Baku, Azerbaijan – 1 October 2009

Thank you,

First of all, I must tell you that this is not only my duty, but pleasure to participate in NATO-related and Euro-Atlantic security related conferences. Let me warmly welcome all colleagues and guests here at this conference, the importance of which casts no doubt, we are pleased and more than happy by contributing to the process launched most recently by the Secretary General of NATO of elaboration of strategy document, I think, the most important document within NATO’s hierarchy after the basic Washington Treaty. 

From the point of view of Azerbaijan, this process should not be limited only within the framework of the Alliance and this is very positive development that the process of strategy elaboration has been decided to be inclusive and partner nations are invited not only as a participant but also as a host country. We all know that we are just at the beginning. We know that we should anticipate series of seminars and conferences dedicated to elaboration of different ideas and concepts which then successfully, I hope, will be continued by development of   certain drafts submitted to Secretary General who then will produce his own draft. So we are just at the very beginning. But nevertheless we are now probably well prepared to take responsibility for strategic concept which is urged and actually demanded by time. Many have noticed that already for 10 years probably NATO has not revisited its strategy. And this exercise is very timely. It is not a strange coincidence that at the very same time we, within the format of OSCE, are witnessing another strategy elaboration, related to so-called European security architecture or European security treaty. From my point of view, these two processes are coinciding not only in time but they also have very strong intertwining connection.  

And here we have to,  first of all, take  questions of whether strategy of NATO for Euro-Atlantic security would be self-centric, would be based on centrical approach of NATO’s central role in the system. Or shall it step beyond that, in a way understanding the system as a wide, flexible coordinated geometry with different countries and different institutions and responsibilities involved.

That systemic approach to Euro-Atlantic security concept is the most important for my country and for some others. Because statutory difference between us and the Alliance members puts us in a very sensitive situation. Especially when we consider the issues of security in the current circumstances in the Euro-Atlantic security area. My assumption is that during this exercise we have to thoroughly consider and elaborate on all the possible elements and aspects of security, including crises and including the conduct of the operations by NATO, especially in Afghanistan.

Lessons of those crises and operations should be helpful in further increasing the effectiveness of NATO and of operations. Cooperation between NATO and non-member states, first of all Euro-Atlantic partners and partners from other regions is, I think, the most crucial in terms of providing so-called cohesiveness and indivisibility and integrity in the Euro-Atlantic security area.

We have been through different developments in last 20 years. We have seen some new memberships. We have seen some successful developments. But we have seen also some crises and some shocking developments. Last events of 2008 August demonstrated that no one is safe and in some cases Washington Treaty is not helpful and partnership is not really sufficient to provide security. So, new kind of development is needed here. Partnership for Peace can no longer be considered as just a mechanism of getting prepared for membership. We have to step beyond the initial idea of January 1994 of PfP. And we have to take this partnership as already existing fabric of relations and further develop and further build up new kind of relations between NATO and non-member states which for different reasons, be it geopolitical, be it economic or political, be it time-related or geography-related reasons, are not able to join NATO. We have to address the relations between institutions within the Euro-Atlantic area.

We are deeply concerned about a possible resurrection of bloc-to-bloc relationship in Euro-Atlantic area. And once that happens that would put countries like Azerbaijan in a very tricky situation. A vacuum may come out of such development. In that case security policies of these countries will need urgent support and back-up. From that point of view, the most effective back-up will be, first, elaboration of security guarantees for non-aligned European and Euro-Atlantic countries. Such a security guarantee recognized and committed to by all states will be at least serving kind of legal background for independently project able, predictable and responsible security policy. At the same time, relations between institutions, as we see them today unfortunately, should be less competing. Although I understand difficulties among these institutions.

We are observing competing building-ups, competing military installations etc. We observe also, a competition in competencies and in involvement in different crisis areas. We observe critical attitudes to a conduct by one institution from the side of another institution. We see critics on the issue of effectiveness and that sometimes creates political difficulties especially for non-member countries. Azerbaijan knows this by its own experience because we contribute to Afghanistan military operations of ISAF, we have been in Iraq, we have been in Kosovo, for political reasons we have withdrawn our forces from Kosovo. But we have been then increasing our forces in Afghanistan. So, we are there today and we think we have to be part of process in a more active way.

Another issue is the future cohesiveness of Euro-Atlantics and effectiveness of security system to be built up with the participation of NATO members and non-member states. We largely are dependent on, not only political unanimity, as I have said earlier, shared goals, as we understand the goal of strategy of NATO, should be not simply stressing, proving and making possible the most central role of NATO within Euro-Atlantics, but the goal should be security of Euro-Atlantics itself. The goal should be creating a system which will be helpful and supporting such a security.

Once shared goals and shared understanding on this are present we can speak about political unanimity. Once security guarantees are in place and once certain legislative development are provided, then we can speak about legal unanimity and approximation, but that should be backed up by practical interoperabilities as well. Once there is no sufficient level of military and military technical cooperation and exchange between Alliance members and partners based on trust, and once there is no sufficient level of exchange on intelligence and exchange of technologies, then I think the practical interoperability will be not sufficiently strong and in the end we should have more tests of August-strained relations and then I think we should not reach stated purpose of the strategy.

My belief is that practical interoperability should be based on policy of not only open doors for membership, but open doors for partnerships policy, and partnership is not yet so welcomed in different ways. Partnership is viewed more as way for preparedness to membership. But we have to be ready for new circumstances.

Major conceptual misgiving or mistake was just last year. Overestimation of current stance of affairs within the process of potential enlargement, and lack of preparedness of NATO members to meet such a challenge when legal framework is not yet created. So difficulty in this process is coming out both from legal insufficiency, from out datedness of PfP doctrine, as well as of from yet not sufficient level of practical interoperability.

Also we have to increase quality of activities within the PfP because the crisis in August 2008 has put natural logical questions, with regard to efficiency of reforms, efficiency of conceptual advice, efficiency of that consultative input which have been recognized so valuable and in time of test by real life did not prove itself.

Security communities of some countries including mine are ready to reconsider and to review together with NATO international secretariat and together with NATO countries’ experts the opportunities of conceptual development of partnership and reform policies. Such an exercise together with NATO on revealing the pillar conceptual elements of security reform policies proposed so far by NATO will be useful. Learning the lessons of August 2008, learning the lessons of Afghanistan and other the most recent and the most self-evident crises and experiences accumulated by NATO countries should be translated into practical steps in order to improve effectiveness of national security systems in the countries, not only members but partners as well. So, this would be my final remark before I thank all of you for attendance and for listening to me. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.