayev, a.g.e.
62. Mustafayev, a.g.e.
63. Rovshan Ganiyev, Siyasal Özellikleri ve devlet Yapısı açısından Azerbaycan Halk Cumhuriyeti (1918-1920), Hacettepe Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Ankara, 2004, s. 64.
64. Nesibli, s. 164

Nargiz AKHUNDOVA
PhD in History

ADR AS A STAGE OF IDEOLOGICAL UNITY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF AZERBAIJANI-POLISH RELATIONS: TRANSCENDING SPACE

The rapidly expanding relations between Azerbaijan and Poland at the level of friendship and cooperation are benefitting essentially all areas of science, culture and education today. Just a decade ago, citizens of Azerbaijan had only a slight idea about the contribution of Polish engineers, oil workers and architects to the overall layout of the Azerbaijani capital and its outskirts. However, currently, one may hardly come across a Baku resident who would be unfamiliar with such names as Potocki, Zglenitsky, Goslawski and Ploszko (1). Polish scholar T. Sventokhovsky went down in the history of science as one of the founders of Azerbaijan studies in Europe. Having focused on the study of the ethnic, ideological and political development of Azerbaijan in numerous articles and monographs ("Russia and Azerbaijan", "Historical dictionary of Azerbaijan", etc.), the author pointed out the peculiarities of the traditions of statehood in the history of this nation (2).

Azerbaijan and Poland are linked by long-standing historical traditions. Polish diplomats were involved in mediation between the Ag Goyunlu state and Western European countries. Thus, following the capture of Trapezund (1461) by Mehmed the Conqueror, Hasan Padishah of Ag Goyunlu, who lost his only outlet to the Black Sea, stepped up diplomatic efforts by sending delegates to Europe. The route of one of those trips traversed the Black Sea and the territory of Ukraine. Having reached Poland, he held talks with King Casimir IV of the Jagiellonian dynasty (3) and the latter's ambassador accompanied him to Italy where he was hosted by representatives of the Venetian government (4). In 1516, the Safavids, in turn, sent envoys to Poland, headed by P. de Monte Libano (a Maronite monk from Syria), who carried a letter from Shah Ismail I on creating an anti-Ottoman coalition. However, the Polish king was not in favor of spoiling relations with Ottoman Turkey (5).



King of Poland Casimir IV of the Jagiellonian dynasty and Hasan Padishah of the state of Aq Qoyunlu laid groundwork for the diplomatic relations between Poland and Azerbaijan in the Middle Ages

17th century archival documents include an important letter of Shah Abbas I to the King of Poland Zigmund III, which is referenced by the Polish researcher I. Sierakowska. The letter, which contained a proposal of Abbas I on friendship and cooperation with Poland, was delivered to Zigmund III by Mahdi Kuli Bay Turman in 1605 (6).

The letters discovered in the Central Archives of Historical Records in Warsaw (Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych w Warszawie) date back to the 17th and the early 18th centuries (1607, 1624, 1647, and 1712). The letters were mostly sent on behalf of Shahs Abbas I and Abbas II (the name of Shah Safi I is cited less frequently) to the Polish kings Władysław IV Vasa, Sigismund III and Zigmund III (7). It is particularly worth mentioning the letters to the royal commander-in-chief N. Potocki and the royal chancellor on behalf of the seventh grand vizier of Shah Abbas, the Great Sultan Khalifeh (8), whose personality is extensively covered by a chronicle of Iskandar Bay Turkoman Munshi (9). All of the mentioned documents indicate a peaceful and friendly relationship between the two sides.

The period from the late 18th to the early 19th cen-

tury ushered in a new and dramatic stage in the history of the Azerbaijani and Polish people, which was largely due to the loss of their territorial integrity. For Azerbaijan, this loss was reflected primarily in the fate of a nation divided into two halves. This destiny turned out irreversible and led to the inclusion of the northern part of its territory into the Russian Empire, as a result of two phases of the Russo-Qajar (Russo-Persian) wars (1804-1813, 1826-1828) (10). As for Poland, this historical period primarily saw a loss of statehood until 1918 and the territorial division of Rzeczpospolita (the Polish state) (from 1569) between Austria, Prussia and Russia, which consisted of three stages (1772, 1793 and 1795). As a result, the territory of the present-day AR and the lion's share of the Polish land became part of a single Tsarist empire. At the same time, this led to the beginning of rapprochement between the two nations.

Well-known Polish Orientalist V. Kostiuško provided interesting information in his writings dated 1858 about Mirza Kazembay, an outstanding Azerbaijani enlightener of the 19th century. Kazembay, who lived in Poland for 18 years, learned the Polish language and dedicated a number of wonderful poems to Warsaw. Many Polish and Azerbaijani political prisoners were exiled to the regions of Siberia and the Caucasus. Most of these people were part of the educated and advanced groups of the population. They met and exchanged ideas while in exile. Thus, A. A. Bakikhanov, the founder of Azerbaijani scientific historiography, met the well-known Polish poet Tadeusz



Polskiemu kompozytorowi
Antoniemu Kątskiemu
 (1817-1899)
 z wdzięcznością za propagowanie
 kultury azerbejdżańskiej w Europie
 poprzez przekłonienie
 azerbejdżańskich muzycznych
 utworów ludowych
 na nuty europejskie



Ambasada Azerbejdżanu w Polsce
 Sochaczew 2017 r.

Polish composer Anton de Kontski (1817-1899) made a great contribution to the promotion of Azerbaijani music in Europe

Lada Zablotsky, who had been exiled from Poland to the Caucasus, in Tiflis (11). By that time, Bakikhanov had compiled the first academic monographic study titled "Gulistani-i-Iram", which centered on researching the eastern part of the Caucasus (1841). It was written in Persian and translated into Russian in 1844. T.L. Zablotsky considerably facilitated the preparation of the Russian text.

Familiarization with the data that has been available in recent years inevitably leads us to the conclusion that the establishment of a democratic republic in Azerbaijan (from 1918) and the second Rzeczpospolita, a revived Polish state, was the most conducive time period in the entire history of the Azerbaijani and Polish people for close cooperation and rapprochement between the two nations. This period differed from the previous ones as it was a special stage in the development of Azerbaijani-Polish relations, which was rather based not on strategic and economic goals commonly pursued by most politicians and statesmen, but mainly on ideology. It was shaped from the period of early political activity

of the leaders of the Republics of Azerbaijan and Poland and was gradually nurtured, increasingly bringing together its followers under a single platform.

As early as in the second half of the 19th century, the Poles actively joined the independence movement of the highlanders under the leadership of Shamil. They even organized the production of artillery installations to support this movement. Having heard about the rise of the national liberation movement during the Russo-Turkish war in 1877, Joseph Adam Gverkovich, who took part in the 1863 uprising, moved to prepare a Polish military unit to facilitate these efforts. The 200-people-strong troops of Colonel Teofil Lapinsky fought for the independence of the Caucasus for three years. The Poles perceived the endeavors of the Caucasus nations as a common struggle. Having joined the national movements of the nations enslaved by the Tsarist regime and subsequently by the Soviet authorities, the Poles sought to weaken the Russian Empire and the USSR. These ideas were drawn up by the Polish statesman J. Piłsudski (the

***Memorial plaque honoring scholars
of the two nations: Polish astronomer Nicolaus
Copernicus and Abbasgulu Agha Bakikhanov,
Azerbaijani historian and Orientalist***

future leader of the Second Polish Republic), who reflected them in a systematic political project that went down in history as "prometeism".

M.A. Rasulzade recalled from his childhood memories about the Polish military doctor of the Baku garrison named Menzhinsky, who was a friend of his father. "My father used to say that he had to be a true Muslim," he said.

Rasulzade also recalled his physics and mathematics teacher, who in addition to teaching nurtured in his students "a revolutionary spirit against tsarism" (12). Later, this thinker cited what he believed were the three main reasons that linked the people of Poland and Azerbaijan: 1. Azerbaijan's affiliation with the family of the Caucasus nations; 2. the predominance of Turkic population; 3. the suppression of this nation by Russian imperialism.

The afore-mentioned factors bolstered the unity of Polish and Azerbaijani public figures and politicians, who subsequently established independent national states, although different political regimes were at the helm of state. The ADR's establishment included ethnic Poles Viktor Viktorovich Klevensky, Stanislav Stanislavovich Vosnevich, Lieutenant-General Masey Alexandrovich Sulkevich (who came from a family of Polish Tatars) and others (13). However, the closest cooperation was maintained when representatives of the Azerbaijani democratic government were in emigration. According to M.A. Rasulzade, who emigrated to Poland in the early 30s, the above-mentioned Colonel Lapinsky, who fought heroically in the Caucasus, continued his struggle for the liberation of these peoples decades thereafter. In 1937, he published a pamphlet titled "Revolution in the Caucasus" in Paris whereby he cited the need for achieving freedom of all Caucasus nations (14).

In recent years, the Azerbaijani government contributed to the publication of a huge number of archival documents pertaining to the heritage of A.M. Topchubashov (Topchibashi). The documents derived from his Paris archives of 1919-1940 reveal numerous letters, protocols and reports concerning the active participation of Azerbaijani democrats in Promethean organizations in the period from 1923 to 1940, as well as the circulation of the "Prometheus" magazine (15). It is hard to say which of these is the most interesting document. For example, there is a letter from T. Holowko,



Polish politician and close associate of J. Pilsudski, addressed to Topchubashov, whereby Holowko asked him to accept a subsidy from the Polish government and promote the publication of the Prometheus magazine dated September 17, 1926.

"I kindly request you, honorable chairman, to dedicate all of your experience and authority to ensure possible publication of the magazine soon...This will be proof of the fact that Paris is capable of interaction," Holowko wrote.

At the same time, Holowko noted that the assistance that the Polish government was requesting to accept was deemed by the latter as necessary, "taking into consideration the friendship that you [Topchibashi - N.A.] displayed to my people in the difficult years of bondage."

The conclusion of the letter perfectly reflects all the realities of the two nations' destinies. "In conclusion of my letter, let me heed attention to the fact that my people are aware better than anyone else of all the tribulations and misfortunes of emigration and when someone came to their aid...Be assured, honorable Chairman, of my sincere respect for you. I am always at your service. T. Holowko." (16).

There is also a document entitled "Letter of A.M. Topchibashi to Ismet Inonu, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Turkey, concerning the memorandum allegedly filed to the Turkish government by the executives of the Caucasus Center in Paris, which was opposed to the Caucasus parties and organizations that were part of the Promethean movement", dated January 31, 1931, from Saint-Cloud.

"I don't know anything about the content of this document," Ali Mardan Bay wrote when he served as chairman of the Azerbaijan Republic. "However, the same Georgian sources cited its tendency to unfriendly interpret the real sympathy that Poland has been displaying toward us and



Memorial plaque and a photo of Colonel Vali Bay Yadigarov, Azerbaijani officer of the Polish army

our Georgian and North Caucasus neighbors. I am referring to the sympathies that move us so profoundly and that all Caucasus patriots are highly appreciative for."(17).

Numerous documents indicating that a significant number of Azerbaijani officers served in the Polish army have been revealed as well. The "Paris Archives" of Topchibashi contain 17 documents dating back to 1922-1928 that are absolutely different -- from ordinary letters and reports to diplomatic notes. For example, one may even trace Topchibashi's consistent solicitations regarding the recruitment of servicemen to the Polish army, such as the one concerning Colonel Israfil Bay Israfilov.

1. November 27, 1923. "A letter from Colonel Israfil Bay Israfilov, a former commander of the 5th Baku Regiment, to A. M. Topchibashi, requesting assistance in drafting Azerbaijani officers who are in Poland to the Polish army"(18).
2. December 14, 1923. "Note[! – N.A.] (19) of A. M. Topchibashi to the General Staff of the Polish Army requesting to admit Colonel Israfil Bay Israfilov and Captain Vali Bay Yedigarov to a course of study in Polish military schools" [Paris].

3. December 14, 1923. "A note by A. M. Topchibashi to First Lieutenant Vali Bay Yedigarov regarding the enrollment of the latter and Colonel Israfil Bay Israfilov for training in the officer schools of the Polish army [Saint-Cloud].
4. March 31, 1924. "A letter from A. M. Topchibashi to Colonel Israfil Bay Israfilov, a former commander of the 5th Baku Regiment, whereby congratulations were extended over the admission of Azerbaijani officers to military schools of the Republic of Poland" (20) [Paris].

Certain information concerning Azerbaijani military men serving in the Polish army was also found in the Military Archives of the Republic of Poland (21). It is noteworthy that petitions on drafting Azerbaijani officers to the Polish army are marked with a slightly earlier date in Warsaw documents. In this case, the correspondence was kept between M.A. Rasulzade and J. Pilsudski:

1. March 31, 1923. A letter of M.A. Rasulzade in French, sent from Istanbul to Warsaw and addressed to "His Excellency Marshal Pilsudski, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of Poland". In the



Busts of military leaders in Warsaw located adjacent to one another: Colonel Vali Bay Yadigarov, Azerbaijani officer of the Polish army, and Maciej Sulkiewicz, Polish general of the Azerbaijani army

letter, Rasulzade requests admission to the Polish army of Azerbaijani officers who could not support themselves.

2. Marshall Pilsudski's reply to "Mr. M.A. Rasulzade, President of the National Center of Azerbaijan, sent to Constantinople" whereby he had to decline the request. "It is my greatest wish to save the brave officers of the Azerbaijani army and at the same time admit them to our army...However, since there is currently a lack of vacant spots in our military schools, I have to postpone the answer to this question until the fall of 1923" (22).

Taking into consideration the cited dates, this correspondence was carried out after Pilsudski stepped down to be succeeded by Gabriel Narutowicz in 1922, though in December that year he was appointed Chief of General Staff. However, he resigned from this post on May 30, 1923. Moreover, Rasulzade's letter cited 10 Azerbaijani officers residing in Constantinople at the time as immigrants, including Israfil Bay and Vali Bay Yadigar. Nevertheless, the letter addressed by Col.

Israfil Bay Israfilov to A.M. Topchibashi (November 27, 1923) was sent from Chmielno, Poland. Perhaps, the initiative on arranging the above-mentioned officers' drafting to the Polish army was taken over by A. M. Topchubashov under these circumstances. As a result, the first Azerbaijani officers of the Polish army from 1924 were the following military men: Vali Bay Yadigar, Israfil Bay Mammad [referenced in the Paris archives as "Israfil Bay Israfilov" - N.A.], Jahangir Bay Kazim, Hamid Bay Mammadzade, and Kazini Bay Safaroglu. Drafting to military service certainly ensured the provision of financial support to the servicemen. At the same time, in keeping with one of Pilsudski's formal decrees concerning "religious worship in the military", "soldiers professing Islam were exempted from military training and exercises on their religious holidays". In the garrisons where mosques were available, "soldiers were [also] exempt from exercises" from 11 a.m. to 2 p.m. every Friday.

On the one hand, these and many other documents testify to the significant support provided by Poland for representatives of the Azerbaijani government and its

people who ended up in exile; on the other hand, they indicate that former members of the ADR government had assumed full responsibility for taking care of their fellow countrymen living outside their home country. They did not abandon the idea of establishing a true democracy either, which is seen from the "Note of M. Y. Mehdiyev (23) [Paris, April 12, 1938], the head of the Azerbaijani delegation and a member of the Azerbaijan National Center, to V. Peltz, the attache of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Paris. The note said, "In order to maintain its influence, the National Center needs to represent our political emigrants as much and as comprehensively as possible and be comprised of representatives of all political trends, including those that are opposed to it" (24).

The fate of Azerbaijani democrats has been reflected in everlasting struggle. Initially, it was a struggle for the nation's inalienable right to have its own language, religion and self-determination, which further translated into a struggle for establishing an independent state. Having founded an independent state, which was the first parliamentary republic in the East and a perfect model of democracy, members of its government left no stone unturned to maintain the republic and attain its international recognition amid an extremely challenging political situation both at home and on the world stage. A group of more than 30 eminent thinkers, policymakers, diplomats and encyclopaedist scholars contributed to the founding of this state. This group of heroic enlighteners of the 20th century, led by M.A. Rasulzade, had come a long way, formulating the idea of national revival into a coherent system of views within the framework of a secular state. It lasted only 23 months. However, the history made during this time period, the road covered, as well as the political and cultural outcome of those accomplishments, became a true asset of the nation. Perhaps, the ADR's demise was followed by the most dramatic time in the lives of its founders, who ended up away from their homeland. As mentioned above, it was this particular period of their activity that saw their most frequent contacts with the Polish government. At the same time, all of the data revealed through research of the Azerbaijani-Polish cooperation in the 1920s and 1930s confirm that Azerbaijani democrats continued struggling for the idea of an independent democratic Azerbaijan even during their stay abroad and remained committed to this cause until their dying day. *

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12. Resulzade Mehmed Emin. Azerbaydzan w walce o niepolegosc. Azerbaydżanskie wydawnictwo narodowe Warszawa, 1938, с. 169.

*Memorial plaque honoring Michal Andrzejkovich-
Butovt, Polish explorer and researcher, who
described Azerbaijani monuments in his book “The
Caucasus chronicles” in the mid-19th century*

13. V.V. Klevensky served as Minister of Social Security. He was born in 1883 in the city of Yelizavetpol and was an ethnic Pole [N. Yagublu. Founders of the Republic. Baku, Nurchular, 2018, p.378]. S.S. Vosnevich was born on May 8, 1889. He came from a noble family. He graduated from Petersburg University, majoring in Law. He served as an officer in the Tsar's army. He held the position of Secretary of the Consular Agency of Poland in Baku [the same source, p. 468]. He also headed the committee for Poland in the ADR parliament [Wilson H. Graeme. Azerbaijan Democratic Republic. Abu Dhabi, 2018, p.153].
14. M.A. Sulkevich (1865-1920), Lieutenant General. He was born in 1865 in the Kemeishi suburb on the territory of present-day Lithuania. In 1919, he arrived in Azerbaijan and was appointed Chief of General Staff of the ADR Army. He made a great contribution to the formation of the national military units of Azerbaijan. Following the invasion of Azerbaijan by the Bolsheviks, he was arrested on April 27, 1920 and sentenced to execution by shooting on June 15, 1920 [the same source, p. 391].
15. Resulzade Mehmed Emin. Azerbaydzan w walce..., c. 169.
16. A.M. Topchibashi. The Paris archives of 1919-1940. 4 volumes. Moscow: "Fiction", 2016/2018. Statistical data regarding the countries where the "Prometheus" magazine was circulated was confidential and handwritten by the person reporting the information strictly in the specially designated copies of the document. One of those copies is kept at the Russian State Military Archive in Moscow, which has a large stack of so-called "Polish trophy documents." According to this data, "Prometheus" issues were sent out to numerous countries in the following quantities: Poland - 109 copies, Syria - 70 copies, Germany - 65 copies, England - 25 copies, Turkey - 91 copies, etc.
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power" [USSR – N.A.], "aimed at influencing the Turkish public opinion, which would be unfavorable for Poland, whose friendship and pro-Turkish sympathy do not need to be reminded here." A.M. Topchibashi. The Paris archives, 1919-1940. Volume 4. Moscow: "Fiction", 2018, p. 19-20.

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AZERBAIJAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (1918-1920) IN FRENCH ARCHIVES

The independent Azerbaijan Republic that existed in 1918-1920 has left the most significant and fascinating remarkable trace in numerous archival documents of the French Republic. In particular, detailed information concerning the emergence, development and tragic demise of the Azerbaijani state of that period has been preserved in the archives of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and the Armed Forces, i.e. the government agencies that have their representatives on the ground witnessing first handing the developments ongoing in the Caucasus. Great significance deserved the fact that the Paris Peace Conference was held in the French capital from January 1919 to January

1920; the issue regarding the states that emerged on the ruins of the Russian Empire was resolved at the event. During the last month of the Paris conference the Entente's Supreme Council passed a decision to recognize *de facto* Azerbaijan and Georgia, the most resolutely steadfast states of the South Caucasus region. Azerbaijan's recognition was directly facilitated by the efforts of the Azerbaijani diplomatic delegation, sent by the government of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic to the capital of France in early 1919 in order to achieve this recognition by the Entente Council.

Since the Peace Conference was being held in Paris, the French government had considerable power to

Entrance to the library of the School for Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences (EHESS) in Paris, which stores personal archives of Ali Mardan Bay Topchubashov





influence representatives of both the Azerbaijani delegation and those from other Caucasus republics, who were in Istanbul, the capital of the Ottoman Empire, by early 1919, and could leave for Paris only upon consent of the French government.

The paramount number of sources has been kept in the archives of the French Foreign Ministry. These documents describe the tough struggle waged by the Azerbaijani diplomatic delegation headed by Ali Mardan Bey Topchibashi for the right to join the Peace Conference that had already been launched in Paris.

Archival records indicate that initially, the Georges Clemenceau administration, which supported the Russian White Army, seeking to restore "a united and indivisible Russia", was initially reluctant to grant French entrance visas to Azerbaijani delegation. However, under the pressure of objective circumstances they eventually had to agree to the arrival of Azerbaijani representatives.

The documents stored in one of the special folders dedicated to Azerbaijan explain the reason for this move taken by the Clemenceau government.

In an effort to ensure reliable blockade of the Bolsheviks ahead of the planned offensive upon Moscow of the Volunteer Army of General Anton Denikin, Paris had to maintain good relations with the government of independent Azerbaijan. As it is known, up to 80 percent of oil of the entire former Russian Empire was produced at the fields of the Baku region prior to the Bolshevik coup of October 1917. In 1919, the Bolsheviks refusing to admit defying Azerbaijan's independence, attempted to transport oil products in small shipments to Astrakhan after negotiating this arrangement with individual industrialists, which were certainly undermining the effort to blockade the Soviets.

The Clemenceau government, which was seeking a deal with the Azerbaijani government on a more effective policy of blockade against the Bolsheviks and was also interested in gaining access to the country's oil resources, had to approve the Azerbaijani delegation's arrival to Paris. Though the latter was not allowed to directly participate in the conference, just like other delegations of the Caucasus nations, it gained the right to submit memoranda and notes to its secretariat, as well

as answer questions from representatives of the Entente Supreme Council. Upon arriving to Paris on May 9, the delegation started hard work, securing a meeting on May 28 with US President Woodrow Wilson, the author of the distinguished and outstanding well-known "14 points". In this regard, one of the most interesting documents found in the French archives is a recording of the conversation that occurred at this meeting, compiled by Francois Menod, an official at the French Commissariat for French-American military issues. In response to Topchibashi's request on recognizing Azerbaijan's independence and authorizing the Caucasus representatives to take part in the Paris conference, US economic assistance to the Caucasus nations, and support in establishing the Caucasus Confederation and its accession to the League of Nations, President Wilson replied directly, "We do not want to divide the world into too many small states. Establishing Caucasus unity enrolls the interests of the Caucasus nations. Put forward your demands at the Peace Conference. Will the Caucasus be inclined to accept a mandate?" (1).

The last line underlined by the document compiler indicates that the US President thought to check up on the opinion of the Azerbaijanis in case consent was to be provided by the US Senate on Washington's mandate for "Turkish Armenia" and further the whole Caucasus. Though the US Senate did not endorse Wilson's project, the latter's stance, which was recorded only in the French archives and concerned the need for very close cooperation and regional interaction among the Caucasus republics, an idea that Topchibashi supported from the very outset, provides us with the unique information on this issue. From that time until late 1919, the "Azerbaijan" folders of the French Foreign Ministry contained a number of memoranda and notes sent by Topchibashi - very frequently with the chairmen of the Georgian and North Caucasus delegations - to the Entente Supreme Council.

Most of these were notes protesting the actions of the Volunteer Army of General A. Denikin, whose troops occupied the territory of the Mountain Republic by late May 1919, posing a direct threat to both Azerbaijan and Georgia.

The documents stored in one of the special folders regarding Azerbaijan explain the reason for this move taken by the Clemenceau government. In an effort to ensure reliable blockade of the Bolsheviks ahead of the planned offensive upon Moscow of the Volunteer Army of General A. Denikin, Paris had to maintain and uphold

good relations with the government of independent Azerbaijan. As is known, up to 90 percent of oil of the entire former Russian Empire was produced at the fields of the Baku region prior to the Bolshevik coup of October 1917. In 1919, the Bolsheviks, defying Azerbaijan's independence, attempted to transport oil products in small shipments to Astrakhan after negotiating this arrangement with individual industrialists, which were certainly undermining the effort to blockade the Soviets.

Though Topchibashi sought to draw the Armenian delegation to the Caucasus regional cooperation from the very beginning, he did not succeed in doing so due to the latter's non-constructive stance. In the wake of their claims to the Ottoman Empire, the Armenians believed that only a small part of the historical Armenia was located in the Caucasus; they deemed the Turks as their main enemies, favoring the Russian White movement. Therefore, the Azerbaijanis, Georgians and Armenians managed to sign a joint document only once. It was a short declaration signed in Paris on September 4, 1919, by A. M. Topchibashi, head of the Georgian delegation N. Chkheidze, as well as G. Oganjanian, a member of the Armenian diplomatic delegation. The signatories stated that "the planned evacuation of the allied forces from the Caucasus may have deplorable consequences." (2). At the same time, the Azerbaijanis and Georgians were wary of a potential incursion into Transcaucasia by the Volunteer Army, which was on a roll by September 1919, following the withdrawal of the units of the 27th British infantry division that had been stationed in the South Caucasus from late 1918. The Armenians feared the same from the Turks. Therefore, representatives of the three republics made a request at the Paris Peace Conference "to postpone the evacuation until the issue of the independence of the above-mentioned republics has been clarified and resolved." (3). The situation changed by the end of 1919, when it became clear to the Entente Supreme Council, including the French government, that their plan to overthrow Bolshevism with the aid of the Russian White army had failed. On January 10, 1920, the Entente Council made a decision to recognize *de facto* the independence of the Azerbaijan and Georgian Republics. The move had a direct impact on the documents that were being delivered to Paris from French servicemen and diplomatic representatives on the ground. From the end of 1918 until the spring of 1920, most of the reports arriving from Tiflis were sent by the French military mission in the Caucasus and French consular representatives. The reports of the chiefs of the

French military mission in the Caucasus, who regularly informed in detail the Ministry of War and the Foreign Ministry of the political, military, economic and other developments taking place in Azerbaijan and the entire Caucasus, are of paramount importance in this regard. The extent of impartiality of the provided information depended on the political situation as well as the personality and service record of the mission chief. For example, the reports issued by Colonel Pierre-Auguste Chardigny, a French officer, who served as chief of the French military mission in the Caucasus from October 1918 to February 1920, often had an obvious bias, despite containing interesting information. Following his appointment in October 1916 to the post of the French military representative under the High Command of the Russian Caucasus army, Chardigny had pro-Russian and pro-Armenian sympathies even after the proclamation of independence by the Caucasus republics. Ignoring the real situation that emerged in the Caucasus after the Bolshevik coup in October 1917, he disapproved of both Azerbaijanis and Georgians and accused them of a pro-Turkish and pro-German slant, which he believed to be the cause of the Caucasus Front collapse in 1918.

According to one of Chardigny's associates, his pro-Armenian policy, among other things, was due to corruption-related interests. In particular, abusing power, he maintained close ties with representatives of the wealthy Armenian bourgeoisie of Tiflis.

The situation took a different turn after the *de facto* recognition of the independence of Azerbaijan and Georgia by the Entente Supreme Council on January 10, 1920. In February 1920, Chardigny, who had been in Paris from September 1919, though he former retained the title of the chief of the French military mission in the Caucasus, was officially succeeded by Colonel Emile-Auguste Corbel. Corbel, who sympathized with Azerbaijan and Georgia, arrived in Tiflis in April 1920. Simultaneously, the French government appointed a High Commissioner for the Caucasus, who would serve as its top-ranking diplomatic representative in the region from February 1920. Damien de Martel was appointed to this position; his reports, drawn up very professionally, provided a good analytical overview of the situation that had emerged in Azerbaijan and the whole South Caucasus region. In particular, Martel rightly linked the fall of the Azerbaijan Republic and its relatively easy invasion by the Red Army with the Armenian rebellion in Nagorno-Karabakh, which prompted the authorities in Baku to send almost the entire bulk of the



available insignificant military forces to the region in an effort to protect the country's territorial integrity. Martel also referred to the manipulation of the Bolshevik government, as a result of which the Azerbaijan Republic was eventually victimized. Very interesting information concerning the last days of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic's existence has also been preserved in the reports sent by Colonel Corbel to the Ministry of War.

It is worth mentioning in conclusion that in addition to the mentioned French state archives, the personal archive of Ali Mardan Bay Topchibashi, chairman of the diplomatic delegation of the Azerbaijan Republic, contains extensive data on the history of French-Azerbaijani relations in 1918-1920. A comparative analysis allows making a conclusion that this particular archive, stored in the library of the High School for the Social Sciences (EHESS) in Paris, currently contains the most comprehensive set of documents and records on the issue in question. Many of the notes and memorandums in this archive, which were once sent to the Entente Supreme Council and the French government, for unknown reasons were not included either in the French archives folders dealing with Azerbaijan or those pertaining to the general series on the Caucasus republics. ♦

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PhD in History

ROLE OF DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS IN FORGING RELATIONS BETWEEN THE AZERBAIJAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC AND GEORGIA (1918-1920)

Hot on the heels of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (ADR) and the Democratic Republic of Georgia's gaining independence in spring 1918, a need arose for the two new states to establish multilateral relations spanning different areas, including politics, military cooperation, diplomacy, economics, finance, transportation, communications, etc. and to regulate and deepen mutually beneficial cooperation. On the one hand, this was necessitated by the fact that the two republics were located in the same region and faced similar challenges. On the other hand, the two newly established states had a common historical heritage, given that the South Caucasus had been colonized by the Russian Empire for more than 100 years. The two republics maintained and developed bilateral relations through ADR's diplomatic missions in Tiflis and Batum and Georgia's diplomatic representation in Baku.

Analyzing the activity of the diplomatic missions is of great importance for clarifying the essence of the entire range of Azerbaijan-Georgia relations in 1918-1920. In the current period of the dynamic development of

relations between the two republics, research on this issue has tremendous practical importance, in addition to its scientific value. In almost every case, the leaders of the new republics managed to resolve extremely complicated and controversial issues during this time period essentially in line with the interests of the two nations through negotiations and mutual concessions. Muhammad Amin Rasulzade, one of Azerbaijan's leaders at the time, noted that "among Christian neighbors, a very friendly relationship with the Republic of Georgia" had been established [10, p. 58].

It is noteworthy that though different aspects of this problem were touched upon in Azerbaijani historical studies, namely, in the monographs of J. P. Hasanli [8] and N. L. Nasibli [9], as well as general works [6, 7], the issue has not been separately researched. This article focuses on scrutinizing the measures taken to establish economic, financial, transport and communications cooperation between ADR and the Democratic Republic of Georgia in 1918-1920 based chiefly on primary sources [1, 2, 3, 4] and periodicals [13, 14].




Georgia's diplomatic mission in Baku was based in this building

Azerbaijani and Georgian leaders and political figures of that time period knew perfectly well that though they had embarked on building independent states, it would be impossible to ensure their existence in isolation and without establishing normal and comprehensive relations with each other. Therefore, the authorized representatives of Azerbaijan and Georgia, who were holding peace talks with the Ottoman state in Batum, concluded an agreement on June 4, 1918 on re-commissioning and ensuring normal operation of the Baku-Batum white oil pipeline [1, p. 364]. On the same day, representatives of Azerbaijan and Georgia, along with those of the Ottoman state and Armenia, signed an agreement on the distribution of the South Caucasus railcar and steam locomotive park in Batum. According to the deal, the parties had to divide the railway park that was the property of the defunct Russian Empire in proportion to the length of the railway lines traversing each country's territory [1, p. 365]. Those agreements marked the beginning of negotiated regulation of inter-governmental relations. Their signing was also a re-

markable success of the diplomatic efforts of the newly launched Foreign Ministries.

Following its relocation to Ganja on June 16, 1918, the Azerbaijani National Council and Government appointed Mahammadyusif Jafarov, who was well-known in the South Caucasus political circles, as the ADR's diplomatic representative in Georgia in order to maintain regular ties and hold consultations with this country. M. Y. Jafarov and other employees of the diplomatic mission made a tremendous contribution to the forging and development of multi-faceted relations between the two countries, including economic ties. Following the liberation of Baku, the Georgian government delegated its diplomatic envoy, Nikolay Kartivadze, to Azerbaijan. The diplomatic representation of the Republic of Georgia started operating in Baku on October 2, 1918.

On June 21, 1918, Georgian Prime Minister N. Ramishvili suggested to M. Y. Jafarov dividing the former South Caucasus government's property between Azerbaijan and Georgia. The Georgian side substantiated the proposal by the fact that Armenia had already



received its share and further placed it in the territories that were transferred to the Ottoman control. On the same day, M. Jafarov sent a confidential notification to Azerbaijan's foreign minister in Ganja regarding the Georgian government's aspiration to improve and strengthen its ties with Azerbaijan and the mentioned proposal on property division [2, pol.1, paper 7, p.13]. The Azerbaijani side agreed in principle to the distribution of joint property. Furthermore, it suggested on August 15 that the movable property, which remained as a result of the abolition of the Caucasus Front and belonged to the South Caucasus central government-controlled organizations, be divided first through arbitration [1, p. 438].



On August 21, 1918, the Georgian government agreed to set up an arbitration commission comprised of Azerbaijani and Georgian representatives. The newly established commission held several sessions as the parties endeavored to find negotiated solutions to iron out their differences.

In the summer of 1918 there was a shortage of money in circulation. The head of the Azerbaijani government, Fatali Khan Khoyski, said on July 11, 1918 in his letter of instructions to the head of the Azerbaijani delegation, M. A. Rasulzade, who was in Istanbul at the time, that the Azerbaijan Republic was experiencing dire financial constraints. According to the letter, there was a lack of circulating South Caucasus bonds in the country, while ongoing negotiations with Georgian and Armenian representatives on the issue of new bonds had not yet yielded fruit [3, p.30].

A confidential message of M. Y. Jafarov, Azerbaijan's

diplomatic representative in Georgia, dated July 17, 1918 and addressed to the Azerbaijani government, said that the Georgian government had started printing money, using the previous bonds (referring to the securities issued during the period of the South Caucasus Commissariat – G. A.) as a sample. The message said further that Georgian and Armenian representatives were in talks on releasing them into circulation on the condition that Georgia and Armenia would be both responsible for their emission [2, pol.1, paper 18, p.66]. Indeed, the governments of Georgia and Armenia signed an agreement on July 20, 1918 on the issuance of 200 million South Caucasus Commissariat bonds without notifying the Azerbaijani government beforehand. The bonds, which had been released by the Russian State Bank's Tiflis office, were divided between Georgia and Armenia. The Azerbaijani government lambasted the move [2, pol. 1, paper 18, p.141].

Nevertheless, the Georgian and Armenian governments' plans to resolve their financial problems without consulting with Azerbaijan did not produce the anticipated result. Therefore, in fall 1918, the governments of Azerbaijan and Georgia had to pursue a monetary policy coordinated with the Armenian government in order to mend the socio-economic situation, given that the same monetary unit, namely, the South Caucasus Commissariat bond, was in circulation in all the three republics, while the customs and border services connecting the republics were still in their inception phase. Therefore, the amount of the bonds issued by the Tiflis bank office was to be regulated by an intergovernmental agreement. For this purpose, representatives of



Front and last sheets of the Azerbaijani-Georgian military and defense agreement dated 16 June 1919

Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia signed an agreement September 6, 1918 on joint emission of South Caucasus bonds worth 280 million Rubles for financial, monetary and loan transactions.

On November 15 that same year, Azerbaijan and Georgia concluded an agreement in Tiflis on the emission of additional South Caucasus bonds totaling 160 million Rubles. The document served as an addendum to the Georgian-Armenian deal on the joint issuance of South Caucasus Commissariat bonds inked on July 20, 1918. According to the new agreement, the Tiflis office of the State Bank was to release bonds for each of the two republics in equal amounts, totaling 160 million Rubles, by November 25. First, bonds worth 80 million Rubles were to be issued for Azerbaijan in 100 and 250 Ruble banknotes. In compliance with the agreement, signed by

Georgian Finance Minister G. D. Zhuruli and Azerbaijan's diplomatic representative in Georgia, M. Y. Jafarov, the Georgian side was to ensure delivery of bonds to the Azerbaijani government by November 25, 1918. If this obligation had not been fulfilled in due time, the Georgian government would have been obliged to send all the bonds to Azerbaijan until this bulk of securities reached the specified amount [2, pol. 1, paper 36, p. 6-8].

On June 4, 1919, representatives of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia signed an agreement in Tiflis on the emission of additional South Caucasus bonds. The agreement envisaged the issue of such securities totaling 100 million Rubles and further transfer of this amount to Azerbaijan. In addition, the State Bank's Tiflis office was to issue South Caucasus bonds worth another 80 million Rubles for Azerbaijan, in keeping with the previously reached agreement [2, pol. 1, paper 32, p.2].

In accordance with the additional Azerbaijani-Georgian agreement signed in Tiflis on June 4, 1919, Azerbaijan transferred 60 million Rubles out of the total amount of bonds worth 180 million Rubles to the



Georgian government. As a reciprocal measure, the latter granted permission for free exchange of Azerbaijan and Baku bonds worth 15 million Rubles in its territory [2, pol. 1, paper 32, p.3].

The successful monetary policy of the Azerbaijani government facilitated efforts to strengthen the exchange rate of both the Baku securities and the South Caucasus bonds. As a result, the South Caucasus bond rate rose at the Tiflis stock exchange in the summer of 1919 amid the depreciation of foreign currencies [13, 2.VII.1919, No.136].

The operation of the South Caucasus railroad played an important role in establishing normal economic relations among the region's republics in 1918-1920. The decisive steps and efficient proposals of the Ottoman state paved the way for conventional use of those rail lines from fall 1918. In August-September 1918, agreements were reached as a result of tense negotiations between the Ottoman, Azerbaijani and Georgian governments concerning cargo transportation by rail, nor-

malization and development of trade and economic relations based on mutual concessions.

A regular rail link between Baku and Tiflis was restored in early October 1918. Afterwards, the traffic of daily postal, freight and passenger trains started between the two cities [13, No.6, 8.X.1918]. The Georgian government also stated that it had approved transportation of the oil products sent by Azerbaijan for the Ottoman state to Batum and Alexandropol (Gyumri) through railways in its territory [13, No.8, 11.X.1918]. In order to secure this deal, the Azerbaijani side undertook a commitment to deliver 20 cisterns of crude oil and two cisterns of white oil to Georgia daily. The Republic of Georgia, which was in dire need of oil products, lifted the bans regarding cargo transportation via the South Caucasus railways from Azerbaijan and the Ottoman state. Afterwards, at least 23 tank cars of white oil and other oil products per day began to be transported from Baku by rail to the Batum port, slated for the Ottoman Empire and Germany [6, vol. V, p.335].

In the fall of 1918, the Azerbaijani government began to take further steps to boost oil exports to Georgia and Europe. First of all, it completed the repair of the Baku-Batum white oil pipeline in an area stretching to the Georgian border in early October [13, No.8, 11.X.1918]. At that time, available capacities allowed transporting up to 4 million Poods (obsolete Russian weight measure) of white oil per month through this pipeline. Azerbaijan was seeking to export white oil, while Georgia was keen on importing it. However, Georgia sought to pay for it in paper money, while Baku intended to receive food, timber and metal in exchange. Therefore, signing of a relevant agreement was being delayed to the detriment of both sides. The Ottoman Empire's defeat in World War I in late fall 1918 and the change of the socio-political situation in the region after the stationing of the Entente forces in the South Caucasus caused a postponement of the work in this area. However, taking into account Georgia's dire need for oil products, the Azerbaijani government continued to supply the neighboring republic with oil regularly in that period. Azerbaijan's Council of Ministers passed a decision December 21, 1918 to deliver 10 cisterns of white oil, 13,000 poods of crude oil and two cisterns of gasoline to Georgia even prior to the conclusion of a relevant intergovernmental agreement [13, No.68, 28.XII.1918]. This decision of Azerbaijan's government was executed without delay, according to the instructions issued by the minister of commerce and industry.

As a result of the talks on regulating cargo transportation held between Azerbaijan and Georgia, the two republics concluded an agreement on the exchange of goods in Baku on December 26, 1918. According to the agreement, which was signed by Azerbaijan's Minister of Commerce and Industry Behbud Khan Javanshir and Georgia's diplomatic envoy in Azerbaijan, N. Kartsivadze, the signatories agreed on free-of-charge transit of cargo transported by rail for one year, i.e. both sides pledged not to levy customs duties in this period. The Azerbaijani side committed to deliver 1 million poods of white oil, fuel oil and lubricant oil during the year to meet the needs of the Georgian population and railroads, while Georgia was to supply the required materials and coal to meet the demand of the Azerbaijani railways [13, 24.I.1919, No.16].

An acute shortage of steam locomotives and railroad cars required for normal operation of the railway was emphasized at a meeting of the bureau on cargo transportation, held on December 30, 1918 and attended by

Azerbaijan's Minister of Roads. According to Teymur Bay Malik-Aslanov, the acting head of the railway administration, one of the main reasons for this shortage was the fact that 57 steam locomotives and 1,500 railway carriages were being used to provide transportation for the Ottoman troops' withdrawal from Azerbaijan [13, No.1, 1.I.1919]. Afterwards, Minister of Roads Khudadat Bay Malik-Aslanov told the "Azerbaijan" newspaper while commenting on the issue that the steam locomotives and railway carriages that transported the Ottoman forces back to their home country remained at the railway stations in Georgia [13, No.2, 3.I.1919]. The lack of fuel in Georgia and the ensuing outbreak of a Georgian-Armenian military conflict hampered bringing back those locomotives and railroad cars until the end of 1918.

In a cable sent to Azerbaijan's diplomatic representative in Georgia, M. Y. Jafarov, on January 2, 1919, the minister of roads said that the Ottoman troops had used the locomotives and railway carriages of the Azerbaijani railways while leaving the Caucasus. Therefore, a total of 31 freight, six passenger locomotives and 100 railway carriages owned by Azerbaijan had been left in the Georgian railways [13, No.4, 5.I.1919]. In January 1919, Azerbaijan's Ministry of Roads notified Georgian diplomatic envoy N. Kartsivadze that the Georgian railway administration was in no hurry to return the locomotives and railway carriages that had crossed into the country's territory. To the contrary, the ministry said, the railroad cars that belong to Azerbaijan are being painted and numbered anew, and inscriptions are being made on those items indicating that they are purportedly Georgian-owned. The Georgian diplomat pledged to inform the Ministry of Roads of the Republic of Georgia in this regard [13, No.21, 30.I.1919].

In conclusion of intensive talks that lasted several months, Azerbaijan and Georgia concluded an agreement on March 8, 1919 on regulating the operation of railways. According to that document, which was inked by Azerbaijani Minister of Roads Khudadat Bay Malik-Aslanov and Isidor Malania, the acting Georgian Minister of Roads, the locomotives and railway carriages in the territory of each of the two republics were entirely at the disposal of that country until the issue was resolved by a special arbitration commission on May 26, 1918. According to the agreement, the terms of the exchange of freight cars and the issues concerning cargo transportation fees were settled between the parties [2, pol. 1, paper 6, p.9-11]. Moreover, the daily direct passenger train traffic between Baku and Tiflis was resumed.



Bonds of the Transcaucasian Commissariat. February 1918

On February 5, 1920, Azerbaijan and Georgia signed an agreement on cargo transit in Baku. According to the deal, the parties committed to ensure railway transit of freight between the two countries free of charge, i.e. without paying any customs duties, for one year [2, pol. 1, paper 86, p.6]. In this period, the Azerbaijani government agreed to provide for duty-free export of up to 16 million poods of oil and oil products, which would meet the demand of the Georgian population and railway. The government of Georgia, for its part, pledged not to send the oil and oil products imported from Azerbaijan out of the country. In addition, it authorized transportation of technical equipment required for the Azerbaijani railways, as well as stone coal and timber, without levying customs duties. These documents, signed between Azerbaijan and Georgia in 1918-1920, allowed developing and deepening bilateral cooperation, as well as strengthening the friendship and partnership between the two countries.

Furthermore, Tiflis hosted the signing of Azerbaijani-Georgian agreements on telegraph communication and postal services on January 3, 1919 and January 4, 1919 respectively; a convention on transporting postal parcels by rail was concluded as well [2, pol.1, paper 20, p.18-19; 20-22]. These documents, signed by the heads of the postal and telegraph administrations of the two countries, facilitated efforts aimed at regulating and developing international telegraph and postal services. Regular telegraph communication was established between the main cities of Azerbaijan and Georgia and citizens of both republics were entitled to the use of international telegraph services. The parties also inked a deal to ensure confidentiality of the content of cables being sent. They also set the fees to be charged for sending



parcels and transporting printed products.

In keeping with the principle of good neighborliness, Azerbaijan was providing intermittent food aid to Georgia. For example, the Azerbaijani government passed a decision on June 6, 1919 to allocate 5,000 poods of barley and 15,000 poods of wheat middlings from the available stocks for Georgia [13, 17.VII.1919, No.123]. Azerbaijan's Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Food swiftly implemented the government's decision. On June 25 that year, two more railway carriages of barley flour and two carriages of middlings were dispatched to Georgia [4, p. 333]. Moreover, the Azerbaijani government sent funds worth 76,000 rubles to the Tiflis-based, underfunded "Experimental Agricultural Station" on September 12, 1919 for the publication of scientific works. In exchange, the institution's management was required to hand over one-third of the printed products to Azerbaijan [13, 14.X.1919, No.220].

On February 20, 1920, Georgia was hit by a devastating earthquake. The quake left thousands of people homeless, causing destruction in the city of Gori and the surrounding settlements. The Azerbaijani government was quick to provide assistance to the people affected by the calamity. On February 25, Georgia's Ministry of Supply was permitted to deliver 15,769 poods of flour derived from the Baku stocks to its country and distribute this bulk among the starving population [4, p. 407-408]. On March 11, 1920, the Azerbaijani parliament made a decision to allocate 3 million Rubles to the afflicted residents in Georgia [14, 1920, No. 20].

One of the most significant areas of mutually beneficial economic cooperation between Azerbaijan and Georgia in 1918-1920 was the operation of the

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
Дипломатический Представитель Азер-
байджанской Республики при Пра-
вительстве Грузинской Республики

port of Batum. Batum served as a crossing point for the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic's economic and trade ties with the Ottoman Empire and European countries. Therefore, Muhammad Amin Rasulzade stressed the need for establishing a representative office in Batum, which was the most important port city in the Black Sea basin and an outlet for the Azerbaijani railway and a white oil pipeline to Europe, as early as in the summer of 1918 in Istanbul during his tenure as the head of the Azerbaijani delegation. Taking into consideration the great importance of Batum for forging economic and trade ties with other countries and establishing relations with European states, the Azerbaijani government made a decision on November 10, 1918 to establish a consulate there. Dr. Mahmud Bay Afandiyev was appointed Azerbaijan's Consul in Batum [13, 10.X.1918, No.31].

The Azerbaijani consulate in Batum was instrumental in receiving and dispatching the country's cargo at the seaport, settling disputes regarding transportation, in particular, freight carriages and railway cars, diplomatic couriers and postal issues.

The Azerbaijani diplomatic mission in Tiflis and the consulate in Batum also contributed to solving problems faced by the Turkish and other Muslim population in the region. For example, the diplomatic representation provided assistance worth 200,000 Rubles on April 5, 1919 on the instruction of the Azerbaijani government to the Muslim residents affected by the Akhalsikh accident [4, p. 298]; the consulate contributed 10,000 Rubles to the Azerbaijani residents in the Batum province in March 1919 and another 10,000 Rubles to the Turkish school in Batum to ensure its normal activity in May 1919.

On May 26, 1919, an agency of the Ministry of Finance was established under the Azerbaijani diplomatic mission in Tiflis. On August 25, the agency was tasked with fulfilling the duties of the Azerbaijan State Bank's correspondent institution [4, p. 352]. On September 27, a commerce department was set up under the consulate. The department included representatives of the Ministries of Roads, Commerce and Industry, and Food. In October, the consulate in Batum became the Consulate General. On October 18, the



Consulate General became a correspondent institution of the Azerbaijan State Bank. It was instructed to ensure the transfer of funds being wired to the Azerbaijani government's account in Batum to the State Bank. On October 22, a decision was made to establish a representative office of Azerbaijan's Ministry of Finance under the commerce department of the Consulate General in Batum [4, p. 375].

The mutually beneficial cooperation between Azerbaijan and Georgia was also reflected in the activity of their delegations at the Versailles Peace Conference. Both Azerbaijani and Georgian representatives consistently countered the allegations of former Russian political figures and Tsarist generals on “a united and indivisible Russia”, and while regularly discussing further steps to be taken as part of these efforts, adhered to a unanimous stance in most cases.

On August 6, 1919, ways of warding off the Denikin threat were mulled at a joint session of Azerbaijani and Georgian delegations in Paris. Participants stressed the need for both republics' rapprochement with England. The head of the Azerbaijani delegation A. Topchubashov and the head of the Georgian delegation N. Chkhheidze noted that safeguarding the independence of small nations under the current situation is possible only under the auspices of a major power. The delegations of both republics arrived at a conclusion that the Caucasus republics should maintain close ties with England and seek to solve their most significant economic and financial issues jointly with this country [2, pol.1, paper 142, p. 211-212].

According to the decision passed at the meeting of the Azerbaijani and Georgian delegations in Paris, a joint



Evgeni Gegechkori, Georgia's foreign minister in 1918-1921

economic department was established. The department, headed by M.H.Hajinski, held talks with major British and US companies, in line with the economic interests of the two republics, and further submitted very significant and lucrative draft agreements to the governments of Azerbaijan and Georgia [13, 11.XII.1919, No. 268].

The close cooperation between the Azerbaijani and Georgian delegations was pivotal in the discussions of the Batum issue, which was of great economic and military-strategic importance for all South Caucasus republics.

The allied states initiated a project during a conference of the Entente supreme council in London in February–March 1920 that envisaged handing over a part of the Batum province to Georgia and another part

to Armenia, and declaring Batum a free city under the auspices of the League of Nations. Georgia strongly opposed the initiative, while representatives of Azerbaijan fully backed their Georgian counterparts in this regard. Representatives of the two republics had agreed that they would oppose splitting the Batum province. The parties concurred that Azerbaijan would support accession of the city of Batum to Georgia together with the province, while Georgia would comprehensively meet Azerbaijan's interests with regard to Batum [9, p.470]. That very clear-cut stance of the Azerbaijani side led to the relinquishment of the plans to break up the Batum province.


All these facts clearly show that Azerbaijan and Georgia began to establish normal relations following their declaration of independence in spring 1918. The mutually beneficial cooperation between the two republics rapidly developed in the following two years and numerous agreements covering all areas of inter-governmental ties were signed. Strategic alliances and reliable partnership were established between the two neighboring states in this time period. *

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Memorial plaque in a hall of the previous Palace of the Caucasus Viceroy in Tbilisi where Azerbaijan's independence was proclaimed on 28 May 1918

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Memorial plaque in a hall of the previous Palace of the Caucasus Viceroy in Tbilisi where Azerbaijan's independence was proclaimed on 28 May 1918

Fakhri VALEHOGHLU-HAJIYEV

PhD in History

ACTIVITY OF THE AZERBAIJAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC'S DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS IN GEORGIA

The government of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic began to pursue an active, constructive and principled foreign policy from the very proclamation of the ADR's independence in an effort to attain the country's recognition internationally and ensure its security. Taking into consideration relevant geopolitical interests, this policy had a special emphasis on developing relations with the neighboring countries, in particular, the Democratic Republic of Georgia (DRG), which declared independence two days prior to the ADR. Fruitful work was swiftly done to establish a legal and contractual basis required for forging and expanding mutually beneficial cooperation between the two countries in the economic, financial, energy, communications, transport and military and defense fields. The two countries signed a number of agreements (1), including those on the issue of additional bonds (November 15, 1918), exchange of goods (December 26, 1918), telegraph communication (January 3, 1919), a railway link (March 8, 1919), the emission of additional bonds and exchange of Transcaucasian bonds (June 4, 1919), military and defense cooperation (June 16, 1919), and transit (February 5, 1920).

The two countries de-facto recognized each other's sovereignty. In order to diversify and develop bilateral

relations, they established ties at the level of diplomatic missions. Azerbaijan opened its diplomatic representation in Georgia in June 1918, while the neighboring republic launched its diplomatic mission in Azerbaijan in October the same year. Mahammadyusif Jafarov and Faris Bay Vakilov sequentially served as the ADR's diplomatic representatives in Georgia, and Nikolay Kartsivadze and Grigol Alshibaya held the same position, representing the DRG in Azerbaijan. In November 1918, an ADR consulate (later designated as Consulate General), headed by Dr. Mahmud Bay Afandiyev, was established in the Georgian city of Batum.

Mahammadyusif Jafarov (1885-1938) was appointed Azerbaijan's first diplomatic representative in Georgia in June 1918. M. Y. Jafarov, a lawyer, was an MP represented in the 4th Russian State Duma in 1912-1917 and in the Transcaucasian Seim from February 23 to May 26, 1918. M. Y. Jafarov, one of the 24 members of the Azerbaijani National Council who signed the Declaration of Independence, served in the first ADR government and previously as Minister of Commerce and Industry in the Transcaucasian Commissariat, the independent government of Transcaucasia, which was established on November 15, 1917. M. Y. Jafarov's tenure as a statesman, including his efforts as a lawmaker and

Besiki Street in Tbilisi where Azerbaijan's diplomatic representation was located in 1918-1920



short-lived experience of serving as a cabinet minister, certainly affected the activity of the diplomat, who was well-known in the South Caucasus political circles.

According to archival documents and media publications released in the Georgian and Russian languages in Tiflis in 1918-1919, the ADR diplomatic representation in the Georgian capital and the head of the mission stood out for their vigorous efforts, in particular, in terms of the latter's worthily representing his country at official events and international meetings held in the city, in accordance with the rules of diplomatic protocol. He also closely followed the political and social developments ongoing in the region, communicated closely with the local community and the media, and focused on delivering the truth about Azerbaijan abroad, the reports said. M.Y.Jafarov's regular press statements regarding the military and socio-political developments that occurred during the liberation of Baku from the Bolshevik-Dashnak invasion in August 1918 were pivotal for not only informing the Georgian public on the matter but also dismissing the circulating false rumors in this regard.

Sakartvelos Respublika (translated from Georgian as "the Republic of Georgia") newspaper, the DRG government's official mouthpiece, quoted the Azerbaijani diplomat as saying in an article headlined "Jafarov's opinion" in its issue released on August 6, 1918, "Ottoman and

Azerbaijani troops entered Baku on August 1, lodging over a distance of about 1 verst (an obsolete Russian unit of length) around the city. As for such oil-refining districts as Balakhany and Surakhani, they are said to have been fully rescued. We also learned on Saturday that Khan Khoyski, Ashurov and Hajinski, members of the Azerbaijani government, have already arrived in Baku. The rumors suggesting that the Ottoman army's aid would clear the way for Baku's transfer to the Ottoman control are false; Baku will definitely be under full jurisdiction of Azerbaijan." (2).

Several days after the complete liberation of Baku, on September 15, 1918, the "Sakartvelo" (translated from Georgian as "Georgia") newspaper, a mouthpiece of the Georgian national democrats, published a report of the information office of the ADR's diplomatic representation which said, "We have received information from Baku that absolute stability has been established in the city. All incidents ceased after the troops entered the city. Dozens of looters have been killed. Nazim Bay has been appointed the commandant. The authority of the previous self-government of the city, which existed prior to the Ilyushkin-led Bolshevik Seim, has been reinstated. All the food-related tasks have been vested in the self-government. The stores are gradually opening. A water pipeline is operational. The oil industrialists have essentially managed to save themselves. Traffic

آذربایجان جمهوریتی

خارجیہ نظارتی

گورجستان حکومت جمهوریتی

بزدینہ امور سباسی و کالقی

Representation diplomatique
de la République d'Azerbaïdjan
auprès le gouvernement
de la République Géorgienne

УДОСТОВЪРЕНИЕ

3 " октября 1918 .

№ 217

TIFLIS

Дано сие Дипломатическому Представителю

Грузинской Республики при Правительствѣ Азербайджанской Республики Николаю Іотамовичу КАРЦИВАДЗѢ въ томъ, что онъ ѿдеть къ мѣсту своего назначенія какъ дипломатической представитель въ г. Баку, что подписью и приложениемъ печати удостовѣряется.

Прошу всѣ военные и гражданскія власти не чинить ему никакихъ препятствій, оказывая наоборотъ, всякое возможное содѣйствіе.

Дипломатический Представитель Азербайджанской Республики при Правительствѣ Грузинской Республики



Секретарь

Nikolay Kartsivadze


ID card of Georgia's diplomatic envoy in Azerbaijan Nikolay Kartsivadze (front side)

was swiftly resumed over the telegraph and the railroad. The fleet sent a delegation to see the commandant, seeking permission to send their wives and children out of the city. They were granted permission to do so. The Azerbaijani government provided assistance to the Georgians, allocating 50,000 Rubles for their primary needs. The publication of the "Open Word" newspaper, which was suspended during the Bolshevik rule, has resumed. The Kaspi newspaper will also be published in the coming days" (3).

The DRG government was concerned over the fate of the Georgian citizens residing in Baku during the tensions in the city in August-September 1918. Konstantin Gvarjeladze, Georgia's acting foreign minister, sent Letter No. 3154 to M.Y.Jafarov in this regard on September 9, 1918. The Azerbaijani diplomatic representative was quick to respond to that query (4). In a response letter sent to K. Gvarjeladze on the following day, M. Jafarov pledged on behalf of the ADR government that resolute measures would be taken to ensure the personal safety and security of the property of all Baku residents, including the Georgian population (5).


The Sakartvelos Respublika newspaper published an interview with diplomatic representative M. Jafarov in its issue released on October 26, 1918. Jafarov answered questions regarding the obstacles impeding Azerbaijani-Georgian cooperation in the oil sector, the solution of problems that emerged with Baku's food supply, the Ottoman army's advances toward Derbent, and the ongoing efforts to achieve recognition of Azerbaijan's independence. He also said the reports of some Tiflis-based newspapers regarding significant destruction of areas and the killing of numerous Armenians during the liberation of Baku from occupation were overly exaggerated, false or biased (6).

Archival sources indicate that M. Jafarov closely communicated with Georgian government officials from the very beginning of his diplomatic service and held talks with them on various issues. In a "classified" letter dated June 21, 1918, he reported to ADR Foreign Minister M. H. Hajinski about the meeting he had with the head of the Georgian government, Noe Ramishvili. M.Jafarov noted that the Georgian government was in favor of boosting its cooperation with Azerbaijan, saying that N. V. Ramishvili had expressed his government's readiness to speedily solve the issues causing



a cool-down in bilateral relations, in line with the interests of the two countries. According to the letter, the head of the Georgian government also touched upon the issue of dividing the property of the former Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic (TDFR) among the South Caucasus countries. He also informed his interlocutor that a 2,500 people-strong German regiment had been deployed in Georgia and that another regiment was due to arrive there in the coming days, adding that they were looking to move toward Baku to acquire oil and oil products. M. Jafarov, for his part, brought Ramishvili's attention to the division of the disputed territories between the two countries, stressing the need for finding a negotiated solution to this issue, as opposed to military action. In this context, he regarded the acts committed by the German and Georgian armed forces against the local Turkic population during the Borchali incident as unacceptable. N. Ramishvili replied while commenting on the matter that the military operations in Borchali were allegedly aimed at opening up roads upon the request of Vahit Pasha (Note 1) (7).

It is worth mentioning that in the summer of 1918, certain armed groups in Borchali, mainly comprised of Armenian gangs, relying on the presence of German troops, stepped up pressure on the local Muslim



One of the documents reflecting Azerbaijani-Georgian events in 1918-1920

government, in turn, agreed to establish an arbitration commission comprised of Azerbaijani and Georgian representatives to deal with the matter.

The military aggression perpetrated by the Armenian (Ararat) Republic against Azerbaijan in 1918-1920 prompted the ADR's diplomatic mission in Georgia to step up its efforts to address the issue.

The ADR government and the Armenian leadership sometimes maintained correspondence and communication not directly, but through the diplomatic representations active in Georgia. The first protest note was sent to the opposing side in the summer of 1918 via the diplomatic representation in Georgia. It condemned the initial invasive actions taken by Gen. Andranik-led Armenian military units, namely, intruding into Azerbaijani territory and taking over the road leading to the city of Shusha near Asgaran and a part of the Zangazur province in an area close to Gorus. In a protest note to Armenia's Charge d'Affaires in Georgia A. Jamalyan, dated August 15, 1918, M. Jafarov made a call on behalf of the ADR government for an immediate pullout of the Armenian troops from the Azerbaijani territory. M. Jafarov reported in writing to the acting Azerbaijani Foreign Minister, M. Takinski, on October 23, 1918, that in accordance with the latter's cable, he had met with A. Jamalyan and informed him that T. Bekzadyan's appointment as Armenia's diplomatic representative in Azerbaijan was inadmissible for the Azerbaijani government. M. Jafarov's letter made it clear that he had spoken with the Armenian charge d'affaires in a peaceful manner, in accordance with the instructions of Azerbaijan's Council of Ministers issued on October 15, 1918. M. Jafarov said during the meeting that some Armenian media outlets were seeking to drive a wedge between the two countries by embellishing certain developments; A. Jamalyan concurred and pledged to inform his government in this regard; the sides further discussed ways of leaving behind the differences, putting an end to the conflict and normalizing the relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia (10).

In an urgent diplomatic cable sent to M. Jafarov on December 9, 1918, ADR Foreign Minister M. Takinski asked him to notify Armenia's charge d'affaires in Georgia that the Garagoyunlu village pertained to "the Gazakh province, which is an integral part of the Azerbaijan Republic", and residents of that village were

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ID card of Georgia's diplomatic envoy in Azerbaijan Nikolay Kartsivadze


not in favor of acceding to the Ararat Republic in any shape or form (11).

"Kavkazskoye Slovo" ("Caucasus Word") newspaper's issue released on October 23, 1918 and the Baku-based official "Azerbaijan" newspaper's issue, published on October 27, 1918, carried M. Jafarov's response letter to A. Jamalyan's protest note (Note 3) over the liberation of Baku from occupation by the Islamic Army of the Caucasus, sent to Azerbaijan's diplomatic representative in Georgia on October 16, 1918. In his letter, M. Jafarov said that A. Jamalyan's allegations regarding mass arrests, blackmail and looting of Armenians in Baku, as well as the Azerbaijani government's purportedly taking belated measures to prevent the pillage, were based on inaccurate information. Jafarov noted that just a few months ago, in March 1918, "the Armenians, who curried favor with the Bolsheviks", committed mass killings of the civilian Muslim population in Baku and Shamakhi, with the death toll exceeding 10,000 people, according to official estimates; in spring that same year, Armenian armed units razed to the ground over 200 villages in the Irevan governorate (12).

A diplomatic note sent by M. Jafarov to A. Jamalyan was published in a story headlined "Armenian army's attack on Azerbaijan", which was carried by Sakartvelos Respublika, an official Georgian newspaper, in its November 22, 1918 issue.

"According to the data available to my government, on November 2, Armenian military units crossed the border of the Azerbaijan Republic, trespassing the boundaries of the 9th section located on the northern side of the Goycha lake in the Ganja province. 60,000 local Muslim residents faced military violence and looting. I express protest of my government in this regard. I request bringing information about this incident to your government's attention in order to take urgent measures to prevent violence against Muslims in the Ganja province and clear the Azerbaijani territories of the Armenian units," the message said (13).

M. Jafarov also held regular meetings with representatives of other countries based in Tiflis to exchange views on pressing issues. Those discussions were covered by the Georgian state-run media. Sakartvelos Respublika reported in its issue published on January 29, 1919, "Beach, the head of England's civilian political mission, met with the head of Azerbaijan's diplomatic



mission in Georgia, M. Y. Jafarov, and had a long conversation with him. The head of the French diplomatic mission, General Chardinye, had a meeting with M. Jafarov as well" (14).

During the first session of the Constituent Assembly of Georgia (Parliament), held on March 12, 1919 in the former Governor's Palace and the Seim building White Hall, both lounges designated for diplomats were full. The meeting was attended by the heads of the diplomatic missions of Azerbaijan (M. Y. Jafarov), England (Major Sanders), France (Captain Hasfeld), USA (Dr. Mein), Switzerland (Berlemon), Spain and the Netherlands (Pereslianta), Poland (Ostrowski), Greece (Manuilidis), Ukraine (Kulinski), Lithuania (Dailida), Czechoslovakia (Svatosh), Iran (Mazaratdovle) and the Mountain Republic (F. Akhundov and V-G. Jabagiyev), chairman of the Armenian parliament (Sako Saakyan), as well as members of the Armenian delegation participating in a Georgian-Armenian conference (15).

Available sources indicate that M. Jafarov had extensively participated in the events of the Azerbaijani Muslim community in Tiflis and conducted charity campaigns on religious holidays. The Kavkazskoye Slovo



newspaper published a story about one of such events, which took place in September 1918.

"On Tuesday, September 17, the date of Qurban Holiday, the local Muslim clergymen held a solemn worship service at the Tiflis mosque, administered by Alaaddin Afandi, a representative of the Azerbaijani Mufti. The event was joined by the Ottoman Empire's representative in Georgia, General Abdul-Karim Pasha with his retinue, Azerbaijan's diplomatic representative at the government of the Republic of Georgia, M. Y. Jafarov, Turkish Consul in Tiflis Tahsin Bay, representatives of Muslim public organizations and the public at large. A guard of honor comprised of the Georgian Legion volunteers (Adjarians released from captivity on the Caucasus Front during World War I) was lined up in front of the mosque. Mutton was distributed among the

Georgian media clearly expressed the stance of Azerbaijan's diplomatic representative in 1918-1920

needy Muslim families on the holiday date on behalf of the Azerbaijani diplomatic mission," the article said (16).

In another issue, Kavkazskoye Slovo reported that M. Jafarov had authorized Mirza Sharif Mirzayev (1860-1937), a graduate of Gori Seminary, teacher, Orientalist, translator and publicist, to receive documents from the former Caucasus vicariate's chancellery archives concerning Muslim clerics, education, the special department and the former press-related issues committee of Tiflis (17).

The powers and scope of the activity of the Azerbaijani diplomatic representation in Georgia included providing consular services and legal assistance to citizens. A notification of the diplomatic mission published in the Sakartvelo newspaper's February 22, 1919 issue said most of the people arriving in Azerbaijan lacked due permission, which caused confusion at the border. According to the notification, authorization from the Azerbaijani diplomatic mission was compulsory for those traveling from Georgia to Azerbaijan, along with permission from the Georgian authorities (18). *

to be concluded

Note 1. Mehmet Vahit Pasha was Commander of the Ottoman Eastern Army group. Initial establishment of the Islamic Army of the Caucasus, which was an administrative division of the Eastern Army group, was supervised by Vahit Pasha.

Note 2. Boyuk Bay Akhundov hailed from the Ashagi Saral village of the Borchali province. Akhundov stood in the elections to the Constituent Assembly of Georgia (Parliament) in February 1919 as a nominee of the Borchali Province Muslims Group (see Fakhri Valehoghlu-Hajilar. The first-ever Turkish Muslim member of the Georgian parliament. Garachoplu Huseyngulu Mammadov. "Birlilik" ("Unity") magazine, Baku, 2018, No. 30, p. 50-53).

Note 3. See the text of A. Jamalyan's diplomatic note. Kavkazskoye Slovo newspaper, 1918, October 18, No. 223.

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тъ.
Полесущность для Грузии и Азербайджана. Въ вѣ юсташії Грузинской республики образовано совѣщаніе съ участіемъ дипломатического представителя Азербайджана М. Ю. Джадарова по вопросу о подсудности и разграничніи судебныхъ дѣлъ, возникшихъ на территории Грузии и Азербайджана, и находящихся въ производствѣ въ судебныхъ установленияхъ названныхъ республикъ.

— Уполномоченные въ банкахъ. По доказу м-ра финансъ о порядкѣ назначения въ кутаисскій

- 248-249, 269-271, 534, 542; Gürcüstan Mərkəzi Tarix Arxiv, fond 1864, siyahı 2, iş № 33.
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взятія Баку
19 октября
1918 года.

Отвѣтъ Е. Ю. Джадарову на ноту А. Джамалына.

Дипломатическій представитель Азербайджана при правительстве Грузинской республики М. Ю. Джадаровъ обратился къ поѣренному въ дѣлѣ Армении А. Джамалыну со слѣдующимъ письмомъ:

„По поводу ноты Вашей отъ 16-го октября за № 1249 имѣю честь сообщить Вамъ слѣдующее:

За все время своей дѣятельности мое правительство прилагало и прилагаетъ большія усилия для достижения полнаго примиренія между двумя націями, живущихъ вѣками рядомъ другъ съ другомъ. Въ первую очередь оно старалось въ этомъ отношеніи успокоить возбужденіе, возникшее среди мусульманскаго населения Азербайджана въ засѣйтіи марта этого года, когда армиями была произведена, подъ видомъ большевиковъ, рѣзня мусульманъ въ Баку и Шемахѣ и когда число жертвъ по официально провѣреннымъ свѣданіямъ, превышало 10 тысячъ человѣкъ или когда весной этого же года проицедены были организованными воинскими армянскими частями разгромы свыше 200 селеній Эриванской губерніи и другие факты подобнаго рода.

При взятіи гор. Баку съ болѣе чѣмъ двумя сотнями тысячами населеніемъ за време поѣза отхода защитниковъ его и установления новой власти, если и бы

Georgian media clearly expressed the stance of Azerbaijan's diplomatic representative in 1918-1920

16. «Кавказское слово» qəz., 1918, 19 sentyabr, № 199.
17. «Кавказское слово» qəzeti, 1918, 5 noyabr, № 238.
18. "Sakartvelo" qəz., 1919, 22 fevral, № 41, s. 2.

Ilgar NIFTALIYEV
PhD in History

DERIVED FROM THE HISTORY OF AZERBAIJANI DIPLOMATIC MISSION IN ARMENIA (1918-1920)

Muhammad Khan Tekinski

Although Azerbaijan and Armenia were actually in a state of war in 1918-1920 due to a territorial conflict, diplomatic missions were active in both republics. "Azerbaijan" newspaper reported on October 22, 1918 that Teymur Khan Makinsky, an associate of the minister of justice (1, p. 89), was appointed the first (and furthermore the last) authorized representative of the Azerbaijan Republic in Armenia. One of the descendants of the Maku Khans, who lived in Irevan, he was an immediate relative of the bearers of the Irevan Khans' family name. T. Makinsky graduated from the Irevan Gymnasium and in 1916 he completed his studies at the University of Warsaw, majoring in Law. Following the convocation of the Azerbaijani parliament in early December 1918, Makinsky became an MP, representing the Azerbaijani community of the Irevan governorate. The Parliament's records and documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic still include the speeches and letters of T. Makinsky describing the tragic situation faced by the Azerbaijani population in Armenia. In the wake of Makinsky's election as a member of the Azerbaijani parliament, Muhammad Khan Tekinsky, an attorney-at-law of Turkmen descent, was appointed the new diplomatic representative to Armenia (1, p.147), in accordance with a decision passed by Azerbaijan's government on January 31, 1919. M. Tekinsky, who lost his parents at an early age, was adopted by Ehsan Nakhichevansky, a Russian army colonel. In 1908, Tekinsky graduated from the department of law of the Novorossiysk Imperial University. He worked for judicial bodies in the cities of the South Caucasus, including Baku. In September 1918, Tekinsky, serving in the capacity of attorney-at-law, was chosen to sit on the Extraordinary Investigating Commission, which was established by the government of the Azerbaijan Republic to scrutinize the facts of violence, pogroms and pillaging perpetrated against the Muslim residents and their property throughout the South Caucasus region from the outbreak of World War I. Tekinsky received a special



message on June 10, 1919 from the Foreign Ministry of the Azerbaijan Republic while serving as the Azerbaijani authorized representative in Armenia. The message instructed him to "collect statistical data -- without disclosure and with the aid of representatives of the looted Muslim-populated villages of the Irevan governorate and, if possible, in the Kars province -- regarding the loss incurred by the Muslims in terms of both human casualties and property, while citing the first and family names and the place of residence of the affected persons, those killed and wounded, their age, the captives, the men and women who were released or were still in


ID card issued by Azerbaijan's diplomatic representative in Batum to someone named Dzhamalyants allowing him to transport transit goods to Baku. 8 May 1919

captivity, as well as the destroyed villages and gardens, stolen cattle, etc." (1, p. 263).

During his tenure as the diplomatic representative Tekinsky opposed forging economic ties with Armenia and supplying it with oil until the Azerbaijani refugees returned completely to their homes. Tekinsky consistently pursued a policy aimed at arming the Muslim population of the Azerbaijani territories (Nakhchivan, Sharur-Daralagez and Ordubad provinces, Vadibasar, Zangibasar, etc.), which had been transferred to the Armenian control by the decision of the British command for its military resistance. In the long run, Armenia lost control over these territories, which was considerably facilitated by Tekinsky's diplomatic efforts. This fact, which is referenced in relevant documents, is also admitted by contemporary Armenian historians. They believe that the Armenian government, which was aware of the extensive efforts made in this regard by the Azerbaijani diplomatic representative (the Armenians were decoding the cables of M. Tekinsky), had made a gross error by failing to expel him from the country in due time (5.p.291-292).


Following M. Tekinsky's appointment as ADR's Deputy Foreign Minister, in January 1920, Abdurrahimbay Akhverdiyev, an outstanding public figure and publicist, was appointed Azerbaijan's new authorized representative in Armenia. Prior to this appointment, he served as ADR's diplomatic representative in the Mountain Republic. Akhverdiyev held this post until mid-March 1920.

Teymur Khan Makinsky, who was re-appointed as the diplomatic representative of the Azerbaijan Republic in Armenia on March 16, 1920, was the last person to serve in this capacity. Following the shutdown of the diplomatic mission in May 1920 due to the Sovietization of Azerbaijan, T. Makinsky, who was in Tiflis at the time, prepared a comprehensive report on its activity and the reasons for its closure. The report Makinsky sent was addressed to People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Azerbaijan SSR, M.D. Huseynov. Referring to the challenges that the diplomatic mission had faced during its activity, Makinsky noted that his efforts focused not so much on defending the interests of Azerbaijani citizens, who did not reside in Armenia, but rather concerned limitations on the individual and property-related security of



the Muslim nationals of Azerbaijan. Therefore, the diplomatic representative and other members of the mission faced a very complicated situation. The Armenian authorities were completely neglecting the principles of extraterritoriality. Physical assault and arrests of the mission staff were widespread. The protest voiced in this regard to the Armenian foreign minister remained unanswered. Makinsky wrote that following the establishment of the Soviet rule in the Azerbaijan Republic, the Armenian government's attitude toward the mission and him personally changed abruptly. The likelihood of an imminent arrest prompted Makinsky to leave Irevan. Shortly after Makinsky's departure, on May 15, 1920, the diplomatic mission received a cable from Armenian Foreign Minister A. Oganjanyan notifying it that the Azerbaijani representation in Armenia had been abolished due to the establishment of a new government in Azerbaijan (4, l. 25-26). Since no instructions were further issued by the Soviet authorities, the diplomatic mission severed its ties with the Armenian government.


The shutdown of the diplomatic mission in Armenia deprived the new Azerbaijani government of a chance to directly communicate with the Dashnak authorities. From then onward, Azerbaijan communicated with Armenia strictly through the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of Soviet Russia and the branch of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party of Bolsheviks in the Caucasus, represented by the RCP's Caucasus Bureau (b). The People's Commissar for Foreign



Minutes of the Azerbaijani-Armenian conference. 21 November 1919

Affairs of the Azerbaijan SSR became a merely formal position and served as a smokescreen for non-existent independence. Nevertheless, Armenia's diplomatic representation headed by Martiros Harutyunyan remained active in Baku until the Sovietization of Armenia in late November 1920. Harutyunyan, who had an economic education, was a member of the Armenian parliament from the Dashnaksutyun party. He was appointed Armenia's diplomatic representative in Azerbaijan in February 1920, succeeding Tigran Bekzadyan.

In July 1920, Soviet Russia appointed Boris Legran its diplomatic representative in Armenia. Legran was also expected to represent the Azerbaijan SSR, holding talks with the Armenian government unbeknownst to it regarding the fate of Azerbaijani land. Legran's status was later legally confirmed by an agreement on a military



*Letter testifying to the fact that
Mammad Rza Vakilov's candidacy was also
considered for the position of the Azerbaijani
diplomatic representative in Armenia*

and economic alliance between Soviet Russia and the Azerbaijan SSR, which was concluded on September 30, 1920. Although the agreement did not include a special clause on incorporating the commissariats for foreign affairs, Azerbaijan, in fact, was deprived of a chance to pursue an independent foreign policy. The post of People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs became sheerly formal, while the republic's diplomatic missions in other countries were just emulation of seeming independence. From then onward, Soviet Azerbaijan conducted negotiations with the outside world, including Armenia, under the direct supervision and with obligatory participation of a representative from Soviet Russia. Moreover, Azerbaijan was represented during the talks with Armenia by such Armenian communists as A. Mikoyan and I. Dovlatov. This justly drew ire from the leadership of the ACP Central Committee (b). Thus, chairman of the Council of People's Economy of the Azerbaijan SSR, N. Solovyov, in a memo titled "Our policy in Azerbaijan two months (May-June) after the coup", sent to V. Lenin in 1920, wrote, "It seemed like mockery that Armenians

Boris Legran, Soviet Russia's diplomatic representative in Armenia

are taking part in the talks with Armenia as part of the delegation from Azerbaijan, while only Armenians are involved in those from the Armenian side, without the participation of Muslims" (7, I. 38).

On July 2, 1920, an Armenian-Azerbaijani agreement was signed to convene a conference in the city of Gazakh soon to seek peaceful solution of all disputed issues between the parties. This issue is covered in detail in N. Narimanov's "Azerbaijan and Armenia" report, delivered at a session of the Political Bureau (Politburo) of the ACP Central Committee (b) on August 24, 1920. In the report, Narimanov noted that in accordance with the agreement reached with Armenia's diplomatic representative, a decision was passed in the Azerbaijan SSR to schedule a conference in Gazakh for August 20, 1920 (3, I. 140-145). Furthermore, a cable sent on August 10, 1920 to Irevan indicated the composition of the delegation representing the Azerbaijan SSR (Dovlatov as chairman, Mikoyan and Lominadze as its members) and also mentioned delegating the authorized representative, I. Dovlatov, to Armenia (6, p. 321). It is beyond doubt that such a composition precluded protection of the Azerbaijani delegation's interests during the negotiations.

Upon return to Baku, I. Dovlatov delivered a report "On the situation in Armenia" at a session of the Politburo of the ACP Central Committee (b) on August 27, 1920. Dovlatov said he had several meetings with Foreign Minister A. Oganjanyan, who actually sought to comprehensively justify the policy pursued in Armenia and signed a response cable in Dovlatov's presence declining the suggestion to call a conference. Thus, Dovlatov's mission to Armenia was a failure. The following ruling was issued at the mentioned session upon the results of Dovlatov's report: A. not to send a mission to Armenia; B. to allow henceforth the representation of an Armenian mission in Baku with oversight of its activity (2, I. 5).

A joint session of the Politburo of the ACP Central Committee (b) and the Caucasus Bureau of the RCP Central Committee (b), which took place on November 4, 1920 and heard a report of the authorized representative of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) in Armenia, B. Legran, concerning the situation in Armenia, pulled the plug on the issue of delegating a representative there. A decision was also made at the session not to send Dovlatov to Armenia (2, I. 20). Following the Sovietization of Armenia in late



November 1920, the issue of establishing a diplomatic mission of the Azerbaijan SSR in Armenia lost its relevance, given that uniform political regimes controlled by Moscow were in power in both republics. ●

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Sevinj ALIYEVA
Doctor of History

DIPLOMATIC COOPERATION BETWEEN THE AZERBAIJAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC AND NORTH CAUCASUS

In an effort to boost relations with other states and protect its interests, the Azerbaijani government (1918-1920) delegated its diplomats to the North Caucasus. Diplomatic missions were being established upon mutual consent between relevant countries. Amid challenging military and political conditions, diplomatic representatives of the Azerbaijan Republic and the subjects of the North Caucasus served as a mouthpiece of the state interests of their countries.

Jafar Bay Rustambayov was delegated to the Kuban People's Republic, while Abdurahman Akhverdov was assigned to serve in the Mountain Republic, in order to maintain diplomatic ties; Pasha Bay Sultanov was appointed the consular agent in Rostov-on-Don (1). Diplomatic representatives of the North Caucasus cooperated with Azerbaijan.

Jafar Bay Rustambayov was born in the Kutkashen settlement (presently the city of Gabala) in 1884. He graduated from the University of Kharkiv with a degree in medicine. In 1905-1910, he was a member of the Socialist Revolutionary (SR) Party. He practiced medicine in the Crimea. He shared the ideas of the local Muslim population regarding the independence of Crimea. Following the takeover of Crimea by the Volunteer Army of General A.I. Denikin in the early 1919, Rustambayov returned to Baku. The government of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic offered Rustambayov the post of the republic's diplomatic representative in Kuban. As is

known, the Legislative Rada (Council) was founded in Kuban on September 2, 1918. The democratically established Provincial Government was its executive body (2).

Following his appointment to this post in mid-February, Rustambayov left for Yekaterinograd (presently Krasnodar). The Rada of Kuban issued accreditation in Yekaterinograd for the representative of Azerbaijan, along with those of Astrakhan, Minsk, Kiev, the Great Don Army, Georgia, Armenia and Persia.

Meanwhile, the Denikin offensive unfolded in the North Caucasus. The Denikin stand-off with the Kuban Cossacks aggravated after the June 13, 1919 speech made by the head of the Kuban Provincial Rada Nikolay Ryabovol, who criticized the Denikin regime. That same night, he was shot dead in the lobby of the Palas Hotel by an employee of Denikin Special Council. Following the death of N.S. Ryabovol, his deputy, Sultan Shahin Girey, a descendant of the Crimean khans from the Kurgokov mountainous village of the Batalpashy department, became the chairman of the Kuban Rada. During the Rada debacle Denikin arrested him along with another mountainous area member of the Rada, Murat Gotagogu, and ordered him to leave the country. Thus, the Denikin regime was established. During this time J. Rustambayov was defending the interests of ADR citizens who were not willing to be subjected to the Denikin call to active duty. He was issuing relevant documents upon request. J. Rustambayov also strongly

Abdurahman Bay Akhverdov

advocated for Denikin's refraining from sending Kuban Cossacks to counter Dagestanis. Furthermore, the command of the Volunteer Army accused Azerbaijan of providing military aid to the nations of Dagestan, which led to the souring of relations between the two sides. Major de Nonancourt, chief of the French military mission in the Caucasus, suggested that the Azerbaijani government "agree to the control of the allies at any time in order to prove its peaceful intentions, which would be aimed at verifying that no military assistance is further provided to the highlanders of the North Caucasus and Dagestan either directly or indirectly" (3). Foreign Minister M. Y. Jafarov noted that Azerbaijan adheres to a policy of non-interference when it comes to the clashes between the North Caucasus nations and the armed forces of southern Russia. In response to the Britons' statement that General Denikin "knows for a fact from available documents about Azerbaijan's involvement in the Dagestan uprising", J. Rustambayov said "the government could not be held responsible for the actions of individual Azerbaijani citizens and my government could not have and did not take an active part in it". (4) The diplomatic representative of the Azerbaijan Republic to the Kuban Government reported that the Volunteer Army was carrying out blockade of Azerbaijan and Georgia, providing Armenia with bread and shells through Novorossiysk and Batum. According to Volunteer Army officials, Armenia served as their forefront area "in the struggle against Azerbaijan, which would be taken over by the Volunteer Army sooner or later" (5).

Gen. Holmen, who succeeded Gen. Briggs as chief of the British mission at the Denikin headquarters, arranged a meeting between Azerbaijan's diplomatic representative in the Kuban government, J. Rustambayov (6) and Gen. A.S. Lukomsky, since A.I. Denikin was not in Taganrog at the time. However, he also refused to negotiate neutralization of Dagestan, while stressing that the Volunteer Army had no intent of encroaching upon Azerbaijan's integrity (7). Thus, the negotiations of any kind that were being conducted by Rustambayov did not result in the conclusion of an agreement on neutralizing Dagestan.

In November 1919, White Guard officers attempted to arrest Rustambayov, but he managed to escape and return to Baku through Novorossiysk. In February 1920, Rustambayov was appointed ADR's Deputy Minister of Commerce, Industry and Food. He served in this capacity until the Bolsheviks came to power. Prior to his arrest,



he was engaged in private medical practice in Baku and Azerbaijani provinces.

Abdurahman Bay Akhverdov was delegated to Temir-Khan-Shura, the capital of the Mountain Republic, in accordance with an order of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Azerbaijan Republic, to serve as the head of Azerbaijan's diplomatic mission there from February 11, 1919. The appointment was announced while he was in Tiflis. Acting chairman of the Mountain Republic's Council of Ministers, Duke Tarkovsky, approved Akhverdov's appointment. Akhverdov reported to the Azerbaijani foreign minister that he arrived in Temir-Khan-Shura on March 28; he was hosted by the head of the Mountain Republic's government on March 30 and handed over his credentials to him. On March 31, Akhverdov met with all ministers and later that day he attended a meeting of the Union Council where a round of applause was given in honor of Azerbaijan and its Government.

"Notification of the acting Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Mountain Republic, Duke Tarkovsky, to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Azerbaijan Republic F. K. Khoyski



Mahammadyusif Jafarov

(11) On April 6, 1919, the Azerbaijani government ruled on rendering military aid to the North Caucasus nations. The ruling noted that Azerbaijan could not send permanent military units to the Mountain Republic, but deemed it appropriate to "informally send volunteer detachments" there. All issues relating to the recruitment and dispatch of interested persons were vested in the political parties represented in the Azerbaijani parliament. In addition, special healthcare groups were to be sent to the Mountain Republic to provide medical aid, and 142,500 rubles were allocated for the purpose. Moreover, the Azerbaijani government allocated intermittent interest-free loans worth 1 million to 10 million rubles to the Mountain Republic. It also facilitated and oversaw the Mountain Republic government's participation in the issue of bonds of the Transcaucasian Commissariat in the amount of 80 million rubles. Azerbaijan concluded three agreements with Georgia to that end (Afterwards, Georgia and Armenia issued bonds without consent of the Azerbaijani Government, while the question concerning the Mountain Republic's involvement in this matter remained unresolved) (12).

A. Akhverdov asked the Government of Azerbaijan to send in Azerbaijani officers to aid the Chechens, saying that "this could have a moral impact on the combatants". Akhverdov reported that there were more Chechen militiamen than Denikin supporters, but they were not organized and disciplined. Akhverdov asked to send a small detachment that would at least reach Khasavyurt. Ingush representatives also met with Akhverdov. (13)

According to Akhverdov, as of April 15, 1919 "the issue of Dagestan's accession to Azerbaijan was being discussed very seriously". Upon the request of many public figures, he asked the Azerbaijani side to provide consent to that effect in principle.

"The groundwork is ready as four out of the ten provinces have long been in favor of accession, while the rest are covertly dreaming of the same thing. Only locals are making an effort in this regard. Gen. Khalilov, a former companion of the minister of war, is due to arrive in Baku in the coming days to table this issue. I kindly request that this matter be expedited. If Rowlenson's informal statement does not hold water and the Volunteer Army moves further southward, Dagestan will not be able to count on reliable protection; in that case let me talk to the Government about sending one Azerbaijani regiment to Shura, given that Azerbaijan's fate also

regarding the consent granted for the appointment of A. Akhverdov as the diplomatic representative of Azerbaijan in the Mountain Republic.

Not earlier than February 11, 1919.

The government signifies its agreement to the appointment of Abdurahman Bay Akhverdov as the diplomatic representative of Azerbaijan.

Acting as Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Duke Tarkovsky. (8).

Akhverdov concluded that the idea of joining Azerbaijan was being discussed in the influential circles of the Mountain Republic's government. In particular, this suggestion was made by Gen. Mikail Khalilov, a companion of the Minister of War (9). On May 30, 1919, Akhverdov offered to rename the diplomatic mission he was heading the "Diplomatic Representation of the Azerbaijan Republic in the North Caucasus." (10)

On April 4, Akhverdov held a meeting of Azerbaijani citizens residing in Temir-Khan-Shura, suggesting that they conduct a census and elect a merchant leader. In an effort to assist the needy Azerbaijani families, Akhverdov asked his government to send 10,000 rubles. He also requested 20,000 rubles "to set up a network of agents to work on the ground; ideological hunters are available..."

depends on the reliable protection of Dagestan. The troops will enjoy a cordial welcome and further developments will take their due course." (14)

According to Akhverdov, the Chechens "were also inclined to join Azerbaijan." It was particularly noted that the head of the North Caucasus Emirate (the territory of a part of Chechnya, which was part of Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kabarda and Ossetia from the fall of 1919), Uzun Haji, spoke in favor of joining Azerbaijan (15). The point is that in this period the Volunteer Army was waging battles in the territory of the Terek province, in particular, in Ingushetia and Chechnya. As is known, Denikin had set out a goal to abolish all the newly established sovereign states and restore "a united and indivisible Russia."

Akhverdov's report indicates that the idea of Dagestan's accession to Azerbaijan came to the forefront after the visit of the Azerbaijani mission amidst the community of local influential persons and among some members of the Union Council, especially representatives of those provinces that were in close vicinity of Azerbaijan, including Kyuri, Samur, Kaytago-Tabasaran, Avar and the city of Derbent. Local lawmakers told A. Akhverdov that "since they had been linked to Azerbaijan economically from time immemorial, our political merger would be desirable as well." Akhverdov did not give them a straightforward answer, but assured them that "if the entire nation wants this, I assume that Azerbaijan would not refuse to accept them." (16)

According to Akhverdov, a considerable part of Dagestan's provinces supported acceding to Azerbaijan. Moreover, volunteers were arriving and financial assistance was being delivered from Azerbaijan. Azerbaijani representatives stepped up their activities in Dagestan. They established contacts with a popular organization called the League of Unity, Independence and Progress of the Highlanders of the Caucasus, set up by young local intellectuals (17).

Although the diplomatic mission of Azerbaijan based in Temir-Khan-Shura was officially disbanded on October 1, 1919, an Azerbaijani consular agent issuing passes for those seeking to travel from the North Caucasus to Baku was still active in Petrovsk (18). Following the Sovietization of Dagestan, sporadic resistance to the imposition of Soviet rule and the struggle for independence continued in some areas. On April 1, 1920, an Azerbaijani diplomatic mission headed by A. Akhverdov was launched under the North Caucasus Defense Council.

Pasha Bay Sultanov. Scarce information is available about Pasha Bay Sultanov. Along with Pshemakho Kotsev, the future Prime Minister of the Mountain Republic, Sultanov was a member of the Kuban Provincial Executive Committee, a body of the Provisional Government in Kuban instituted by its commissioner K. Bardizh (19). According to the minutes of a meeting of the Council of the Kuban regional government held on January 13, 1918, government official Pasha Bay Sultanov reported on two officers from the Don region who were recruiting volunteers from among the highlanders (20).

Alikhan Kantemir. Alikhan Gadoyevich Kantemir was born on May 9, 1889 in the Karagach village of the Terek province. He graduated from the Vladikavkaz Lyceum. He also graduated from the St. Petersburg University majoring in Law and Kiev University. An attorney-at-law. He was a Socialist Revolutionary. In 1918, he was a comrade-in-arms of the Interior Minister of the Transcaucasian Commissariat. He closely collaborated with the first national government of the Azerbaijan Republic. He was a member of government of the Mountain Republic as an associate of the foreign minister (21). Kantemir served as a diplomatic representative of the Union of Mountainous Nations of the Caucasus in the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic.

On January 5, 1919, Kantemir asked Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan Republic Fatali Khan Khoyski to provide a short-term loan worth 10 million rubles. Kantemir and Azerbaijani Minister for Food K. Lizgar signed an inter-governmental agreement between the Republic of the Union of Mountain Nations of the Caucasus and the Azerbaijan Republic on the supply of grain crops from January 9, 1919 (22).

On February 26, 1919, Kantemir officially appealed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Azerbaijan Republic over the actions of the Volunteer Army in the territory of the Mountain Republic. Kantemir sought "support from the Transcaucasian republics, in particular, fraternal Azerbaijan." It was not long before the Azerbaijan Republic responded to the appeal. On March 6, 1919, the Azerbaijani foreign minister sent a note to the military governor of Baku, Gen. W.M. Thomson, saying, "the Azerbaijani government certainly cannot be a silent witness to the unequal struggle of the kindred mountainous nations in the cause of defending their physical existence and their sacred rights to independent existence against the impending reactionary forces. Therefore, the Azerbaijani government, of course, will deem itself obliged to come to the aid of the mountainous

peoples by all the means at its disposal in this difficult time of their state and political life..." (23)

In his appeal to the Azerbaijani foreign minister dated February 26, 1919, Kantemir reported that the Volunteer Army was conducting warfare against civilian population, in defiance of the will of the nations of the North Caucasus, the Parliament and Government of the Mountain Republic, and had reached Grozny. The command of the Volunteer Army demanded that the Government of the Mountain Republic resign and intended to divide the Union into national districts. However, according to Kantemir, the Mountain Republic's parliament "dismissed all the demands put forward by the Volunteer Army and suggested that the Government defend independence by all means with the support of fraternal Azerbaijan, with whose people highlanders are linked by blood and the traditions of unshakable friendship." (24)

On April 26, Kantemir sent a note to the governments of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia and the allied command on the instruction of the head of the Mountain Republic's government P. Kotsev, protesting the Volunteer Army's actions in Chechnya. It stated that no agreement had been reached between Denikin and representatives of the Mountain Republic and the latter's government decided to "continue military defense operations against the Volunteer Army and would strive to cleanse from it the republic's unlawfully and violently occupied areas." In a letter, the commander of the British troops in Petrovsk assured Kotsev that Denikin would not press ahead with military action as he had reached agreement with the Chechens, Ingush, Balkarian and Ossetian people on restoring peace and was awaiting a decision of the Peace Conference concerning the independence and borders of the states formed on the ruins of the Russian Empire. In exchange, the government of the Mountain Republic was to allow the Volunteer Army to enter Petrovsk in order to fight the Bolsheviks and to tackle their elimination in the cities and villages in the republic's territory. (25).

On May 14, 1919, A. Kantemir and A. Butayev represented the Mountain Republic at a regular session of the Transcaucasian Conference focusing on the territorial commission-related issues. During the meeting held on May 19, Kantemir voiced the focal point of the Mountain Republic delegation's stance:

1. Resolution of territorial disputes among the republics of the Caucasus should be based on the principle of self-determination of nations through the expression of free will of the population of the disputed areas.

2. A dispute could be raised only over adjacent areas.

3. In case voting of the population in the disputed districts fails to ensure an absolute or established majority of votes, the dispute must be resolved on the basis of the principles of domestic and economic inclination of the disputed district to any particular state.

Kantemir supported solution of territorial disputes in keeping with the self-determination principle or in the worst-case scenario on the basis of economic indicators. All these issues were put on the back burner in the wake of the ensuing military-political developments (26).

In May 1919, Dagestan was occupied by the Volunteer Army. The activity of the Government and Parliament of the Mountain Republic was suspended.

Chief of Staff of the Dagestan Defense Council, Osman Osmanov, queried at a meeting of the Council, held on October 4, 1919 in the Levashi village and chaired by A. Kantemir, "What kind of real assistance can we expect from the outside?" Kantemir replied, "We understand perfectly well that Dagestan is unable to wage a long war on its own without outside help. But the tragic nature of our situation dwells upon the fact that one way or another we have to defend ourselves against the dark reactionary forces. The Allied Majlis (Council) in Transcaucasia has taken the known steps to obtain outside help and continues working in this regard. We think that our closest natural neighbors, Azerbaijan and Georgia, will not leave us alone in this difficult moment of mortal danger. But at the same time, we must leave no stone unturned and organize our forces for frontline combat. We need to set aside all internal disputes and personal discords, if they exist indeed, and reinforce our borders after forcing out the enemy. We cannot rely on outside assistance unless we show vitality and capacity for state-building." (27)

A specific decision was passed at a meeting of the Defense Council on October 15 in the Buglen village in Nizhny (Lower) Jengutai to start talks with Azerbaijan and Georgia (28).

Although representatives of the Mountain Republic did not attend the fifth meeting of the Caucasus Conference held on May 29, 1919, A. Kantemir participated and addressed the event as a representative of the Mountain Republic in Azerbaijan. (29)

On November 25, 1919, Kantemir handed over to the foreign minister of the Azerbaijan Republic a letter to the Azerbaijani government from the chairman of the North Caucasus Defense Council, Sheikh-ul-Islam Ali-Haji Akushinsky. Since no reply was given to the let-

**Leaders of the Mountain Republic.
Tapa Chermoyev is seated in the center**



ter, a similar appeal was made to the Azerbaijani foreign minister on December 4 (30).

In 1921, Kantemir emigrated first to Turkey and then to Germany (31). On June 15, 1926, the Caucasus Independence Committee (CIC) was established in Istanbul. The committee was comprised of members of the Committee of Caucasus Confederals, Social Democrats and Musavat supporters, including M.E. Rasulzade, M. Vakilov (Azerbaijan), Sayid Shamil and Alikhan Kantemir (from the North Caucasus), N. Ramishvili and N. Magalashvili (Georgia) (32).

In the 1930s, Kantemir headed the North Caucasus People's Party and acted as the editor-in-chief of the "North Caucasus" magazine, which was published in Paris in 1934-1939. In 1954, he took charge of the Elmejeli magazine in Munich, which was published by the Institute for the Study of the Soviet Union in Russian, English and Turkish. In 1961, he established the Caucasus Committee in Munich. He died in Munich on April 16, 1963.

Bagadur Bay Malachikhan. Bagadur Gamzat Bay Malachikhan was born in 1882 in the Ashulta village of the Untsukul district of the Dagestan province. He served as the Zagatala governor from January 1920 until the Soviet period.

It is worth mentioning that on June 26, 1918, the Muslim National Council of the Zagatala province expressed the population's willingness to remain as part of Azerbaijan and passed a decision on accession to the Azerbaijan Republic (33).

Prior to his appointment as the Zagatala governor, he held the position of the authorized representative of the government of the Republic of the Union of the Mountainous Nations of the Caucasus. He signed a number of important documents while in this capacity. According to the report made to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Azerbaijan Republic by the interim diplomatic representative of the Republic of the Caucasus Highlanders Union at the Government of the Azerbaijan Republic B. Malachikhan, the Republican armed forces repelled an attack and a group of Bolsheviks was arrested, in accordance with the orders issued by the Temir-Khan-Shura commander and with the approval of the head of government P. Kotsev and Minister of War of the Republic of the Union of Caucasus Highlanders Jamalutdin Musayev. The detainees were accused of an attempt to overthrow the Mountain Republic and annex Dagestan to Soviet Russia (34).

On November 28, 1918, authorized representatives

of the Azerbaijan Republic, Minister of Commerce and Industry Behbud Khan Javanshir and Minister of Finance Mammad Hasan Hajinsky, and the Mountain Republic's Bagadur Bay Malachikhan and Ibrahim Bay Heydarov signed a new treaty in Baku. According to the agreement, the Mountain Republic's government was to receive a loan in the amount of 10 million rubles from the Azerbaijan Republic for a two-year term, effective November 1, 1918. 3 million rubles were allocated to the Mountain Republic in November, while the remaining 7 million rubles were to be disbursed in December of the same year. If the government of the Mountain Republic concluded an agreement with Georgia on joint issuance of banknotes, the loan provided by the Azerbaijan Republic was to be repaid within six months from the date of the first release of these banknotes. If the Mountain Republic asserted its authority in agricultural areas, it was to repay the debt with grain crops. The Azerbaijani government gained the right to buy bread at a market price through its representatives throughout the territory of the Mountain Republic (35).

According to B. Malachikhan, the Volunteer Army's incursion into the Mountain Republic cost the local population "significant loss in terms of human casualties and a lot of destroyed and burnt-down villages." The Volunteer Army's actions in the Dagestan province took a toll on the situation in Chechnya where riots flared up again. The Chechen and Ingush uprisings also swept through Gudermes, and two special squads were sent in from Petrovsk to quell them (36).

Malachikhan returned to Dagestan in the Soviet period. In August 1920, he was detained in Kumukh and sent to Temir-Khan-Shura. Though he was released soon thereafter, he was taken into custody on several occasions again. In July 1941, he was executed by shooting.

Alibay Takho-Godi. Alibay Takho-Godi was born on August 15, 1892 in the mountainous village of Urakhi of the Dagestan province. He graduated from the Vladikavkaz Russian Gymnasium and then Moscow State University with a major in Law. In April 1917, he returned to Dagestan and joined the socialist group. As the alignment of forces changed in Dagestan with the departure of the White Guards and the strengthening influence of the Bolsheviks, the composition of the Defense Council of Dagestan and the North Caucasus was altered as well. The documents of the Defense Council evidently indicate that A. Takho-Godi took over the correspondence with the government of the Azerbaijan Republic from Alikhan Kantemir and became the diplomatic represen-

tative of the Defense Council of the North Caucasus to the Azerbaijani Government.

The point is that the Volunteer Army occupied Dagestan and took over Derbent, despite the Britons' promises. A special state defense committee was established in Baku. On May 9, 1919, the ADR's Ministry of Foreign Affairs instituted its own agency in Petrovsk that was tasked with informing the Azerbaijani government about the ongoing developments.

Both the manner of appeals and the demands being put forward changed. On February 22, 1920, A.Takho-Godi asked the head of government of the Azerbaijan Republic to allocate assistance to the highlanders that would be sent to the provisional government, i.e. the Defense Council of the North Caucasus Republic (37). In addition, he appealed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Azerbaijan Republic, demanding that the Volunteer Army detachment evacuated from the city of Krasnovodsk to Baku be interned. According to Takho-Godi, the detachment was to be dispatched to Petrovsk (38). Heydar Bammat, the diplomatic representative of the North Caucasus Republic in Georgia and Armenia, told the North Caucasus Defense Council that the latter is deemed in Georgia as a backer of Bolsheviks and as hostile to Georgia (39). Takho-Godi was seeking to establish a customs checkpoint on the border with Azerbaijan and opposed the circulation of Baku bonds under the pretext of what was regarded as embezzlement of Dagestan raw materials by "Azerbaijani and Turkish agents of commercial capital." (40) The document does not indicate what raw materials were referenced. In fact, it was Azerbaijan that was providing comprehensive humanitarian aid to the fraternal nations of Dagestan, while Takho-Godi's hostile attitude was due to his certain views regarding the democratic Azerbaijani government.

ADR Foreign Minister F. Khoyski said in a letter addressed to the diplomatic representative of the North Caucasus Defense Council in Azerbaijan dated March 16, 1920 that "the Azerbaijani Government, which has always adhered to the point of view of recognizing the independence of the Mountain Republic, has been trying by all means available to render support to the mountainous nations in their heroic struggle for freedom and independence."

"Despite a number of ordeals that befell the mountainous peoples, the Government remains committed to this stance and is ready to further do its utmost to facilitate meeting the just demands of these nations and provide them with all possible assistance," the letter said (41).

Rashid Khan Kaplanov

In a bid to establish bilateral relations between Azerbaijan and the North Caucasus, a delegation comprising MPs A.D.Pepinov and R.Vakilov, the head of the government's administration, Parviz Mirza, and others, left Baku for Grozny on April 19. They greeted the Congress of the Nations of the Mountain Republic and held talks with political leaders of the North Caucasus. Ahmad Bay Pepinov was mandated by the Central Committee of the Azerbaijan Social Democratic Party and the parliamentary faction of Socialists, while Rahim Vakilov had been granted a mandate by the Presidium of the ADR Parliament. The delegation also included Ivan Yelansky, a former yesaul (a Cossack military post) who served as the second secretary of the diplomatic mission of the North Caucasus Republic in Azerbaijan, and his wife, Kristina Petrovna Yelanskaya, a relative of A. Takho-Godi. All of them had permits issued by the diplomatic representative of Dagestan Defense Council Andreyev (42). A. Takho-Godi, the diplomatic representative of the Defense Council of the North Caucasus Republic to the Azerbaijani Government, reported to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Azerbaijan Republic that Dagestan intellectuals were considering several scenarios for further unfolding of developments: 1. establishing a united coalition power of the people in the Mountainous territory; 2. upholding the idea of independence of the Mountain Republic through negotiations with the Bolshevik authorities (43).

From 1921, A. Takho-Godi was a member of the government of the Dagestan (Autonomous) Soviet Socialist Republic, holding high-ranking positions, including those of People's Commissar of Labor and People's Commissar of Justice; from 1925 he served as the People's Commissar of Education, simultaneously acting as Deputy Chairman of the DSSR Council of People's Commissars. He was a member of the USSR Central Executive Committee (CEC) and sat on the presidium of the Dagestan CEC, and also participated at the second nationwide Soviet congress, as well as the eighth and eleventh All-Russian Soviet congresses. In 1937, Takho-Godi was arrested by the USSR People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs, convicted of affiliation with a counter-revolutionary group and subsequently executed by shooting.

Conclusion. All branches of government began to function in the short time of the existence of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic. This time period sheds light



on the history of ADR diplomats' activity in the North Caucasus and vice versa, the track record of diplomacy in Azerbaijani history. Sovietization put an end to the diplomatic ties of the de-facto recognized independent Azerbaijan Democratic Republic.

Scrutinizing the work of diplomats and the ADR's overall diplomatic efforts 100 years later, one arrives at a conclusion that these statesmen, who worked in challenging and sometimes extreme conditions, were doing their job precisely and in a concerted manner. But first and foremost, they worked without errors and flaws for the sake of their nation, without trampling on the interests of their neighbors. These people worked tirelessly and harmoniously because they believed in their cause and the bright future of their people. Azerbaijani diplomats were making the history of the diplomacy of their state as they were aware and confident that this was necessary for the future fate of their homeland. The methods employed in their diplomatic activity are being studied today. This experience will also be relevant and worthy of emulation in several centuries. We are grateful to the honorable diplomats of our Motherland and praise be to them! ♦



North Caucasus leaders, government members of the Mountain Republic. A drawing by Yevgeny Lansere, eyewitness of the developments

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Map of the Mountain Republic

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MILITARY COOPERATION ISSUES IN ARMY BUILDING OF THE AZERBAIJAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

One of the most pressing issues facing the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (ADR), which proclaimed its independence on May 28, 1918, was ensuring the territorial integrity and independence of the country, given that an extremely complicated military and political situation emerged in this time period both in Azerbaijan and in the surrounding area. Therefore, there was a great need for organizing the national army in a short time to ward off the existing military threats. One of the most significant matters in this regard was establishing international cooperation in the defense and military fields.

Since it was impossible to set up a substantial defense force in a short time to counter the rapidly increasing military threat, the delegation that held talks with the Ottoman Empire in Batum on behalf of the ADR in the first days of June 1918 sought military assistance from this country (1). The request was met by the Ottoman government. On June 4, 1918, an agreement was signed in Batum between the Ottoman Empire and the ADR government in order to establish a legal basis for sending troops to Azerbaijan. Clause 4 of that treaty stipulated that the Ottoman state could provide military aid to Azerbaijan if a request was made for ensuring law and order within the country (2). Upon mutual consent, the 5th Caucasus infantry division of the Ottoman army was initially brought in. The Islamic Army of the Caucasus involving Azerbaijani national military forces was established on the basis of the Ottoman armed forces and Lieutenant-General Nuru Pasha was appointed its commander. Taking into account the peculiarities of the exist-

Colonel Abdulhamid Bay Gaitabashi took part in M. A. Rasulzade's negotiations with the Ottoman Sultan in June 1918



ing historical conditions, he was also tasked with overseeing the formation of the Republic's army, according to a decision of the Azerbaijani government (3). This made it

Major-General Ibrahim Agha Usubov headed an Azerbaijani military delegation in Italy in 1919

possible to capitalize more comprehensively on the potential of the incoming Ottoman forces in forming the republic's armed forces and upgrading its supplies.

Undoubtedly, the most significant historic outcome of the military cooperation between Azerbaijan and Ottoman Turkey was the liberation of Baku and other territories of Azerbaijan from the Bolshevik-Dashnak occupation with the involvement of joint military forces. Ottoman Turkey also rendered valuable assistance to Azerbaijan in the training of military officers, providing the logistics of military units and organizing military bodies. As part of these efforts, Colonel Atif Bay, an experienced Turkish officer, was tasked with running the newly opened National Military School in Ganja. The first-ever graduation at this institution was held on October 27, 1918 (4).

A considerable amount of weaponry and ammunition was delivered to Azerbaijan from Turkey to improve the logistics of the republic's military units. Furthermore, the parties planned to continue collaborating in this area (5). In a bid to expedite the organization of the republic's military bodies, this process was to be carried out on the basis of Turkish military units. Using the personnel and property of those military units for setting up military units of the Republic's army was envisaged as well (6). However, the military cooperation with Ottoman Turkey ground to a halt following the withdrawal of Ottoman forces from Azerbaijan in accordance with the terms of the Armistice of Mudros.


Azerbaijan's military cooperation with Georgia in organizing defense forces was also of particular importance for ADR's army building efforts. Forging friendly relations with Georgia, which declared state independence in the same time period and amid similar historical conditions was one of the important directions of ADR's policies. Azerbaijan and Georgia sought to establish close ties, which were in line with the interests of both countries. In an effort to regulate bilateral military ties, Azerbaijan established a military attache's office in Tiflis in spring 1919 and Lieutenant-Colonel Mammad Bay Aliyev was appointed military attache (7). In August that same year, Georgia followed suit and Colonel Navasalov was named its military attache in Azerbaijan (8). As part of the effort to further expand the mutually beneficial military cooperation, Azerbaijan and Georgia inked a relevant deal on June 16, 1919. On behalf of the Azerbaijani government,



the agreement was undersigned by Foreign Minister M. Jafarov, Minister of Defense S. Mehmandarov and Chief of General Staff M. Sulkevich. The three-year agreement, which was signed in Tiflis, centered on mutual assistance in the event of an outside intrusion (9).

The signing of the mutual defense treaty was hailed by Azerbaijani government officials and politicians. This deal was ratified at an extraordinary session of the parliament held on June 27, 1919. Lawmakers and Foreign Minister M. Jafarov highlighted in their speeches the importance of the agreement for the security of Azerbaijan and the entire region, regarding the date of its signing as a historic day for the two republics. According to M. Jafarov, in addition to the agreement's being a stride in preventing the Denikin aggression, which was considered a real threat to the South Caucasus, it was a historic deal in terms of the unity of the South Caucasus nations. Taking into consideration the practical significance of the agreement for the people of the two countries, a Georgian delegation attended discussions on the issue in parliament.

In addition to this agreement, the two countries signed a document on military and technical cooperation, which obliged Georgia to assist Azerbaijan both in the military-technical and ammunition supply fields and the training of military personnel. The mentioned



agreements began to be enforced upon signing. The weaponry, ammunition and supplies purchased from Georgia considerably improved the logistics of Azerbaijani troops, as well as the forces deployed along Azerbaijan's northern border to counter the Denikin threat. A special commission was established under the Azerbaijani ministry of defense to receive the military supplies delivered from Georgia. Major-General Tlekhas was put in charge of this body (10). The commission worked effectively in Tiflis in July 1919. It collected a significant amount of military and technical supplies representing great importance for Azerbaijani armed forces, as well as food, and dispatched it to Azerbaijan.

On July 11, two special trains full of weapons and ammunition were dispatched from Tiflis to Azerbaijan. The consignment included 12 hilltop cannons, 10 boxes of explosives for the cannons, 1,500 rifles, as well as a lot of spare parts for these weapons. Another batch of weaponry, sent in on July 19, included eight light cannons, 16 explosives for the cannons, 1,500 more rifles, more spare parts for cannons and rifles, medicine and medical supplies worth 12,885 Rubles, as well as topographical items. On July 21, another consignment, which was mainly comprised of engineering and fortification supplies, was dispatched from Tiflis to Ganja (11).

Italian documents about I. Usubov's delegation

From July 18, the commission started receiving a large number of kitchen cars and four-wheelers. Moreover, a lot of spare parts for cannons, worth 20,000 Rubles, were provided by private individuals. An advance payment totaling 80,000 Rubles was made to the Georgian side for the bulk of supplies. An agreement was also reached that a part of the payment for the military supplies to be purchased from Georgia would be made with oil (12).

As part of their successful military cooperation, Azerbaijan and Georgia jointly established the Military Council on January 20, 1920. This body was to ascertain potential enemies of the two countries and review the location of warfare, draw up appropriate defense plans, oversee the combat readiness of the armed forces of both countries, and prepare plans on the deployment of troops. It was to include two representatives on each side and one of them was to be elected co-chair of the council upon mutual agreement of the two governments. High-ranking officials of both republics could be invited to the Council's meetings. Enforcing the strategic and military-technical decisions passed by this body was obligatory for both parties. If necessary, working meetings could be held to mull implementation of the previously made decisions; the procedure of enforcing the decisions made during such meetings could be determined in due order. In case differences of opinion emerged in the course of such sessions, the issue causing the differences was to be reported to the heads of government and agreement was to be reached to that end with their participation (13). A. Shikhlinsky and M. Sulkevich were elected members of the Council from Azerbaijan, while Georgia was represented by N. Odoshelidze and Kutetaladze (14).

In accordance with the signed bilateral documents, Azerbaijani servicemen were sent to Georgia to undergo military training. Six officers were to take part in aviation training, while four officers and 10 soldiers were expected to study radiotelegraphy. At the same time, a large number of Georgian officers filled the ranks of ADR's army. For example, 14 of them were admitted to the Azerbaijani army according to the order issued by the minister of defense on July 15, 1919 alone (15). The process of drafting Georgian servicemen was continued afterwards.

The drafting of Georgian officers amid a shortage of local military personnel in Azerbaijan was of great importance for the formation of national troops. In com-

pliance with the bilateral agreement, Georgian officers could serve in the Azerbaijani army but they were not obliged to take part in the battles waged in Azerbaijan's territory. The agreement stipulated that Georgian officers were entitled to retaining their privileges, including the ranks, service records and related perks. Taking into account their work experience, a number of Georgian officers were appointed to high-ranking positions in the military. For example, Lt.-Col. Svanadze was appointed commandant of the city of Ganja. Col. Chkheidze became commander of the 4th Guba Infantry Regiment and was later appointed principal of the Military School. Five ethnic Georgian generals served in the ADR army: Maj.-Gen. Amashukeli, Maj.-Gen. Sisianov, Maj.-Gen. Purseladze, Maj.-Gen. Kargaleleteli and Maj.-Gen. Chkheidze. Kargaleleteli and Chkheidze were the last ADR generals to have been granted this senior military rank by a decision of the Azerbaijani government.

Each of the mentioned Georgian generals played a great role in the formation of the ADR army. Defense Minister Samad Bay Mehmandarov said while assessing the military service of Maj.-Gen. Amashukeli, "According to the application filed by Maj.-Gen. Amashukeli, the acting cavalry division commander and chief of the division headquarters, he is stepping down on his own free will and will be dismissed from the troops. Gen. Amashukeli, who was appointed HQ chief of the cavalry division seven months ago, at a time very intensive army-building work was underway, in fact, served as the division commander for more than five months. Gen. Amashukeli, who is proficient and fond of military service, was distinguished by his vigor and resoluteness in meeting the requirements of service in military units and greatly contributed to doing this job. Bidding farewell to Gen. Amashukeli with a sense of disappointment, I sincerely thank him for his excellent and efficient service in the military" (16).

Georgian military specialists were also invited to Azerbaijan on numerous occasions to provide counsel on specific issues. For example, Georgian generals Kutalashvili and Takayshvili arrived in Baku in late August 1919 at the request of Lt.-Gen. M. Sulkevich (17). These experienced generals were to render assistance in setting up the defense system of Baku. A plan on defending the city and the surrounding areas was drawn up with the oversight of Gen. Takayshvili. The plan consisted of two parts. The first part envisaged the defense of the Absheron Peninsula, while the second one was aimed at organizing work on engineering and fortification


related to Baku's defense. The area where the fortification work for the Absheron Peninsula was to be carried out stretched from Badamdar to Masazir Lake. A host of seven defensive props was to be set up along this route. The other defense line was expected to cross the Bilajari-Boyuk Shor-Razin Mountain and the Ahmadli Heights. Placing a group of six defensive props along this route was envisaged (18).

In November 1919, Gen. Takayshvili returned to Baku. Takayshvili reviewed the implementation of the plan on the defense of Baku and the Absheron Peninsula. The Georgian general prepared and submitted his recommendations to the leadership of Azerbaijan's Ministry of Defense to speed up and improve the defense work.

A group of Georgian officers was contributing to the engineering and fortification activities aimed at reinforcing the country's northern borders. Staff-Captain Tsereteli was in charge of the project. Tsereteli prepared a very detailed report on progress in those activities and submitted it to the Ministry of Defense.

In an effort to facilitate the solution of the domestic problems of Georgian officers, Azerbaijani Minister of Defense S. Mehmandarov issued an order on February 28, 1920 to increase the amount of compensation for mission trips. The Defense Ministry leadership sought to ensure that these officers worked more efficiently in Azerbaijan without any difficulty. It is worth mentioning that a great deal of work was done in a short time span with the aid of these officers and a very powerful defense system was created in Azerbaijan to counter the Denikin menace.

One of the priorities in international activities of the Azerbaijani government and the Ministry of Defense in particular was establishing military cooperation with developed European countries, which was aimed at boosting the country's defense capabilities and military supplies. Successful forging of such international cooperation would allow the republic to acquire the much-needed supplies of high quality. One of the steps taken in that direction was an attempt to establish military cooperation with Italy. An ad hoc commission headed by the commander of the 2nd Infantry Division, Gen. Ibrahim Agha Usabov, was set up for this purpose. According to the instructions issued by the Defense Ministry leadership, Gen. Usabov was to be delegated to Italy where he would negotiate acquiring artillery, fortification, medicine, clothing and other items required for the ADR army with the Italian ministry of defense. The parties agreed that 25,000 sets of military uniforms would be purchased and delivered from Italy to Azerbaijan (19).



The commission led by Gen. Usabov left for Italy in October 1919. In late October, the commission members arrived in Rome and immediately launched negotiations with the Italian ministry of defense. Once the commission representatives learned that the latter was unable to provide the goods meeting Azerbaijan's needs, they started negotiating with privately owned Italian companies. Talks were held with local companies in November 1919 in the cities of Genoa, Milan, Turin, Verona and Trento. As a result, an agreement was reached with Kiono, Gello and Co. A total of 20,000 sets of military uniforms stored in the company's warehouses were made available. The company's executives pledged to allocate an additional 5,000 sets of uniforms shortly, as well as deliver 500 sets of clothing for generals and officers to the Azerbaijani side. On November 23, 1919, an agreement on the purchase and sale of these items was signed between the Azerbaijani delegation and the company. In accordance with the deal, the military clothing was to be dispatched from Turin, Italy to Baku on December 20, 1919 (20). However, timely dispatch of the purchased military supplies from Italy was not possible due to the complication of the socio-political situation in this country. As a result, the consignment sent from Italy reached its destination shortly before the fall of the Republic and was taken over by the Bolshevik army, which had intervened in Azerbaijan (21).

Information is also available regarding attempts to forge ties with the command of the Entente forces in order to upgrade the ADR's military logistics. According to that data, the head of the delegation sent to Italy, Maj.-Gen. I. Usabov, contacted the Entente command while in Europe. The military brass of the Entente countries did not decline to collaborate with the ADR Ministry of

Italian documents about I. Usabov's delegation

Defense. However, it turned out that most of the military clothing stocks in the Entente warehouses had been distributed among Romanian, Czech and Polish armed forces. Since just a small number of military uniforms remained in those warehouses, which would have been insufficient to meet Azerbaijan's needs, Usabov's delegation continued its trip onward to Italy (22).

Following the Defense Ministry delegation's departure for Italy, Minister S. Mehdmandarov discussed purchase of weapons, ammunition and military uniforms from England at a meeting with Col. Stokes, the political representative of the British High Commissioner in Baku. Referring to the Usabov-led delegation's visit to Italy, Mehdmandarov noted during the meeting that all agreements that could be reached with Italy might be revised if England agreed to cooperate with Azerbaijan militarily (23).

ADR Foreign Minister Fatali Khan Khoyski, who met with Col. Stokes on January 7, 1920, requested providing arms and military uniforms to Azerbaijan. Stokes welcomed Azerbaijan's request and further raised the issue of rendering such assistance with the British authorities (24). The British military and political leadership deemed it possible to assist the Azerbaijani military in order to prevent a Bolshevik incursion into the South Caucasus. Consequently, the British military command ordered the commander of the country's naval forces in the Mediterranean to supply the missing spare parts for shells in the Caspian Sea bay (25). Following the appeal of the Azerbaijani delegation, which was attending the Paris Peace Conference, the Entente's supreme military council mulled the issue of providing military aid to the South Caucasus republics, including Azerbaijan, in January 1920. A relevant memorandum submitted to the supreme military council stressed the need for providing food and military assistance to these republics. At the same time, a suggestion was made that the weaponry and ammunition slated for the Denikin army be delivered to the South Caucasus republics (26).

In February 1920, British military representatives visited the South Caucasus, including Azerbaijan, to determine the current needs for military assistance. Having collected the required information, they returned to their home country via Istanbul. Following the talks, a number of private British companies announced their intent to cooperate with Azerbaijan. Members of the Azerbaijani delegation, which attended the Paris Peace

Italian documents about I. Usubov's delegation

Conference, said that the head of the Azerbaijani military delegation, Gen. Usubov, who was in Italy at the time, should be delegated to England to sign relevant agreements with those companies and further determine which military supplies were required. Nevertheless, aggravation of the military situation in Karabakh from February 1920, Azerbaijan's ending up in a state of war, as well as the military-political developments ongoing in the region hampered the signing of such documents on military cooperation (27).

Following respective negotiations, French officers, Maj. Nonancour and Navy Lt. Deforge, visited Baku March 9-12, 1920 and explored the possibility of providing military assistance to Azerbaijan. The French representatives looked into ways of invigorating the Azerbaijani naval forces. They said in the reports sent to their superiors that revitalization of the Azerbaijani Navy required sending in military instructors along with providing military supplies (28). However, the entry of Bolshevik troops to Azerbaijan in late April 1920 ruled out the previously planned military cooperation with European countries. ♦

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

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
HISTORY OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE AZERBAIJAN REPUBLIC IN 1918-1920 DOCUMENTS

In the process of research devoted to the 100th anniversary of the establishment of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan, we were further convinced of how deep the traditions of our country's statehood are. Azerbaijani states that have replaced each other over the centuries played a prominent role in international relations not only in the region, but also in the continent and at times even in the whole world. Even such a short period as 23 months of the existence of the first democratic republic in the Muslim East – the ADR, is reflected in thousands of documents currently stored in various archives around the world – from London to Istanbul, from Washington to Moscow. The photos published below form only a small part of the documents reflecting the ADR's foreign political activity. We are sure that further research of this area will reveal many more secrets of the first republic.

From the editorial team








Le Président de la Délégation géorgienne.
Signé : M. Tschauder.

Le Président de la Délégation d'AZERBAÏDJAN:
Signé : M. TOFTCHIBACHEV.



آذربایجان اجتماعی شورا جمهوریت
امور خارجیه خلق قومیسارلیقی

A. C. C. P.

НАРОДНЫЙ КОМИССАРИАТ
по
ИНОСТРАННЫМ ДЕЛАМ

1920

№

ДИПЛОМАТИЧЕСКИЙ ПРЕДСТАВИТЕЛЬ
А.С.С.Р. В ГРУЗИИ

2-й СЕКРЕТАРЬ

Дипломатическому Представителю Азербайджана

В виду переживаемого момента делегация Азербайджана лишен газмен-
иста выехать в Тифлис для принятия участия в работах Закавказской Кон-
ференции течка Наше Правительство просит первоначально Конференцию в Баку
встречи течка № 2840

МИНИСТР ИНОСТРАННЫХ ДЕЛ

С этого верн

H. H. Soysalibacheff

PRESIDENT DU PARLEMENT,
PRESIDENT DE LA DÉLÉGATION DE PAIX
DE LA
REPUBLIQUE D'AZERBAÏDJAN

Je suis offensé
de votre très obligeant
et humble serviteur
Signé H. H. Soysalibacheff

Am directeur de la
Délégation azerbaïdjanaise

Claridge's Hotel



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1920

CAUCASUS.

Future of Nakhichevan.

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آذربایجان سوسائیتی شورا جمهوریت
خارجیه اشترست خلق قومیسارلیقی
گورجستانیه کی میاسی منتظر

A. C. C. P.
НАРОДНЫЙ КОМИССАРИАТ
по ИНОСТРАННЫМ ДЕЛАМ

ДИПЛОМАТИЧЕСКОЕ ПРЕДСТАВИТЕЛЬСТВО
Азербайджанской Советской Социалистической
Республики
в Грузии

19 Сентябрь 1920
№ 374
Тифлис

R. de Odell
8.5.20



ДИПЛОМАТИЧЕСКИЙ
ПРЕДСТАВИТЕЛЬ
Грузинской Республики

в Азербайджане.

25 Июня 1920 г.

№ 30

Гор. Баку.

THERE IS NO AZERBAIJAN WITHOUT KARABAKH



AZERBAIJANI DISTRICTS occupied by Armenia and dates of their occupation

Asgaran – 1991	Khojaly – 26.02.1992	Agdam – 23.07.1993	Gubadli – 31.08.1993
Hadrut – 1991	Shusha – 08.05.1992	Kalbajar – 02.04.1993	Zangilan – 29.10.1993
Khojavand – 1991	Lachin – 18.05.1992	Fuzuli – 23.08.1993	
Khankandi – 1991	Agdara – 07.07.1993	Jabrayil – 23.08.1993	